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This thesis explores violence against migrants at the Croatian-Bosnian border, with the focus on 
migrants’ everyday sites and practices. Whilst the rich literature discusses structural violence against 
migrants at the EU’s borders, it omits to consider direct and concrete daily acts of violence. We also 
know little about violence against migrant men and violence at the latest transit spot at the Croatian-
Bosnian border. 
This thesis addresses this research lacunae while drawing upon eight months of participant 
observations in makeshift camps in Velika Kladuša (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and 68 interviews with 
migrants. It questions diverse forms of violence against migrants and seeks to what degree and in 
which ways this violence impacts their everyday practices. In addition, it asks whether and how the 
dominant assumptions about race and gender impact migrant men’s experiences of violence and how 
this violence is circumscribed by the historico-political context of the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
The findings suggest that direct border violence against migrants – border attacks, takes place 
alongside more structural violence - border administrations and withdrawal of aid in makeshift camps. 
Yet border violence is also at work in migrants’ everyday practices where violence is least expected; in 
private sites, where violence is routinised and leaves no visible marks, but has power to harm or kill. 
This thesis also argues that Arab Muslim men, in this context at least, are most commonly subjected 
to border violence due to the dominant racialized and gendered assumptions about (migrant) men of 
colour as dangerous and in need of violent interventions. Yet violence against migrants is also enforced 
and concealed by the Western dominant imagination of the Croatian-Bosnian border as a line between 
peaceful Europe and the violent Balkans. However, migrants challenge such assumptions by their own 
meaning makings of this geographical location upon their experiences of solidarities and violence here. 
This thesis nuances knowledge on border violence as a complex phenomenon that functions as an 
ongoing daily process across months or years rather than singular episodes that come and pass. By 
doing so, it demonstrates the importance of bringing direct but also taken-for-granted practices in 
research analysis of violence to develop an understanding of how violence is experienced and made 
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1. Introducing border violence in everyday life at the border.
1.2: Dangerous routine in the games, push-backs and makeshift camps. 
‘Please, tell me, what I should do? It would be better if I died in Afghanistan than everyday dying here 
inside’, Azim told me, an Afghani man in his late forties, and remarked that ‘physical pain at the border 
does not matter too much. But being at the border everyday matters.’ While talking to me, Azim was 
sitting in a corner of a former slaughterhouse, where me and other volunteers were providing a few 
provisional showers to all living in the Trnovi camp. This makeshift camp was made of wooden 
structures and tarpaulins that were all called heima (tent in Arabic) by its inhabitants, whom most were 
Arab Muslim men. Its location was in a small border town Velika Kladuša (Kladuša) lying in the north-
west of Bosnian border with Croatia (see Figure 1), surveyed by helicopters, drones and border patrols. 
Figure 1 The map indicating the location of Velika Kladuša. It also shows the places of migrants’ 
departure for games and the push-back points (Augustová & Sapoch, 2020). 
Here, hundreds of migrants were daily attempting to walk across the EU’s doorstep when playing 
games, as they generally call unauthorised border crossings. However, they were mostly pushed back 
to Bosnia by the EU’s border patrols, like Azim. Migrants returned tired, with blisters on their feet after 
a days or weeks long walk, some with black eyes and footlong bruises from police baton strikes, broken 
bones and bleeding wounds. When walking around Kladuša, one can immediately notice the hallmarks 
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of such violence, when meeting predominantly injured young men who go on with their daily life at 
the border; eating together around a fire in the camp, showering, praying, laughing, waiting for 
rumours about new game returnees, getting ready for another game, or sitting overdosed by tramadol 
in a town-park. Violence seemed to be hidden in all these routines and daily interactions, which 
became taken-for-granted at the borders but would not pass what normal was considered elsewhere. 
As this fieldwork diary excerpt indicates, this thesis is about border violence against migrants at the 
Bosnian-Croatian border. Here, I have conducted an eight-months long research, drawing upon 
ethnographic methods, employed in my role as a volunteer in the Trnovi camp. I used daily participant 
observations of migrants’ life in makeshift camps and border sites and conducted 68 semi-structured 
interviews with migrants within an activist-led border violence monitoring project. By doing so, I 
questioned diverse forms of violence and how they made meaning of it in their day-to-day life at the 
border. 
I found that migrants talked about countless manifestations of violence that were direct, concrete and 
systematically present, while trying to play the games and being pushed back from Croatia to Bosnia. 
The game and push-back were the key definitions of border violence from migrants’ own 
understandings and for this reason, they are used in this thesis as vectors to the detailed strategies 
and experiences of direct violence (Galtung, 1969). Yet this violence continued through more structural 
forms (Galtung, 1969) in informal camps, where the migrants struggled to heal their injuries due to the 
withdrawal of medical and material aid, poor hygiene and pollution. 
However, the more deeply involved I became in the life at the border, I was coming to an essential, yet 
often academically side-lined understanding that border violence was not taking place as singular 
episodes that came and passed. Instead, this violence was omnipresent and an ongoing process in the 
everyday life, one that was under constant transformation. As Azim like many others pointed out, 
‘being at the border everyday matters’ in understanding of violence rather than dramatic expressions 
of violence and somatic pain alone. In line with this, this thesis explores the everyday practices and 
social relations in which direct and structural violence takes place in the background and seek how the 
day-to-day events matter in understanding this violence. 
To analyse violence as everyday phenomenon, I follow feminist scholars (Acuto, 2014; Enloe, 2011; 
Fernández et al., 2017) and explore violence at work where it is least apparent, in migrants’ private 
sites and concrete routine practices and relations. By doing so, I problematise how these taken-for-
granted practices turn violence into an intimate process that organises each minute of the day. This 
makes violence an everyday phenomenon that harms people equally or even in greater power than 
direct attacks and structural forms of violence (Mishra, 2018; Scheper-Hughes, 1992) yet is often 
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unnoticeable, as this thesis will show. This approach allows me to nuance knowledge on violence in 
more comprehensive and subjective ways across extensive time when many migrants daily live in 
border violence for months or years, which constitutes the thesis’ major contribution. 
Whilst learning about violence at the border, I was also trying to be aware of the local context where 
this violence took place and to whom it targeted. This is vital given that the Bosnian-Croatian border 
is commonly represented within the EU’s political narratives as the border where the violent Balkan 
and Islam end and the peaceful Europe and Christianity begin (Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004). For this 
reason, I additionally explore in this research whether and how the local context of the Bosnian-
Croatian border organises migrant’s experiences of violence. Finally, those migrating through this 
border are also deeply racialized and gendered due to the pre-existing hierarchies in this location. I 
noticed that those most commonly subjected to crude forms of violence were particularly migrant 
Arab Muslim men. This made me question if the dominant assumptions about gender and race as 
migrants’ visible differences impacted their experiences of border violence. 
I consider the above research objectives fundamental yet note how they go unasked in the existing 
literature or are examined only partially. Research seeking complex forms of violence and how these 
are experienced by different groups of migrants in their everyday life at the border is still puzzling, 
upon which I identify the thesis’ research questions in the following section. 
1.2. Identifying the thesis’ research puzzle and questions. 
This thesis understands violence as a complex phenomenon that involves more actors than only 
state(s), but particularly migrants’ who are subjected to this violence and whose experiences must be 
brought to the debate on violence. This approach differs from a rich academic literature that explores 
violence against migrants from state perspectives, questioning diplomatic and humanitarian 
negotiations, administrative procedures (Andersson & Keen, 2019; Norman, 2020) or sci-tech smart 
borders (Bigo, 2014). Instead, I place migrants’ everyday practices at the centre of this study to 
highlight the consequences of these punitive migration and border measures on the migrants’ life at 
the border. 
Whilst scholars (Davies et al., 2017; Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015) show ample evidence that 
migrants are pushed to take unauthorised border crossings and are exposed to dangerous situations 
as the result of EU border controls, they mostly restrict conceptualisation of this violence as structural. 
This approach omits considering direct and concrete encounters of infliction of harms on migrants in 
their daily life. This is a problematic gap that needs to be filled given that we know that direct violence 
daily takes place at land borders along the ‘Balkan Route’ (Augustová & Sapoch, 2020; Isakjee et al., 
2020), but we know only little about this form of violence in academic literature. To address this 
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research lacuna and contribute towards more comprehensive understandings of border violence at EU 
border, I pose the following research question: What are the forms of violence against migrants along 
the EU’s external border with Bosnia? 
To answer this research question, this thesis shifts attention from sea to land borders of the so called 
‘Balkan Route’, particularly the border between Croatia and Bosnia, which marks migrants’ entry point 
to the EU from the latest transit spot in the region. By doing so, this thesis firstly aims to broaden our 
knowledge on border violence beyond geographical location of sea routes, that prevails in academic 
papers (Iliadou, 2019; Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Secondly, this point of entry into the 
research rejects understanding of violence from state-centred and institutionalised (humanitarian, 
diplomatic, technological) perspectives and thus avoids limiting a definition of violence against 
migrants exclusively to structural and passive forms. Instead, this thesis suggests considering both 
direct and structural forms of violence, which both take place at EU external land borders but are 
overlooked. 
This is a theoretical approach to the analysis of violence proposed by Johan Galtung (1969), who argues 
that direct and structural violence function in causal relationship to one another, and thus are worth 
pursue in such a relationship in a research. Galtung’s thoughts on violence often came to my mind at 
the Bosnian-Croatian border, where I observed direct attacks to step in when more structural forms of 
violence, such as closed legal border channels, crumbled or when the withdrawal of aid in the camps 
by state authorities disabled the migrants’ to heal their injuries from the attacks. To this end, Galtung’s 
(1969) theory is a useful analytical approach to grasp both fast and dramatic occurrences inflicted with 
brutality and further track how the border violence functions beyond a hit by police baton but 
continues in the life makeshift camps. 
However, Galtung (1990) further argues that outbreaks of direct and structural violence are enabled 
by the assumptions that justify violence in certain places, such as the ‘Balkan Route’, where I have 
conducted my research. Numerous scholars (Bird et al., 2020; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004; Rexhepi, 2018; 
Todorova, 2009; van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020) who deconstruct the ‘Balkans’ in literature, popular 
culture, politics, and most recently, migration policy suggest that the term Balkans has been stranded 
in the highly problematic and discriminatory cultural dichotomy between West and East, Christianity 
and Islam, and peace and violence. The dichotomy enforces and legimises diverse precarities of people 
living in the former Yugoslavia and outside of it. It would be strange if this context did not have an 
impact on violence against migrants at the Bosnian-Croatian border today, yet, such analysis is missing. 
For this reason, I suggest taking into an account how the context of the Bosnian-Croatian borders 
impacts diverse forms of violence against migrants – also the direct and the everyday encounters of 
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violence, which are generally understudied. In line with this, I pose the further research question: To 
what extent does the local context of the Bosnian-Croatian border organise migrant’s experiences of 
violence? 
As pointed out previously, this violence does not only happen in specific location but also targets 
specific groups of migrants, who were mainly Arab Muslim men. But why are men prioritised in this 
research when women are portrayed in the existing literature as the main victims of gendered violence 
(Crenshaw, 1991; Shepherd, 2007)? I know that migrant women also experience border violence. 
Whilst the women’s subjection to violence is also tragic and needs attention, I found through 
observation this violence to appear more randomly in contrast to dozens of men daily reporting 
extensive abuses at the border, which were used against them in more systematic and brutal patterns, 
as I show in Chapter 7. These encounters made me to think about how the dominant assumptions at 
this border about masculinity and race galvanised the everyday life in violence.  
While intersections of race and gender were questioned in the existing research on violence against 
migrants along the ‘Balkan Route’ (Milivojević, 2018), this has not yet been documented and 
contextualised with the focus on migrant men and their everyday encounters of violence. This is even 
more fundamental to explore given that this migration literature (Milivojević, 2018), like most studies 
on violence in diverse contexts (Crenshaw, 1991; Shepherd, 2007), consider racialized women as most 
affected by border violence. Drawing upon this, why are not migrant women more subjected to 
violence in the context of Bosnian-Croatian border? Why men? To address this and contribute to an 
emerging literature on male migration (Griffiths, 2015; Turner, 2019b; Suerbaum, 2018) and its 
intersections with racialized violence in the EU (Isakjee et al., 2020), I pose the following research 
question: Do race and gender organise experience of border violence, and if yes, how? To analyse this 
question and unwrap how identities, such as Arab Muslim migrant men, organise one’s experiences of 
border violence, this thesis draws upon literature (Butler, 2004a; Carr & Haynes, 2015; Crenshaw, 
1991; Harris, 2000; Isakjee et al., 2020; Razack, 2004) on racialized and gendered violence.  
After exploring diverse forms of border violence, where it takes place and whom it targets, the crucial 
questions about subjective and intimate dimensions of violence remain: How do migrants act on their 
experiences of violence and make meaning about them in their everyday life at the border? How is 
their everyday – daily decisions, practices, and relations - permeated by this violence? And, how do 
these everyday events further our understanding of border violence? Whilst migrants’ own narratives 
of border violence have been the locus of various academic publications, violence in its diverse forms 
and its impact on the everyday is still puzzling (Vogt, 2018), especially in European context. Although 
many scholars discuss migrants’ journeys and experiences of violence, still, only a few ethnographic 
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encounters of human everyday suffering in its myriad manifestations is evident from these in the way 
migrants (culturally) construct it at EU border (Iliadou, 2019). This is a critical research lacuna given 
that the extensive non-migration research shows that the everyday matters in understanding violence 
as it sheds light on how violence is part of people’s social life, which gives violence its meaning and 
power (Nordstrom & Robben, 1996; Scheper-Hughes, 1992). This ethnographic approach to violence 
offers a different recognition and conceptualisation of border violence, which has not yet been 
documented and analysed at EU land borders of the so called ‘Balkan Route’. To contribute to an 
emerging literature on everyday violence in migration, I pose the last and most essential research 
question in this thesis: To what degree and in which ways does the border violence impact on migrants’ 
everyday practices and social relations? 
1.3. Thesis outline. 
In Chapter 2, l firstly outline a conceptual framework to situate my research within the existing 
knowledge on violence. I focus on the three theoretical concepts that allow me to unwrap the main 
points outlined in this introduction and guide the data analysis. Firstly, I will discuss Galtung’s (1969) 
thinking on ‘direct and structural violence’ (Galtung, 1969), which were identified as the most 
occurring forms of violence within the data. Following that, the chapter will shed light on feminist 
literature highlighting the role of gender and race with other social categories in violence (Butler, 
2004a; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000). Then, looking into social dimensions of diverse forms of violence 
against specific groups of migrants, the chapter moves to an anthropological stance on violence 
through the theoretical lens of everyday violence by Scheper-Hughes (1992). The conclusions will then 
provide a rationale for how these theories provide a solid foundation to build upon in analysing 
everyday border violence against the migrants at the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
The thesis will then proceed with Chapter 3, which explores violence against migrants along the 
European Union’s borders. It will begin with the literature that approaches violence against migrants 
from the top - using state(s) and their technologies as the starting point. Following that, the chapter 
will move to the scholarly work examining border violence from the bottom, via migrants’ own 
experiences of this violence, while moving across sea and land to the EU. Narrowing the focus into 
even more detailed encounters of this violence, I will then shed light on an emerging literature on 
‘everyday violence’ in migration, which is however scarce in European context. In order not to omit 
migrants’ individual differences, I will further review the literature discussing how the dominant 
assumptions about gender and race matter in border violence. In the final part of this chapter, I will 
draw conclusions from this literature and situate my research in the existing canon. 
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Chapter 4 contextualises the research by placing the contemporary border violence against migrants 
in a historical and political context of the ‘Balkans’ and its existence within the EU’s foreign policy. The 
chapter will pay attention to the literature deconstructing the term Balkans in diverse fields, including 
violence and migration policy field. It will also outline the most recent developments of migration 
across SEE, leading to the latest transit point in Bosnia. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis will detail the methodology and ethics that guided the data collection process 
for this study. It will firstly explain the rationale behind using ethnographic research tools and militant 
research employed in my role as a volunteer in Bosnian makeshift camps. The chapter will then move 
onto the discussion of specific research choices that are presented in chronological order, when 
entering, living in and leaving the fieldwork, detailing the process of participant observations and 
interview data collection. To discuss methodological opportunities and challenges of these methods, I 
will in greater detail reflect on my research site and access, possibilities of collaboration with 
participants and reciprocity among us, and how I navigated our diverse positionalities. Whilst ethical 
issues are presented throughout the chapter, I will discuss them more closely in the final part. 
In Chapter 6 I move from the theoretical to the empirical. In this first data chapter, I examine migrants’ 
narratives and my participant observations upon my arrival and life in Kladuša, while trying to answer 
the research question: To what extent does the local context of the Bosnian-Croatian border organises 
migrant’s experiences of violence? To answer, I firstly focus on the migrants’ arrivals to the Bosnian-
Croatian border and shed light on how they narrate and make meanings of their new passage here 
through their experiences of violence. I will then seek how these narratives fit within the Euro-centred 
imagination of Bosnia as ‘violent other-Europe’ (Bird et al., 2020; Rexhepi, 2018), in contrast to Croatia 
as ‘liberal-EU state’ (Isakjee et al., 2020) to discuss how these organise migrants’ experiences of 
violence in Kladuša. Moving from here, I will question how the past war conflict in Kladuša influences 
solidarities among the local residents and the migrants that stand against violence coming from the 
other side of the border – Croatia. Finally, I will discuss the major transformations from solidarities to 
violence against migrants across time, as driven by macro political pressures on Bosnia for the EU 
integration. 
Chapter 7 moves the focus from the places of violence to the subjects crossing these places and 
subjected to various border measures: the migrant Arab Muslim men. It will thus explore the research 
question: Do race and gender organise experience of border violence, and if yes, how? To answer, I 
will discuss how so-called single men are constructed in migration as ‘fake refugees’ and a ‘threat’, in 
contrast to brown-skinned women and children. I will then shed light on the outcomes of these 
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frequent assumptions, demonstrated on the men’s subjection to direct violence. By doing so, I seek 
how gender and race, as migrants’ visible differences, shape their experience of border violence. 
The following two chapters then address the research question: What are the forms of violence against 
migrants along the EU’s external border with Bosnia? Firstly, Chapter 8 examines direct violence 
through the migrants’ testimonies to shed light on their experiences of direct and crude attacks, mostly 
by police in Croatia; its patterns and transformation across the four seasons of the year. Chapter 9, the 
focus is the more subtle and structural forms of violence. Here, I will discuss the administrative 
procedures within push-backs as well as the life in makeshift camps, where the withdrawal of state 
organised aid take place by the site of solidarities and rich social life. While doing so, I will detail this 
structural violence and question how it functions in a causal relation with direct and brutal attacks, 
which all permeate migrants’ everyday lives at the border. 
This leads us to the last empirical chapter, which addresses the degree and ways in which the border 
violence impact on migrants’ everyday practices and social relations. To answer, I will discuss the 
migrants’ meaning making of violence across extensive time spent at the border and question how 
they see themselves, as dependent upon their daily choices, practices and intimate relations impacted 
by violence. By doing so, I wish to show how violence takes place in these ordinary things and practices, 
which are harmful yet leaves no visible traces. I will also outline how the violence in everyday life gives 
rise to new harms, when migrants often turn to alcohol and drug abuse, self-harm and inter-communal 
fights. 
Finally, Chapter 11 will outline the major conclusions that can be drawn from the five empirical 
chapters, while trying to answer what they tell us about diverse forms of border violence, people – 
Arab Muslim single men - subjected to these, and their everyday life at the border. I will question what 
these aspects explored in this thesis mean for our knowledge on border violence in Europe and beyond, 




Chapter 2: Conceptualising violence in everyday life at the border. 
2.1: Introduction. 
Whereas violence is obvious to all (Arendt, 1970) and everyone knows it exists (Farmer, 2009), it is a 
deceptively difficult concept to pin down (Davies, 2019). Over one hundred years ago, Georges Sorel 
pointed out: ‘The problems of violence still remain most obscure’ (1906 in Arendt, 1969, p 11). Since 
the Second World War, some of the most prominent thinkers (Arendt, 1970; Benjamin, 1996; Derrida, 
1967; Fanon, 1961; Foucault, 1975) have started scrutinising the knowledge of violence in depth, when 
investigating its meanings, origins, legitimacy, means, efficiency, and ends across various socio-political 
contexts. However, the definition of what violence is and how it is experienced remains complex and 
impossible to grasp with a single universal theory. Whereas numerous theoretical and philosophical 
concepts shed light on certain aspects of violence, Keane (2004, p 30) argues that relying exclusively 
upon one of these theories is dangerous: ‘Theories and typologies of violence can be fatal for the 
imagination, in that they lull their users into a false sense of certainty about the world.’ Thus, what is 
rather useful than using a singular typology of violence, as Galtung (1969) notes, is to indicate 
theoretically significant dimensions of violence that can lead to thinking, research and, potentially, 
action, towards the most important problems. 
In line with Galtung (1969), the thesis conceptualises the empirical data using a framework that 
acknowledges diverse types of violence that I observed as the most significant at the Bosnian-Croatian 
borders and then, considers their impact on people’s everyday lives. To do so, it was inspired by the 
literature on Galtung’s (1969, 1990) ‘vicious violent triangle’, literature highlighting the role of gender 
and race with other social categories in violence (Butler, 2004a; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000), and 
scholars viewing violence through the lens of everyday (Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Scheper-Hughes & 
Bourgois, 2004). In this chapter, I am going to discuss these three relevant theoretical approaches to 
situate my research within the existing knowledge in the field. 
By bringing together the three theoretical approaches from this literature, this thesis firstly seeks to 
understand how violence operates along European borders, in its major forms identified within the 
thesis’ data: direct attacks and structural border rules (Galtung, 1969), which I elucidate in the first 
section of this chapter. Nevertheless, this violence is racialized and gendered, when targeting specific 
groups of migrants, as I observed on violence against Arab Muslim men along the Bosnian-Croatian 
border. While Galtung (1990) considers how race and gender as social constructs predict violence, 
other scholars (Butler, 2004a; Carr & Haynes, 2015; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000; Razack, 2004; 
Touquet & Schulz, 2020) discus in greater detail how the pre-existing racial and gendered cultural 
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hierarchies impact on one’s subjection to violence. This thesis takes inspiration from this literature on 
race and gender in violence but uses insights from this work to nuance our understanding of border 
violence against Arab Muslim migrant men, which remains underexamined at the EU’s borders. It is 
thus the conceptualisation of violence as direct force and structural inequality that are legitimised 
against ‘other’ (racialized and gendered) humans, which the following section will shed light on. 
Moving the discussion further, the chapter then outlines how the concept of the everyday (Scheper-
Hughes, 1992), which opens up for more inclusive understanding of different forms of violence in daily 
actions, but remains underexamined in migration along European borders. It explains how the 
everyday is used in this thesis, allowing us to underscore mundane and concrete practices and the 
subjective values and ideas undrelying these, and how these matter in understanding of violence. In 
line with this, this thesis pays focal attention to migrants’ daily choices, rituals, routines and social 
relations to border violence that embed border violence as a complex phenomenon. 
At the end, I will discuss how the everyday concept of violence together with Galtung’s and academic 
works on gender and race in violence provide a solid foundation to build upon in analysing border in 
this thesis. 
2.2: Conceptualising violence: structural inequality, direct force, and cultural 
legitimisation. 
Firstly, this thesis draws on the work of a Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung, whose thinking was 
chosen to navigate the complexities of violence across its direct as well as structural forms, which both 
take place in migration along European borders, yet their intersections have been neglected in 
academic analysis. While a great number of migration studies utilised Galtung’s structural violence 
(Davies & Isakjee, 2015; Davies et al., 2017; Igonin, 2016; Martínez et al., 2014; Menjívar & Abrego, 
2012; Milivojević, 2018; Schneider et al., 2017), almost none paid attention to Galtung’s concept of 
violence as a whole, proposing three super-types of violence: structural, direct and cultural violence. 
As this section will argue, the diverse forms of violence function in symbiosis and consequently impact 
on ones’ everyday life, which Galtung’s thinking highlights, which I also observed at the Bosnian-
Croatian borders. 
Thus, putting migration studies and Galtung’s conceptual framework into a more fruitful dialogue with 
each other allows for more comprehensive insights on how migration and violence inter-sect (Bank et 
al., 2017). In line with this, I argue that Galtung’s concept of violence offers the most adequate starting 
point to analyse diverse dimensions of violent border measures that proper daily social processes at 
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the Croatian-Bosnian borders. What follows is the clarification of Galtung’s definitions of violence and 
the discussion of differences and similarities in diverse forms of violence. 
2.2.1: Structural violence. 
Galtung (1969) firstly focuses on structural violence, when resources in a society are unequally 
distributed, and the power to decide over the distribution is also unequally distributed. Galtung 
suggests that structural violence requires a group of people to intentionally monopolise their resources 
in the way that violence becomes present in the system. Albeit, in his later work with Höivik (1971), 
Galtung admits the inability to see all actors involved in structural violence as it functions through long 
and highly ramified causal chains, in which actors remain anonymous. Consequently, no perpetrators 
are identified, leading to their impunity. From the abstract and mysterious ‘structure’, therefore, stems 
the power of structural violence. I will return to the issue of the meaning of ‘structures’ later on when 
discussing direct violence1, which is symbiotic with structural orders enforced directly by concrete 
individuals on the ground. Importantly, Galtung (1969) further discusses the result of structural 
violence, when human beings are reduced in their biological capability instead of being directly killed. 
This means that people on the bottom of society may be so disadvantaged and exploited that they 
starve or waste away from disease or are left in a permanent state of misery (Galtung, 1990). 
When illuminating structural violence, one cannot omit the notion of power, which resonates broader 
discussions on violence, including in migration studies. As Brambilla and Jones (2020) argue, border 
making represents the first and most important means by which the state exercises power over people, 
often including the use of violence. Yet power is troublesomely controversial (Lukes, 2004). It can be 
positive and liberating as well as negative and restrictive (Diken, 2004, 97). Moreover, in some 
languages, one expression combines semantically violence and power, such as the German word 
Gewalt (Ghasssem-Fachandi, 2009). This raises questions of the theoretical distinction between power 
and violence, and more importantly, whether the concept of power matters in the understanding of 
violence in this thesis. 
Arendt (1970, p 35) suggests that while the previous political theorists perceived that ‘violence is 
nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of (legitimate) power’, the distinction between 
power and violence needed to be drawn to grasp meanings of diverse specific phenomena. Arendt 
(1970, p 52) wishes to show with these theoretical distinctions that violence was an instrument that 
could be justifiable but not legitimate for the power of the state. Wolff (1969) points out that power 
is the ability to make and enforce decisions, while violence is the illegitimate or unauthorized use of 
 
1 Ibid, Chapter 2.2.2, p 12. 
12 
 
force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others. Thus, violence distinguishes itself from 
power by its instrumental character (Lukes, 2004). 
Following such theoretical distinctions, this thesis seeks to understand how border violence against 
migrants is used in diverse instrumental forms (direct/structural/everyday) and how this violence is 
experienced and understood by migrants. For this reason, this thesis follows the concept of violence 
rather than power to avoid an understanding of violence through decision making and shift the 
attention to state perspectives rather than migrants who are at the centre of this thesis. Yet the 
concept of power echo in the discussions about the unequal power relations classifying racialised and 
gendered groups of migrants as less worthy or unworthy (Bourgois, 2004; Butler, 2004b; Crenshaw’s 
(1991), the power embedded in the humanitarian and surveillance industry in refugee camps (Maestri, 
2017; Rozakou, 2019), and in the notion of structural violence when it denominates the power to 
decide over unequal distributions of resources in a society (Galtung, 1969). 
Migration scholars, such as Bank et al. (2017), also follow the concepts of Galtung’s broad 
understanding of border security in understanding violence, rather than power, and argue that can be 
useful as it requires us to consider the various levels and actors involved in violent processes in 
migration. Igonin (2016) elaborates on this and suggests that the concept of structural violence allows 
us to encompass migration politics as a source of structural deprivation in European modern society, 
which turns to apathy and withdrawal of resources for migrants. Such a structural violence approach 
has been omnipresent in migration to Europe since 2015, when violence shifted from humanitarian 
care and control (Foucault, 2000) towards an emphasis on containment through violence and the 
withholding of such care (Andersson & Keen, 2019). For this reason, structural violence needs to be 
highlighted in the contemporary border violence analysis. 
Numerous scholars found insightful patterns of structural violence in migration: in laws closing legal 
border crossing options (Schneider et al., 2017), or disruption of unauthorised border crossing routes 
at sea, when the state(s) let people drown (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). The existing 
research also encompassed the same structural violence patterns in migrants’ informal camps, where 
migrants are denied aid (Umek et al., 2018). As the result of this ignorance, migrants are kept without 
sufficient provision and in poor living conditions, leading to their hunger, illness, and extensive bodily 
harms (Davies et al., 2019). Some authors argue even further that the state keeps migrants alive but 
in a state of injury, death worlds and intense cruelty, eventually inflicting death, manifesting 
‘necropower’ (Davies et al., 2017; Mayblin et al., 2020; Mladenova, 2019), which construe structural 
violence at borders.  
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However, borders and camps are not only spaces of the living dead and control, but also of social life 
(Rygiel, 2011; Sigona, 2014), which I observed along Bosnian-Croatian borders, where closed legal 
border crossings and limited aid in camps were omnipresent in migrants’ everyday lives, besides other 
forms of violence. For this reason, the analysis of structural violence proves useful in this thesis’ 
research context. In support of this argument, other studies conducted beyond the European and 
migration context argue that Galtung’s concept of structural violence allows us to draw the lines 
between one’s physical illness, poor health, and death with social, economic and political fault lines 
(Fassin, 2011; Farmer, 2003; Martínez et al., 2014; Scheper-Hughes, 2004; Vogt, 2018), which I also 
found present in the refugee camps. For this reason, Galtung’s understanding of structural violence is 
useful here to comprehend how harms of migrants are intentionally inflicted and hidden through 
various layers of state’s neglect at the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
For Galtung (1969), structural violence was the crucial concept to analyse when developing his theory, 
triggering a shift of scholarly focus from more obvious and brutal forms of violence, which is however 
problematic in migration research today. Galtung (1969) wished to revolutionise thinking about 
violence by pointing to structural silent and slow harms, which occur undramatically in contrast to 
direct and visible forms of violence, which traditional conflict research had predominantly focused 
upon at that time. However, the contemporary migration research seems to make the opposite 
mistake to traditional conflict studies. A great many migration scholars drew upon Galtung and 
conducted fascinating research on structural violence but omitted to highlight direct violence that 
many migrants navigate around EU borders. I find this problematic given that I daily encountered direct 
police attacks against migrants, which together with other forms of harms construed the everyday 
social fabric at the border. In line with this, this thesis will follow further Galtung’s thinking on direct 
violence. By doing so, it aims to show that these two dimensions of violence – structural and direct - 
are deeply intertwined. To this end, I argue that structural violence and direct violence, require mutual 
analysis, as I discuss in greater detail in the following section. 
2.2.2: Direct violence. 
Galtung (1969, p 169) discusses direct violence, which is according to him present when ‘means of 
realisations are not withheld as in the case of structural violence, but directly destroyed by an actor’. 
The direct violence is physical when one actor of a group intentionally hurts a human being(s) 
somatically, to the point of killing, driven by the aim to lock out a person from a territory. Galtung 
(1990) further argues that direct violence is also the destruction of one’s things and environment as 
the consequence of these destructions may be harm to a person. In line with this, personal violence 
can be either focused on one’s anatomy, directly and quickly damaging her/his body, using various 
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tools from a physical body to all kinds of arms. It can be also focused on one’s physiology, such as 
denial of air, water, food, medical attention or movement through detention (Galtung, 1969). The 
direct violence can be therefore an event that is registered immediately and changes quickly (Galtung 
1969) or it may be a process resulting in slow intentional harms and killing (Galtung, 1990). To this end, 
violence does not always need physical contact with one’s body to cause harm. As Galtung argues, 
threat of physical violence is also violence as it conveys intentional human action to harm and causes 
psychological distress (Galtung, 1969). 
Migration research (Davies & Isakjee, 2015; Igonin, 2016; Martínez et al., 2014; Menjívar & Abrego, 
2012; Milivojević, 2018; Schneider et al., 2017) often analyses violence as structural violence - 
separated out from direct violence. However, Galtung (1969) problematises the distinction between 
direct and structural violence, which are deeply interconnected and require symbiotic analysis. Both 
forms of violence concentrate direct and personal actions of human beings, although they use different 
means; Galtung (1969) argues that structural violence has indirect means as there is no direct subject-
object relation. Similarly, Farmer (2009) suggests that behind structures are human decisions and at 
the end of the chain of structures are also humans directly enforcing such decisions. In line with this, 
Galtung (1969) admits that there is a causal relationship between the two types of violence and rises 
theoretical concerns as to whether there is any real distinction between the two. One could not exist 
without the other as both stem from production relations, as Galtung (1969) argues. For instance, 
military and police welfare along borders use personal and direct inflictions of harms against migrants 
as produced by societal structures. However, personal norms can project into the police and military’s 
violent actions or, in contrast they can shake the structure with non-cooperation, which I also observed 
along Bosnian-Croatian borders, as showed in empirical chapters. Looking from the top down, there 
are concrete people, who mobilise individuals to use violence, albeit it is almost impossible to track 
them in a long and complex chain of structures (Galtung, 1969). 
This causal relationship between both forms of violence is fundamental as Jones (2019) argues that 
considering structural violence as mere anonymous chain – without direct actions and personal harms 
involved, is problematic as it elides responsibility for the action. This remains problematic at European 
borders, where inflicting injuries or killing migrants takes place with impunity (Border Violence 
Monitoring Network, 2020), as also the empirical chapters will shed light on. Hence, both direct and 
structural violence ought to be highlighted and considered within specific and temporal contexts to 
bring to light who carries out the violence, how it is perpetrated, and why (Jones, 2019). One type of 
violence is always ready to step in when another type crumbles: direct violence is called into an action 
to reinforce structural violence and vice versa (Galtung, 1969), and this often repeats in a vicious cycle, 
as migrants’ narratives will show. 
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To this end, this thesis derives from the assumption that structural violence functions in symbiosis with 
direct violence and ought to be analysed in such symbiosis, including migration-violence nexus 
research, which mostly discern structural violence as a separated out theoretical concept. By 
suggesting this theoretical grounding, this thesis advocates for the need to examine violence against 
migrants that ranges from hits by police batons and deprivation of food and shelter to administrations 
that hinder migrants’ movement to safety, which all take place at the border. As this thesis will argue, 
these all practices create the everyday life in violence at the border and ought to be conceptually and 
empirically grasped. 
Yet fundamental questions remain against whom this violence is used as I found border violence 
targeting particularly against Arab and Muslim migrant men. This moves the theoretical grounding of 
this thesis further when focusing on how border violence is racialized and gendered – and thus 
legitimised against those whom are at the EU’s borders socially constructed as ‘others’. 
2.2.3: Violence against ‘others’. 
Twenty years later, Galtung (1990) brought into the debate what he calls ‘cultural violence’, when 
religion and ideology, art and language, or science are used to legitimise violence in its direct or 
structural forms. Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right or invisible 
(Galtung, 1990). Similarly, the concept of symbolic violence by Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2004) 
suggests that violence is embedded in the internalised schemata of habitus and legitimisations of 
hierarchies. Bourdieu and Wacquant (2004) use the example of gender domination, where male order 
is so deeply grounded it needs no justification: it imposes itself as self-evident and universal. Galtung 
(1990) uses racism as exemplary to show legitimisation of violence. He argues that the disparity 
between white people and people of colour can be sanitised in the language of religion, such as 
Christianity over Islam or West over East (Galtung, 1972, 1990). Indeed, violence is not only legitimised 
by gender and socially constructed race, but also geopolitical locations, when some states and nations 
are considered as more violent than others (Taussig, 2004), such as countries in the Middle East and 
Africa (Kaya, 2016), where migrants come from, and the ‘Balkans’ (Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004), where 
they are migrating through to the EU. 
Cultural violence has been imminent particularly in how Europe has constructed the Orient as cultural 
and political fact (Said, 1978), particularly (migrants’) Arab and Muslim worlds. Said's (1978) notion of 
Orientalism is useful to illuminate how intellectual (science), political (colonial and imperial 
establishment), and cultural (tastes, texts, values) representations of Orient as Europe’s deepest and 
most recurring images of the Other have serious consequences. According to Said (1978), the European 
representation of the Muslim or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient, often 
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used in policy jargon. To this end, Said (1978) agrees with Galtung that culture is not politically or 
historically innocent, when he uses colonisation as the most prominent example of how the Orient 
was rendered as exotic and dangerous Other through violence. 
These encounters on how the assumptions about race and religion legitimise violence against ‘others’ 
shed light on racialization, which is an ideological process utilized to justify or explain social 
stratification, inclusion or exclusion, based on biological and cultural characteristic, such as phenotype, 
ethnicity and/or religious identity (Carr & Haynes, 2015). Racialization enables us to see ‘how colonial 
context as one where a variety of processes were at work, and that they were processes which resulted 
in material practices’ (Mills, 1996, p 126). This echoes Fanon's (1961) earlier writings about the 
legitimisation of violence against Africans, Arabs, Muslims in capitalist societies (i.e. France) through 
an atmosphere of submission and of inhibition, entangled in education and policing systems. It also 
has a basis in Foucault's (1975, 2000) suggestions that the state power of ‘make live or let die’ through 
the systems of ‘care and control’ is directed to ‘man’ at the level of species; to those who are classified 
as ‘them’, criminals, an enemy race. Today, this is observable on restricted and violent policies against 
Arab Muslim migrants in Europe who are to be feared and opposed as a homogenous ‘migrant enemy’ 
and ‘terrorist’ within the ‘war on terror’ (Bhui, 2016, 2018; Isakjee et al., 2020). This shows that 
thinking about race allows us to trace legitimisation of border violence against Others - specific groups 
of migrants - and trace how racialization have material impact on migrants’ day-to-day life at EU 
borders. 
However, different facets of the racialized being are refracted through gender (Carr & Haynes, 2015) 
when violence against ‘others’ is also articulated through racism to those associated with male/female 
gender (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Bhui, 2016). Galtung (1990) argues that the narratives of 
racialized cultures are further gendered when Arab (migrant) men are reinforced in art portraying 
oriental men as sexual and violent subjects. Also Said (1978) asserts that Arab men are portrayed as 
sexual predators, and those men associated with Islam are further rendered as undeveloped within 
the hegemonic European Christian world. This allows us to consider how border mechanisms in Europe 
makes citizen observers or even feel right broader inequalities, in which specific groups of migrants 
live or not to see the direct violence against them at borders at all (Bank et al., 2017; Igonin, 2016; 
Isakjee at al., 2020). The above listed thinkers thus emphasise social categories to illuminate how 
gender power relations and racism against those constructed as Others (Arabs, Muslims) are at play in 
violence, which I argue need scrutiny also in border violence against migrants. 
Prior assumptions about gender and race also shape one’s experiences of violence in migration  
(Pande, 2017). As many scholars (Basham & Vaughan-Williams, 2013; Bhui, 2016; Bosworth et al., 
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2018; Isakjee et al., 2020; Milivojević, 2018) suggest, migration policies are highly racialized and 
influenced by gender as demonstrated on stereotypical notions of suspicion, criminality, and inferiority 
assigned to specific groups of migrants and calling for violent order responses at borders. Yet there is 
need to develop analytical bridge between migration studies and knowledge on how social 
constructions of gender and race impact on violence. For this reason, I wish to draw upon scholarly 
work conceptualising race and gender in tandem as cornerstone of violence, upon which I develop my 
analysis of how gender and race impact on border violence against migrants along the Bosnian-
Croatian borders, as I encountered from the migrants’ narratives. 
Those analysing individuals’ categories in violence in greater detail when questioning the state of 
culture, imbued by power relations, and its symbolic positioning of specific populations in violence 
have been particularly feminist scholars. Butler (2004b) suggests that culture carries with it implicit 
norms of racial purity and gender domination when considering some lives as less lives, which is 
implicit in the questions of migration in Europe. Butler (2004b, p 25) argues that violence against those 
who are already not quite lives leaves a mark that is no mark. For this reason, Butler (2004a) points 
out elsewhere, that acts of violence against some racialized and gendered groups of populations, such 
as intra-group of migrants, are ‘nongrievalble’; they leave no empathy or pity. In migration context, 
this can be illustrated on gendered and racialized categorisations such as ‘violent and dangerous’ Arab 
Muslim masculinities, ‘victimised and imperilled’ Arab Muslim femininities framed in ‘modern’ civilised 
western subjectivities, which provides a rationale to survey and discipline Arab Muslim migrant men 
(Razack, 2004). Deriving upon this, we can analyse how border violence is legitimised and leaves no 
marks on some migrants’ bodies (Butler, 2004a), which I intend to show in this thesis. 
Other feminist scholars (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000; Mills, 1996; 
Razack, 2004; Stubbs, 2015; Yuval-Davis, 2006) agree with Butler that gender and race are two of the 
primary sites leading to various experiences and legitimisation of violence. Crenshaw (1991) shows 
that gender and race intersect with other identity categories that are most often treated in mainstream 
liberal discourse as vestiges of bias or domination, upon which violence is used against those who are 
different (Crenshaw, 1991). This means that being oppressed as a person of colour is always 
constructed and intermeshed in other social divisions - gender,  nationality, migration status – when 
these identities are constructed within the terms of specific political projects (Yuval-Davis, 2006). This 
helps us to understand how ‘others’ are racialized from different social categories (migrant, Arab, 
Muslim, men) within the EU’s border protections, upon which they are subjected to violence. Gender 
and race and other social categories are thus fundamental to explore in tandem in border violence to 
rethink the social dimension at play in everyday experiences of violence (Vogt, 2018) and move forward 
Galtung’s thinking how structural and direct violence is legitimised and concealed. 
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Whilst Crenshaw’s (1991) argues that the matter of individuals’ differences raises critical issues of 
power that go beyond violence against women of colour, only some (Carr & Haynes, 2015; Connell, 
2000; Harris, 2000; Touquet & Schulz, 2020) extended such analysis to men’s experiences of violence. 
For instance, Harris (2000) argues that gender and racialized violence does not produce only female 
victims as most victims of violent crimes are men, as shaped by cultural fantasies of race, nation, and 
gender. According to Harris (2000), cultural structures of masculinity in the West divide men along 
lines of race, as well as class, leading to gender and racial violence among men. Harris (2000) illustrates 
this on police security work in liberal democracies where white male cops use violence to overcome 
non-white male evil in the name of protection of citizens. 
I find this this theoretical thinking on race and gender in violence also useful in European migration 
context as it helps us to illuminate how border violence is used and legitimised in broader terms than 
violence against migrants as an undifferentiated human mass or archetypal refugee women and 
children (Malkki, 1996). Instead, it brings to light the powerful currents of European border police 
violence against Arab Muslim men – as gendered and racialized group, which I found to be imminent 
in the everyday at the Bosnian-Croatian border, despite their tremendous cultural, ethnic and national 
diversity (Carr & Haynes, 2015). For this reason, racialized and gendered pre-existing hierarchies in the 
context of the Bosnian-Croatian borders are included into the analysis here to articulate who is 
subjected to border violence and how racism and patriarchy shapes multiple dimensions of this 
violence. 
Yet Laurie & Shaw (2018) argue that repeated exposure and representation of violence against 
racialized and gendered people render such violence as banal and everyday, which makes harms and 
deaths against certain populations in certain places barely even marked. This leads us to the focal 
question of this thesis, trying to understand what diverse types of violence against Arab Muslim 
migrant men means in the everyday life at the borders and how the notion of everyday matters in 
understanding of this border violence. 
2.3: Meanings of violence in everyday life. 
How do we conceptualise the everyday? And why does the everyday matter in a research analysis? 
Since the late twentieth century, feminist analysts stated that ‘the personal is political’ (Enloe, 2011, p 
447) and suggested to analyse politics at work where it is at least apparent - in private sites and 
concrete and local practices (Fernández et al., 2017). This means that scholars ought to problematise 
taken-for-granted dichotomies in Western binary thinking, such as war/peace, international/domestic, 
war front/home front, perpetrator/victim, strong/weak, security/insecurity (Acuto, 2014). By doing so, 
feminist scholars called to go beyond methodological elitism (Enloe, 2011) and understand ordinary 
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and the everyday in which political and international are embodied, performed, and domesticated 
(Acuto, 2014). 
But what does make some practices everyday? Crane-seeber (2011) argues that everyday sites and 
practices are marked by the extent to which they are unremarkable, taken-for-granted, or ostensibly 
natural. Ginty (2014) adds that this also implies for the situations in violence-affected sites where what 
passed as ‘normal’ would be abnormal elsewhere. It is in the sites of the day-to-day life that people 
can see visible and concrete violence at micro level and their place of life becomes the object and site 
of political contestation (Fernández et al., 2017). Scholars have used the notion of everyday to 
understand both violence and militarisation (Mishra, 2018) as well as revolt against violence and peace 
(Ginty, 2014), demonstrating that we need to question the quotidian to understand violence. This 
shows that the notion of everyday allows us to seek how mundane rhythms and spaces can be 
reconfigured as sites where violence is produced and reproduced as well as question values and ideas 
underlying experiences of border violence (Stanley & Jackson, 2016). 
In the same lines, an American anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992; 2004) introduced  the 
concept of ‘everyday violence’, calling for exploration of a more phenomenological level of violence in 
its individual lived experiences. Similar to Galtung (1996, 1990),  Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) 
rejects a focus exclusively on the physical and dramatic aspects of violence that submerges the 
structural causes under lurid details of blood. However, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004, p 1) add 
another layer to their analysis of violence, when viewing violence as a social process in everyday life, 
and argue: 
Violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the 
victim. The social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and 
meaning. 
Indeed, we are social creatures and our cultures, social structures, ideas, and ideologies fuel violence, 
both its expressions and repressions (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). The concept of everyday 
discerns how direct and structural violence interface and permeate social processes, in which violence 
is experienced, routinised, and expected as normal part of the everyday (Bourgois, 2001). This proves 
useful to think though the relationship between broader insecurity – which direct and structural 
violence against male migrants represent - and social actions at borders. 
Hence, the notion of Galtung’s understanding of direct and structural violence is implicit in the concept 
of everyday violence, but Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) move the analysis further and 
interrogate how the vicious cycle of violence shapes people’s everyday choices, actions, and social 
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relations. This moves attention from visible wars and diverse broader struggles, which are inevitably 
present in the lives of many migrants, to what Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) consider as 
violence happening in between war and peace; a new form of terror that operates in rumours, wild 
imaginings, and daily enactments of various public rituals, and routines. 
Importantly, what the everyday focus reveals is that violent acts are not necessarily freak occurrences, 
but they are parts of normative fabric of social life, taking place in the shadow of brutal direct attacks 
or/and structural inequalities (Ferrándiz, 2004a). For instance, Scheper-Hughes (1992) in her work in 
North-east Brazil documented and analysed everyday violence as condoned and celebrated mortality 
of infant ‘angel babies’, slow starvation, disease, and other controlling processes that assault individual 
collective survival. Using the concept of everyday violence therefore enables scholars to clarify the 
chain of causality that links direct and structural violence ‘in the production of an everyday violence 
that buttresses unequal power relations and distorts efforts at resistance’ (Bourgois, 2004, p 433). 
However, what do scholars specifically seek when analysing violence in everyday? The everyday places 
the emphasis on one’s emotional and inter-subjective experiences in regard to her/his place in a 
community and the world. When observing people’s daily events in aftermaths of brutal direct attacks, 
we encounter how the direct force inverts and destroys the given, taken for granted experience of 
embodiment, casting doubt to one’s existence: ‘Am I real? Is it really happening to me?’ (Strejilevich, 
1977 in Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). Through daily events, people express how violence does 
not only cause pain, but mainly destroys their world as they know and value it, making an end of the 
bonds that constitute the community, in which their values are grounded (Lazreg, 2008; Nieminen, 
2019). The day-to-day experiences of violence make victims to adopt a new truth about themselves 
(Nieminen, 2019). Also, Fanon (1961, p 34) affirms that violence destroys one’s social values, beauty 
and normality driven by the aim to replace a certain ‘species’ of men by another ‘species’ of men. The 
everyday violence therefore offers possibility to understand how physical force and loss of bodily 
certitude correlate with terrible bouts of existential doubts (Scheper-Hughes, 2004), when the life 
stranded in border violence along Croatian-Bosnian borders is specific example of that. 
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) offers a powerful, yet surprising, argument; that such everyday 
social processes have power to destroy humans with even greater frequency than painfully graphic 
and transparent state repressions. Also, Morar-Vulcu (2015) suggests that situations that are perceived 
as ordinary common events in a given context result in extensive bodily harms or death. The diverse 
forms of violence inform, transform, and minimize each other across social space to ‘nothing special’ 
and become trivialised as the product of social processes in daily life (Henriksen & Bengtsson, 2018). 
It is the routinisation of violence and saturation of daily worlds that fuels the power of violence (Das 
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et al., 2000; Green, 1994; Vigh, 2011). Everyday life is built on frail foundations that constantly reveal 
glimpses of their capacity for violent disruption (Vigh, 2011). The routinisation of life in inequalities 
and physical attacks result in the taken-for-granted quality, which render them invisible and often 
misrecognised. However, the layer of everyday ought to be analysed to grasp the whole picture of 
what violence is as lived experience: 
Everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of normal social practices – architecture of 
homes, gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts and etc. – forces us to 
rethink broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of 
everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 
2004, p 20). 
Importantly, the vector of the everyday enables to encounter that lives in violence are not only filled 
with victimisation, hunger, pain, and exposure to physical elements, but also hope for change, love, 
and social and family responsibilities (Quesada, 2004). Closely observing violence as everyday 
therefore uncovers how deeply ambiguous social experiences of harms at borders are (Ferrándiz, 
2004a). 
2.4: Conclusion: Drawing lines between violence against Others and everyday in border 
violence analysis. 
The conceptualisation of this thesis therefore draws on Peace and Conflict Studies concept of a vicious 
violent triangle (Galtung, 1969, 1990), which highlights how the direct and structural forms of violence 
intersect and need mutual analysis. Additionally, I also bring the scholarly work on race and gender in 
violence (Butler, 2004a; Carr & Haynes, 2015; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000; Razack, 2004; Touquet & 
Schulz, 2020) and the everyday violence (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) into the analysis here. 
Such theoretical approach has been omitted in migration and violence research in European context, 
yet it allows for the examination of how diverse forms of violence against specific groups of migrants 
intersect and reinforce each other in concrete daily practices. I believe that this theoretical framework 
opens up new directions of understanding border violence as a complex, gendered and racialized 
phenomenon, consequently shaping individual’s social being at European borders. This final section 
aims to discuss how these concepts play out in the migration context along Croatian-Bosnian borders, 
where I have conducted my research. 
Firstly, Galtung’s taxonomy of violence gives insights into the ways in which violence operates, from 
its cultural and structural aspects, down to the visible and raw direct attacks and tortures (Isakjee et 
al., 2020). For this reason, Galtung’s understanding offers a useful analytical starting point to examine 
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both broader inequalities (closed border crossings and the withdrawal of state-aid in camps) and direct 
police attacks against migrants, which all take place along the Croatian-Bosnians borders. Using 
Galtung’s analysis also allows us to problematise a tight line between structural and direct violence, 
which are deeply intertwined. This is of a crucial importance given that most scholarly work on 
migration and violence focuses on structural violence and omit to highlight how the daily life in 
violence construes also direct actions. 
Galtung’s concept further provides a tool to question the logic, upon which the violence against specific 
groups of migrants is legitimised. This is of a great importance when analysing violence against Arab 
and Muslim migrant men in European context, when Said (1978) reminds us that this specific group of 
population have been historically and politically racialized as Oriental and Other to be controlled, 
which echoes in violent policies at EU borders today (Isakjee et al., 2020). Yet to further elaborate this 
analysis, this thesis also borrows from feminist work on gendered and racialized violence to establish 
and explore the pre-existing systems of domination, which impact contemporary acts of violence – 
their understanding and concealment within a dominant society. Importantly, paying attention to 
socially constructed negative meanings and consequences of categories, such as migrant, men, 
Muslim, Arab, invites us to interrogate critically the dominant discourses when seeking fuller range 
and analysis of participants’ narratives of violence. 
To this end, Galtung’s thoughts on violence together with the literature on gendered and racialized 
provide a solid starting point for analysing violent measures practiced along EU external borders, 
before seeking how violence impacts on migrants’ everyday practices and relations. As Galtung (1990, 
p 295) points out, being stranded in between the cycle of violence may lead to collective trauma, 
feeling of hopelessness, deprivation and frustration that shows up on the inside as self-directed 
aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal (Galtung, 1990, p 295). The vicious cycle of 
diverse forms of violence significantly shapes the everyday life. Yet only little migration research has 
drawn theoretical connections between Galtung’s violent triangle and the everyday life, which this 
thesis aims to address. 
By bringing the concept of everyday violence to the theoretical framework, this thesis aims to approach 
violence from the migrants’ private sites, in which structural inequalities and direct brutal force at 
borders intercept and are attributed social meanings by migrants. Ordinary in this thesis concerns 
migrants’ daily choices, routines, and relations that they experience on the daily basis at borders, which 
are influenced by broader and more visible forms of violence; whether in camp, centre of the town, or 
games, or while socialising, rebuilding shelters, showering, eating, praying, and being bored; or while 
living in communal unity or navigating interpersonal conflicts. I will question how these daily events, 
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entangled in the macro border conflict, assume a taken-for-granted quality and create new destructive 
and generative forces in the social fabric at borders. 
I argue that using the analytical vector of the everyday addresses the weakness of Galtung’s concept, 
which has been criticised as too broad when using the words ‘systems’ and ‘structures’ and neglecting 
concrete events and actors involved in violence. Instead, the thesis questions both direct and structural 
violence targeting migrants, which intersect and reinforce each other in concrete daily practices and 
relations at the Bosnian-Croatian border. By questioning everyday life, I will therefore elucidate social 
meanings of diverse forms of violence for migrants, in their own meanings. I consider the analytical 
vector of the everyday, in combination with peace and conflict studies and feminist work on violence, 
as much to offer when analysing violence, which is also at work in routine and unnoticeable practices 
and things. The analysis of violence from micro perspective and across extensive periods of time is 
commonly neglected in the literature on violence in migration and border studies, which 
predominantly elucidate macro and structural level of violence across short periods of time, as the 
following literature review will show.  
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Chapter 3: Literature on violence against migrants along the European 
Union’s borders. 
3.1: Introduction. 
Moving from the theoretical dimensions of violence, this chapter narrows the focus on violence against 
migrants at European Union (EU) external borders. The objective here is to critically review the existing 
studies in the field by discussing the topic from the top-down perspective, beginning with the state 
and its tools of border controls through to the migrants’ experiences of violence in the everyday at the 
border. In doing so, I will locate my research within the work of scholars who approach violence 
through an ethnographic lens of the everyday, which I will argue remains side-lined in the European 
context. 
 
This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on the nexus of violence and migration across the EU’s 
external borders from a vertical perspective, firstly the border externalisation and internalisation and 
then, smart borders. Here, I will question what scholarly studies, starting with the state and its 
assumption about violence, say about violent border measures and importantly, about its impact on 
migrants’ journeys across the EU’s external borders. 
 
Moving from a horizontal to a vertical perspective, the chapter then turns its attention to migrants’ 
experiences of these state(s)’ measures. The branch of studies interrogating this violence encompasses 
particularly disruption of migrants’ border crossing journeys to the EU and their subjection to the 
strategic denial of aid in (makeshift) camps, to which end migrants are exposed to harm or death. Here, 
I will focus on two major routes to the EU – sea and land. I will compare research on these two major 
transit points and question how they approach and conceptualise violence against migrants compared 
to the dominant focus on the sea. 
 
Moving the discussion into more detailed and intimate perspectives, I will then discuss an emerging 
and fundamental body of literature drawing upon ethnographic methods that questions the impact of 
violence on migrants’ daily routines and social relations. I will explore how this body of scholarly work 
enriches studies on border violence through its understanding of violence as concrete and daily 
encounters, considering diverse forms of violence as a process in everyday life. In doing so, I intend to 
show here the relevance of the theoretical framework of everyday violence (Scheper-Hughes, 1992) 
while pointing to gaps in the existing research. I will further suggest how to address this when 
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examining violence through its direct and structural forms and how these permeate the everyday life 
at the border. 
 
The chapter finishes by examining the existing research considers social constructions of race and 
gender and how these impact on the experiences of specific group of migrants. It is indeed useful to 
explore who is subjected to violence while migrating, and how this is dependent upon the pre-existing 
racialized and gendered cultural hierarchies and colonial and post-colonial European presence. I will 
specifically show how most studies focus on brown-skinned women and children as genuine ‘real’ 
refugees and victims yet omit violence against racialized migrant men. 
 
Finally, I will conclude by focusing on what we know about violence against migrants at the EU’s 
external borders from this body of literature and how diverse scholars conceptualise this violence. By 
doing so, I will track the academic blind spots and situate this study in this body of scholarly work. 
3.2: The politics of border externalisation and internalisation. 
The first pivotal approach identified by scholars in understanding border violence from macro - state-
centred perspectives, is the politics of border externalisation and internalisation. This mechanism 
stems from diplomatic and humanitarian negotiations of the EU with its wider neighbourhood to re-
delegate border responsibilities for migration in geostrategically important EU and non-EU states 
(Norman, 2020), such as the Mediterranean, Turkey, Libya and Niger (Andersson & Keen, 2019). South-
Eastern Europe (SEE) are mostly overlooked in the existing research. Yet numerous authors (Isakjee et 
al., 2020; Milivojević, 2018; Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019; Obradović-Wochnik & Bird, 2020; Stanivuković 
& Neuman, 2019; Umek et al., 2018) argue that SEE is part of extensive European border regimes and 
is expected to play an active role in establishing the EU’s external control migration apparatuses. The 
EU is directly involved in state-building with both military and/or civilian missions with the aim to turn 
non-EU countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia into ‘Europe’s policemen’, 
under the promise of ‘eventual EU membership’ (Geiger, 2016; Rexhepi, 2018). 
What border studies further show is that the EU’s border process is multiple and plural as it also 
fortifies part of its internal borders when turning some of its member and Schengen states into buffers 
(Panico & Prestt, 2019). This means that the neighbouring EU countries, such as Croatia neighbouring 
Bosnia, are expected to mark the crucial position for EU’s border controls. However, this border region 
remains under-researched, particularly Bosnia, which became the latest hub of migration and a new 
buffer zone. It is therefore likely that the politics of externalisation and internalisation, when deploying 
violence, will take place along the Bosnian-Croatian borders and so provides a rich site for fieldwork. 
26 
 
The crucial question is how the border externalisation and internalisation functions, which highlights 
the violent impact of this mechanism on migrants, through their off-shoring out of the EU to the so 
called ‘buffer zones’. Andersson and Keen (2019) argue that the so-called game of external bordering 
is commonly characterised by asymmetrical relationship, wherein the powerful partner increases the 
incentives to solve a conflict instead of participating in meaningful deliberation. This means that EU 
member states have been bargaining with wider neighbourhood readmission agreements (i.e. visa 
liberalisation, financial, technological and political support, future EU membership) (İşleyen, 2018). 
The aim is to off-shore their border controls to other states (Panico & Prestt, 2019). 
As the result of this off-shoring borders out of the EU, migrants are confined in areas in Africa and the 
Middle East, where they remain close to armed conflicts; or in marginal parts of Europe, where they 
are stranded in a vicious abuses between authorities who get political legitimacy, financial support and 
impunity for abusive behaviour (Andersson & Keen, 2019). This border process creates legal lacuna 
making EU members states not to be considered responsible for human rights violations of third-
country border security (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). In SEE, the existing research deriving particularly 
from interviews with state authorities and migrants (Ahmetašević & Mlinarević, 2018; Iliadou, 2019; 
Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019; Obradović-Wochnik & Bird, 2020; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017; Zavratnik & 
Krilić, 2018) argues that the EU’s policy deals and financial support for border militarisation has 
resulted in the confinement of migrants in camps across Greece and Serbia. However, the question 
remains how this process of border externalisation impacts upon migration in the latest hub along the 
border with Bosnia. We also know little about how these macro political processes impact migrants’ 
everyday life at borders. 
3.3: Smart borders and liberal technology. 
The second state-centred dimensions of borders and violence discussed by scholars are ‘smart’ 
borders, which emerged after the September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States (Amoore, 
2006). Squire (2011) argues that this move towards smart borders involves soft and distant border 
controls prior to travel through digital checks and visas. The aim is to reduce the time needed to 
identify suspect travellers, while also hindering the movement of unwanted migrants and criminals 
(Bigo, 2014). On the ground, smart borders mean the development of biometric identifiers, the 
storage of personal data in huge databases, technologies of surveillance, and the exchange of 
these data at the transnational level. These developments are not limited to Europe and are 




For some scholars (Amoore, 2006; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Squire, 2011), ‘smart borders’ construe  
‘symbolic’ or ‘virtual’ violence and the indirect blockage of movement, and are predicted upon the 
racial, gendered and religious profiling of individuals, as discussed previously (Galtung, 1990). In 
contrast, Menjívar and Abrego (2012) argue that these borders amount to ‘legal violence’ as 
technologies surrounding the law determine who is eligible to obtain travelling permission or 
protection is intertwined with criminal law. These studies thus suggest that smart borders use 
stigmatisation and legal rules to inflict more subtle and structural violence. 
However, Jones and Johnson (2016) assert that smart borders also inflict direct and physical violence 
that has the power to kill when using border militarisation - unmanned aerial vehicles, surveillance 
systems, military hardware, and military strategies and combat veterans. This military package, when 
threat to direct violence is embedded in a techno-scientific border approach (Kraska, 2007), is intrinsic 
to smart borders. Thus, smart border security ranges from subtle to direct use of violence, when its 
spatial extension stretches from one’s place of departure to borders of final destination, which is in 
line with the externalisation and internalisation politics discussed in the previous section. 
Importantly for this study, it is important to highlight how the smart border function in the SEE region, 
which few studies have examined. Across Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, borders are 
controlled by smart militarised projects, such as of EUROSUR2 (European Commission, 2013) and 
EURODAC3 (European Commission, 2020b). In the language of the European Commission (2013), these 
surveillance programmes are a tool to save migrants’ lives at sea and combat cross-border crimes. 
However, particularly ethnographic studies (Iliadou, 2019; Isakjee et al., 2020; Vogt, 2018) show the 
limits to this approach and how migrants attempt to avoid this surveillance system via clandestine 
border crossings, which again are deeply intertwined with various forms of violence, as the following 
section will show in greater detail. 
Also, Bosnia integrated smart border management that enabled the country to be subject to closer EU 
observation, in exchange for its citizens being granted e-passports and visa-free travel to the Schengen 
Area (Geiger, 2016). Additionally, Bosnian northern borders lie next to the European member state of 
Croatia, which is part of the EUROSUR and the EURODAC programmes. Geiger (2016) closely 
interrogates the integration of smart borders in Bosnia and argues that it involves intensified ‘filtering’ 
at the borders and more rigorous checks and surveillance as well as the exchanges of information with 
Interpol. Smart border transition was fundamental to ‘EU-ropeanisation’ as the country did not have 
its own border guard force until 2001 (Geiger, 2016). Thus, the studies show that smart borders filter 
 
2 European Border Surveillance System. 
3 European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database. 
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out unwanted passengers and push migrants to attempt clandestine journeys, where militarised smart 
technologies once again operate to violently deter movement. We also know that smart borders 
operate along Bosnian-Croatian borders, however, almost no research connects these two points or 
examines the impact of these measures on migrants’ experiences of violence in this specific location. 
To summarise, from research discussing the two major state-focused dimensions of border 
enforcement - border externalisation and smart borders – it is clear that border controls are multi-
layered, and involve increasing numbers of states, border agents, and technologies. There is no 
singular state, institution, or structure involved in border violence as it stretches across EU/non-EU, 
liberal/authoritarian, free/controlled, and virtual/real spaces. Hence, it is impossible to identify a 
homogenous border violence approach. Rather, what is required is the re-articulation and expansion 
of sovereign authority in border security (Jones & Johnson, 2016), and therefore new perspectives into 
border violence against migrants that explores their more concrete and daily encounters. Indeed, the 
above research neglects diverse experiences of migrants moving across and living at borders, which 
will shed light on the impact of border externalisation and smart technologies. What is required is the 
consideration of everyday cross-border journeys and experiences of concrete actors present at the 
border, to which end, the following section aims to encompass the existing literature that examines 
such narratives. 
3.4: Disruption of border crossing routes: violent (in)actions. 
Research that moved its locus from a vertical to a horizontal perspective, that is from states to the 
experiences of  migrants, shows that the border mechanisms discussed so far do not solve or prevent 
migration, but only make it unauthorised and dangerous (Andersson & Keen, 2019). Migration no 
longer takes place across traditional urban crossing points but rather across less heavily policed seas, 
deserts, and mountains to avoid detection by state authorities (Cornelius, 2001; Coutin, 2005; Reece 
Jones, 2019; Martínez et al., 2014). These journeys to the EU most commonly take place in 
overcrowded rubber dinghies across the Aegean and Mediterranean seas (Albahari, 2015) or walking 
across the ‘Balkan Route’ while being chased by patrols and dogs (Augustová, 2020), often with 
support of people smugglers (Maher, 2018; Tinti & Reitano, 2018). Whilst moving without 
authorisation or hiring a people smuggler, migrants are subjected to law and border enforcements, 
towards which they have limited protection (Coutin, 2005). The existing literature gives a rich insight 
into border enforcements and violence, which aims to disrupt, stop or slow down migrants’ movement 
particularly across sea routes, as the following section will explore. Nevertheless, land routes across 




3.4.1: Sea routes. 
The majority of studies examining cross-border journeys focus on landscapes that have the most 
obvious harmful potential, which are in Europe the Mediterranean and the Aegean seas. The lack of 
access to food and drinking water on a boat, the danger of strong winds, tides, and currents, and the 
generally inhospitable nature of drifting at sea have been examined by numerous scholars, who argue 
that state authorities and border agencies use this hostile environment to disrupt migrants’ arrivals in 
European shores (Amoore, 2006; Andersson & Keen, 2019; Cuttitta, 2018; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018; 
Schindel, 2019; Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Weber & Pickering, 2011). To this end, some (Stierl, 2018; 
Weber & Pickering, 2011) argue that migrants’ most common form of death in Europe, which happens 
when hundreds of thousands are drowned at sea, are not accidents nor unforeseen causalities. Some 
authors (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015) argue further that death became a norm through 
which migration has been governed at sea, as similarly suggested by those exploring violence at the 
U.S.-Mexico borders (Doty, 2011; Martínez et al., 2014; Squire, 2017). 
Whilst some frame this violence as perpetrated by humans, another way of examining this violence is 
through space. For Schindel (2019, p 4), the harms in dangerous landscapes construe ‘slow spatialised 
violence’; border enforcement is outsourced and displaced to environmental and topographic ‘non-
human’ agents. In contrast, other literature suggests that violence is possible at sea as a consequence 
of human agency in these types of border securitisations and humanitarianism, like when pushing 
boats with migrants back to places of their departure (Andersson, 2014; De Genova, 2017; Garelli & 
Tazzioli, 2018; Stierl, 2018), banning rescue missions (Cuttitta 2018), or the criminalisation of rescue 
operations at sea (Andersson & Keen, 2019; Squire 2017). 
The naval push-back missions and banning of rescue operations intertwine military and humanitarian 
rationales (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018; Stier, 2018). Whilst deaths and harms at sea serve as a deterrent, 
they also give an opportunity to argue that preventing migration to Europe is humanitarian because it 
reduces the frequency of drownings (Andersson, 2014) and to combat human smuggling (Jones, 2019). 
These are indeed the rationale of broader externalisation politics and smart borders approaches, under 
which sea operations belong. Visible harms and deaths are then blamed on the hostility of the 
environment, which provides policy makers a moral alibi when declaring the deaths as ‘natural causes’ 
(Doty, 2011, p 607) or portray them as self-afflicted (Isakjee et al., 2020). 
This violence and the deaths at sea have been predominantly conceptualised as structural violence, 
indirect violence and violent abandonment (Cuttitta, 2018; Murray, 2006; Squire, 2017; Stierl, 2018), 
when border authorities let migrants die (Foucault, 1975). However, Vaughan-Williams (2015, p 65) 
criticises this and argues that understanding violence as ‘indirect’ force is insufficient as it implies 
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passivity that belies the active nature of attempts to abandon migrants. While border agencies (e.g 
Frontex) facilitate the abandonment of migrants, as Vaughan-Williams (2015) argues, drownings are 
the result of various acts by EU border security authorities, which had primarily stripped migrants from 
protections and thus placed them at greater risk of death. In support of his argument, recent studies 
encounter the rich efforts of NGOs and activist-led initiatives trying to save migrants from drowning 
(Stier, 2018). This goes against assumption that the state has the power to manage migrants’ lives and 
death through abandonment at sea. Therefore, it is these various actions and processes on the ground, 
perpetrated through either direct or indirect means, by individuals or institutions constitute a border 
crossing environment, that constitute violence directed towards migrants (Schindel, 2019). 
3.4.2: Land routes. 
In contrast to migratory routes across the sea, research examining violence experienced by migrants 
crossing land routes to the EU is limited. These are SEE countries that serve as the second major transit 
route to the EU, and as pointed to previously, they function as a fundamental geostrategical location 
of the border of the EU’s externalisation politics and smart borders. Since these natural landscapes 
have less power to kill in contrast to seas and deserts, violence against migrants here functions in more 
direct and crude forms (Isakjee et al., 2020). The disruption of movement across land is enacted 
through the establishment of restricted legal border transit (Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Umek et al., 2018), 
building razor-wire fences, smart border surveillance technology, and military border patrols (Nedoh, 
2017). However, Jones (2019) argues that when border walls and laws fail, physical violence is often 
the only means left to prevent undesired movement. In support of Jones, recent studies show how 
land routes became characterised by highly repressive and direct violent border practices within chain 
push-backs4 (Arsenijević et al., 2018; Isakjee et al., 2020; Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019), yet this is marginal 
to recent research. Also, the existing literature does not examine the detail of direct attacks and their 
transformation as well as the impact on migrants. 
However, recent activist-led border monitoring (Augustová & Sapoch, 2020; Border Violence 
Monitoring Network, 2020; Forensic Architecture, 2019; No Name Kitchen, 2020) and non-
governmental organisations research (Amnesty International, 2019; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017; 
UNHCR, 2019b) show that the involuntary nature of push-backs is demonstrated by the use of direct 
violence against migrants by state authorities, which ranges from damage of personal items to physical 
attacks. Encounters of violent push-backs were also reported by activist groups along the land borders 
between Greece and Turkey (Forensic Architecture, 2019), and along the Turkish-Syrian border (Panico 
 
4 The definition of push-back is in more detail discussed in Chapter 4, Ibid, p 49. 
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& Prestt, 2019). Whilst there have been encounters of push-backs along the sea routes from Spain to 
Morocco (De Genova, 2017) and from Italy and Malta to Libya (Panico & Prestt, 2019; Vaughan-
Williams, 2015), the research does not indicate the common use of direct violence along these sea 
borders. This can be explained by the natural environment of the sea, which itself is dangerous and 
results in harms and deaths (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015), and hence, substitutes for direct 
attacks by border guards. 
Thus, the non-academic research sheds light on the different forms of violence taking place along land 
borders in contrast to the sea. It shows that land borders are marked by restricted (externalised) 
polices, biometrics, and high-tech surveillance, which are closely interconnected with the direct 
violence against migrants. This is the case particularly across the EU’s borders with Serbia and Bosnia, 
and external ‘buffer’ zones in the EU’s wider neighbourhood. In line with this, the use of direct force 
needs to be closely interrogated as it is a fundamental part of the disruption of migration land routes. 
Yet only little academic research has examined direct violent push-back strategies across South-East 
Europe. 
For instance, using visual participatory research along the Serbian borders with Croatia, I have argued 
elsewhere that border spaces across South-Eastern Europe convey multiple forms of violence, 
including the direct attacks, which need to be grasped from migrants’ own viewpoints to understand 
their journeys (Augustová, 2020). Also, our previous research with Isakjee et al. (2020) considers both 
crude direct attacks along the Croatian-Bosnian border and abandonment of migrants in the Calais 
camp, and highlights how violence across the EU has multiple manifestations. Similarly, El-Shaarawi 
and Razsa (2019) take into account direct violence in Serbia and Slovenia while examining the dynamics 
between activists and migrants who together claimed free movement and shape the infrastructure of 
the Balkan Route. However, these studies did not question how this violence is inflicted through 
detailed police strategies and how migrants experience and respond to these. Only a small number of 
health-oriented studies (Arsenijević et al., 2017, 2018) closely examined direct violence against 
migrants across land routes to the EU and these highlight the health costs of this violence rather than 
its meanings for migrants. 
In line with this, I argue that the extensive interrogation of direct violence (its strategies, patterns, 
experiences, transitions across time) against migrants and its impact on everyday life have not been 
examined, which this thesis seeks to address. Also, Brambilla and Jones  (2020) point out that the 
relations between borders, violence, and conflict remains particularly salient but understudied, lacking 
attention to the multiple tensional processes that converge at the border (which direct violence is part 
of). In contrast, some scholars even argue that direct violence is not fundamental to scrutinise as these 
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capture mere dramatic occurrences (Jeandesboz, 2014; Žižek, 2009). However, activists and 
researchers both identify the need to examine direct violence as increasingly used along the EU’s 
external land borders.  As Vogt (2018) argues, through injury and trauma migrants embody the 
histories that propel and circumscribe their movements and signify that these are not random, 
anomalous, or an unintended consequence of militarisation, which I argue below is also the case for 
European borders. 
This academic spot is the more remarkable given that the instances of direct violence in migratory 
transit have been examined in spaces where direct violence is conventionally assumed to belong. 
Scholars investigated the direct attacks on refugees in Angola and Tunisia (Cuéllar, 2005) Tanzania, 
Guinea and Rwanda (Malkki, 1996), Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Onoma, 2013), 
Kenya (Newhouse, 2015), Libya (Andersson & Keen, 2019), Bangladesh (Akhter & Kusakabe, 2014), 
Thailand and Cambodia (Cuéllar, 2005), Lebanon (Khalili, 2008; Shahid, 2002), and Mexico (Vogt, 2018). 
This extensive migration research in non-European contexts recognises that violence includes discreet 
acts of physical force against the person, which become articulated with the policing of spaces of 
borders. Drawing upon this, I argue that migration studies along the EU’s borders also must 
acknowledge such a multiple dynamic of violence and their everyday impacts, in order to correct the 
concealment of direct violence in western liberal territories, where violence is conventionally assumed 
not to belong (Isakjee et al., 2020).  
3.5: Violence in camps: from care and control to abandonment and interventions. 
As the result of the disruption of migratory routes, migrants move across the territories of EU and non-
EU states, and from camp to camp, which are vital spaces of contemporary migration and violence 
(Davies et al., 2019). This section aims to review the literature examining transit camps along migratory 
routes to the EU in its both formal and informal settings. It further aims to question how the existing 
studies analyse and understand violence against migrants here and how attention to the camps will 
nuance our understanding of border violence. 
Social scientists commonly conceptualise camps for migrants as state-run institutions5, where the state 
controls people under the auspices of their care and welfare (Foucault, 1975). Numerous scholars 
(Agier, 2011; Beznec et al., 2016; Jones & Johnson, 2016; Malkki, 1996; Newhouse, 2015; Peteet, 2005; 
Rygiel, 2011; Verstrate, 2001) argue that violence is perpetrated against migrants in the camps through 
technologies of humanitarianism and its correlation with military and political powers. The camps 
manage and contain cross-border migrations of needy people (Darling, 2009; Diken, 2004; Newhouse, 
 
5 i.e. detention centres, transit camps, reception centres, one stop centres. 
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2015) through what Jeandesboz (2014, p 2) also calls ‘capture’. These institutions are commonly 
established in abandoned locations  (Verstrate, 2001) and in strategic points of buffer zones (Umek et 
al., 2018). Such spatial segregation limit and control migrants’ agency (Johnson, 2015) and prevent 
their movement onwards (Umek et al., 2018). Martin et al. (2019) further point out that many refugee 
camps in Europe were transformed from former Nazi concentration camps, military barracks and 
prisons. The presence of barbed-wire, police and military remains, for instance in refugee camps in 
Greece and Serbia, which adds to the spatiality that keeps every aspect of refugees’ lives in custody 
(Iliadou, 2019; Umek et al., 2018). 
Agamben discusses the worst possibility of the camp as an exceptional space which produces bare life 
or homo sacer; the rightless and speechless individual, who can be killed at any time. Notwithstanding 
the influence of Agamben’s work, his work fails to acknowledge the complex interplay between the 
social, the spatial and the political in the camp (Sigona, 2015). Indeed, there are multiple and 
interacting actors governing the camp, including state, NGOs and human rights groups (Maestri, 2017). 
The camps thus do not only produce violence but also solidarity and political co-existence (Maestri & 
Hughes, 2017). 
This critique of Agamben became crucial particularly within the recent studies of camps across Europe, 
which consider that the camps are not only state-run institutions and migrants are not mere rightless 
and speechless victims. Instead, scholars (Davies & Isakjee, 2015; Koptyaeva, 2017; Mudu & 
Chattopadhyay, 2017) argue that migrants on their journeys commonly avoid state-run camps and 
establish their own makeshift camps, where they seek to create an autonomous and socially included 
life. 
Large makeshift camps emerged in Calais (France) popularly known as ‘the Jungle’ (Rygiel, 2011); 
Madrid (Spain), the squat ‘Palacete Opado’ (Martínez López, 2017); and Rome and Trieste (Italy) 
(Roberta Altin, 2017). Since SEE is a fundamental passage to the EU and buffer zone (Stojić-Mitrović & 
Vilenica, 2019; Obradović-Wochnik, 2018), makeshift camps have been on the rise across cities, 
border-zones and strategic transit hubs there (Jordan & Moser, 2020). Dozens of squats emerged in 
Athens, such as the ‘City Plaza’ and the ‘SquatBo’ (Greece) (Koptyaeva, 2017), in an old railways station 
warehouse ‘Barracks’ in Belgrade (Serbia) (Obradović-Wochnik, 2018), and the ‘Idomeni’ makeshift 
camp along the Greek-Macedonian border (Martin et al., 2019), and numerous smaller ‘jungles’ at the 
border crossings from Serbia to Croatia and Hungary (Umek et al., 2018). Makeshift camps also 
appeared in Bosnia, but due to their recent emergence, did not attract so much academic attention 
(except Hromadžić, 2019; Isakjee et al., 2020). 
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Whilst migrants escape from biometrics and surveillance techniques in makeshift camps, in fact, many 
have no other option than to reside here due to the limited capacity of state-run camps (Umek et al., 
2018). To this end, Davies et al. (2019) suggest that makeshift camps commonly emerge via the state’s 
inaction. For this reason, Martin et al. (2019) argue that makeshift camps are co-existent, 
complementary and symbiotic with state-run camps. This symbiosis is also demonstrated by makeshift 
camps being established inside/around state-run camps, such as in Moria (Greece) (Iliadou, 2019). 
Taking into account the state withdrawal of aid as one of the main source of harm for migrants, 
violence in camps is conceptualised as violent inactions (Davies et al., 2017; Schneider et al., 2017) and 
violent abandonment (Davies & Isakjee, 2015), which in Galtung (1969) refers to as structural violence. 
However, the existing research further shows that makeshift camps are in constant interplay between 
the state’s abandonment as well as intervention (Martin et al., 2019). This means that state authorities 
tend to enforce the camp’s temporary status by abandoning their populations with the provision of 
minimal or no services, but also control migrants through incarceration, deportation, and police 
harassment (Martin et al., 2019; Rygiel, 2011). These actions are often justified by state authorities as 
stopping migrants from invading public spaces  (Altin & Minca, 2017). Migrants are then (forcibly) 
relocated to state-run camps, the only ‘proper’ spaces for finger-printed asylum seekers (Bird et al., 
2020), or are expected to leave for elsewhere (Martin et al., 2019). The aim of what scholars call 
violence actions and inactions in camps therefore aims to contain mobility and relocate (EU) borders 
further away from migrants (Altin & Minca, 2017), which is consistent with externalisation and smart 
border logics discussed previously. 
The research therefore shows that makeshift camps need to be understood as part of the matrix of 
how violence functions within border enforcements, together with disruption of border crossings. This 
is particularly fundamental at EU external borders, where makeshift camps are increasingly emerging 
by the side of other violent border measures, where both direct and structural harms occur. However, 
the literature mostly interrogates structural violence as separated-out phenomenon from direct 
violence. Such analysis fails to consider how diverse forms of harm function in the mutual relationship 
(Galtung, 1969) and effects migrants’ everyday life (Scheper-Hughes, 1992). Furthermore, despite 
extensive analysis of camps, it appears that most of the camps in Bosnia have been overlooked. To 
address these gaps, this thesis places migrants’ makeshift camps in northern Bosnia at the centre of 
the study and questions how these camps construe vital points of contemporary migration and 
violence. It specifically explores how direct and structural forms of violence intersect in the everyday 
life in the camps and how this adds to the knowledge of violence involved when crossing borders from 
Bosnia to the EU. 
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Moving from here, it is the concept of everyday that offers complex insight into how violence operates 
in diverse forms in migrants’ camps by the side and solidarities, as recognised by scholars, drawing 
particularly on participatory and ethnographic methods (Mould, 2017; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015; Rygiel, 
2011). This complex understanding, that the focus on the everyday confrontations at the border is 
significant yet generally side-lined in the analysis of violence against migrants in Europe. The following 
section sheds light on the little migration research that looks at violence as a process in everyday life. 
3.6: Movement between camps and border crossings: violence as everyday. 
The research discussed so far indicates that diverse forms of direct violence as well as structural 
violence characterise the complex experiences of what border violence is, as governed by border 
externalisation and smart technologies. Although these spatial, political, and social connections make 
the complex experience of border violence, social science studies mostly interrogate these 
independently. However, as argued in the extensive non-migration conflict research, various forms of 
violence are interconnected: they can come together, accumulate, and become part of the everyday 
life (Farmer, 2009; Laurie & Shaw, 2018; Mayblin et al., 2020; Nordstrom & Robben, 1996; Scheper-
Hughes, 1992). This raises the following questions: How are the everyday practices and social relations 
at borders permeated by diverse forms of violence? And how does the everyday matter in 
understanding border violence? This section aims to explore these questions. 
Little research exists, particularly ethnographically informed work, that questions the accumulation of 
diverse violent experiences and their impact on the everyday at the EU’s external borders. For instance, 
de Vries and Guild (2019, p 2163) suggest that moving between transit camps and border crossings 
around Europe (Greece, France) results in being ‘completely exhausted’, when fracturing and 
exhaustion became meaningful concepts in the context of spaces of transit. Also, the recent study by 
Iliadou (2019) focuses on the everyday and examines how violence manifests through practices and 
processes of everyday humiliation in refugee camps in Greece, which according to her are embodied 
in ‘waiting’. With the same focus on the everyday, Obradović-Wochnik and Bird (2020) found that 
borders and violence were imagined and represented through banal, everyday objects (posters, flyers, 
maps) used to communicate to migrant populations across the migratory pathways in Serbia and 
Greece. 
The above demonstrates an emerging research focus that traces how border violence functions in the 
everyday life at EU borders. It enriches the extensive body of literature that understands violence 
predominantly through structures discussed in the previous sections. The research of the everyday, 
methodologically approaches migrants as subject rather than objects and take seriously both their 
struggles for mobility and the detrimental effects of migration management (de Vries & Guild, 2019). 
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However, there is a research lacuna of systematic examination of how diverse forms of violence impact 
migrants’ routines and social worlds, in their own understanding and experiences across time. This is 
particularly important in transit spaces that are generally excluded from migration (violence) research, 
such as the most recent transit point to the EU (Croatia) from Bosnia, where various forms of violence 
take place. This is where this thesis makes a central contribution to the migration and violence 
research, by exploring migrants’ daily choices, routines and relations at violent borders. 
The call for research into the violence in everyday life at borders in Europe also highlights social science 
studies that question the distinction between what is commonly regarded as the routine and remarked 
violence in the non-European context. For instance, the recent ethnographic work by Vogt (2019) 
examines strategic social relations and forms of intimacy and care that migrants develop along the 
Central American migrant route in Mexico, while navigating diverse forms of violence by state and 
criminal organisations. Also, Latif (2012) in her research in Palestinian camps (Lebanon) explored how 
the multi-layered violence impacted on refugee’s habits and relationships, such as shattering familial 
order and community norms. Similarly, the research by Bhagat (2020) with LGBT asylum seekers in 
South Africa suggests that structural violence functions besides hidden, personal, and intimate forms 
of violence in everyday life. 
To this end, I argue that knowledge of violence in migration should not be bounded purely in the 
perspectives of EU apparatus, administrations, policy making, border crossing environment, and 
humanitarianism. Instead, to understand violence in migratory transit and borders, research must 
examine how border violence is organised into migrants’ mundane routines and social relations, how 
it is normalised and re-produced, and transformed across time. As Scheper-Hughes (2016) argues, the 
locus on everyday life make the concepts of violence concrete and real. In line with this, this thesis 
examines social relations and routines of the everyday caught in various types of violence along 
Croatian-Bosnian borders and contributes to the emerging literature on everyday violence in migration 
and border studies. 
3.7: Violence along borders targeting racialized and gendered lives. 
Latif (2012) also suggests that approaching violence through the everyday foregrounds further 
questions of how the role of individual locations – race and gender - in violence impacts one’s 
experiences; which this last section of the literature review aims to discuss. The social category of race 
is a vital point to analyse in violence (Crenshaw, 1991). Race has been imminent to violence against 
migrants across history, when state violence has always targeted specific ethnic and religious groups 
of migrants who were framed as a threat (Zolberg, 1983), and as rooted in racism, fascism and colonial 
practices (Fanon, 1961; Lazreg, 2008). Contemporary research shows that race in migration functions 
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to categorise illegal migration. Race distinguishes between that which government must promote and 
foster and that which can be disciplined, expelled, or even destroyed (Turner, 2015, 2018). While race, 
migration and violence have been extensively explored by scholars in hosting states (De Genova, 2016, 
2018; El-Tayeb, 2008; Turner, 2015), little research has closely questioned the relationship between 
these in a European border context, such as Bosnian-Croatian borders. 
However, Pajnik (2019, p 126) argues that borders are contested sites of struggle where the nation-
state attempts to maintain its sovereignty and a fictive ‘homogenous ethnicity’. Isakjee et al. (2020) 
also explore the spectre of race as apparent logic, under which violence operates at European borders 
and thus carries the marks of European colonialism and its civilising of ‘others’ with the use of violence. 
Also, Milivojević (2018) finds that structural violence, like the closing of borders to prevent migrants’ 
entry, was justified by linking migrants’ race at the intersection with gender. For instance, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria and Croatia, first brought in favourable treatment of non-SIA (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan) 
nationals, who were then prevented from continuing their journey (Pajnik, 2019). 
Some argue that border practices against racialized individuals are embedded in the discursive linking 
of migration and terrorist attacks from 11 September 2001 (Bank et al., 2017; Gineste & Savun, 2019; 
Mafu, 2019; Mudu & Chattopadhyay, 2017). According to Milivojević (2018), narratives of a generic 
brown Arab-Middle-Eastern-Muslim migrant as a potential terrorist proved useful as the key argument 
by government officials to strengthen the policy on non-entry to the EU, including from Serbia, Croatia, 
and Hungary (Milivojević, 2018). In this way, the word terrorist has been exploited by various powers 
to justify interventions and the use of violence against others (i.e. Arab Muslims) as self-defence 
(Butler, 2004a). For Kaya (2016), racism is a key ideological form, in which social and political 
contradictions of the neoliberal age are dealt with, including migration-related inequalities geopolitical 
orders. 
Turner (2018) and Isakjee et al. (2020) view the border violence of liberal European states as rooted in 
the history of colonialism, as well as present military interventions in migrants’ home states in the 
Middle East, while using brutality and ensuring deniability within liberal ideologies and racism. From 
this research appears the main argument that non-white migrants across borders are not inferiors, but 
are ‘inferiorised’ by the violence imposed on them by racist discourse (Žižek, 2009). However, the 
question of violence and its racial logics along land routes to the EU remain underexplored, although 
in the empirical section of this thesis it will be argued that the experiences of violence are significant 
to the everyday. 
Furthermore, previous academic work on gender and migration shows that the concept of dangerous 
migrants is not only racialized but is also distinguished from an image of genuine refugee, usually 
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exemplified by women or children (Griffiths, 2015; Helms, 2015; Malkki, 1996; Turner, 2019). This 
gender-age divide is observable also within research as most investigations into the refugee experience 
of vulnerabilities, violence and the need of protection, focuses on women and children or suggests 
that this should be the case (Milharčič Hladnik, 2016; Zavratnik & Krilić, 2018). Consequently, an image 
of the refugee excludes the able-bodied mature man, making the male an invisible figure in the 
humanitarian refugee system (Charsley & Wray, 2015). Carpenter (2005) argues further that such 
assumptions also reconstruct male migrants from vulnerable would-be refugees to false refugees, and 
makes the men undeserving illegal migrants, commonly represented as unknown lawbreakers and 
threat. 
Military research explores this interconnection in greater detail when examining how the socially 
constructed discrepancy between masculinities and vulnerabilities transforms men into violent 
objects. Myrttinen et al. (2017) argue that men’s exclusion from vulnerability interconnects with the 
category of perpetrator, rendering males’ vulnerability as something unimaginable. When men are 
examined in scientific research on violence, they are commonly portrayed as warlords, combatants 
and perpetrators of sexual violence, while suggesting women as sexual subjects and victims (Myrttinen 
et al., 2017). This simultaneously shows broader dominant notions of masculinity, which carry specific 
roles, expectations and position, in which violence is deeply embedded (Hall, 2002; Juarez, 2009; 
Seymour, 2009). Men are traditionally expected to be the protector and breadwinner, and not to seek 
help (Myrttinen et al., 2017; Schulz, 2018) particularly in war time (Helms, 2015).  
These pre-existing cultural assumptions are of great significance in migration, as Turner (2019a) 
argues. Migrant men in particular are likely to be perceived as agential and dangerous, and migrant 
women as passive and in need of empowerment through humanitarian technologies (Turner, 2019a). 
Anti-immigrant sentiments and anxieties are premised on fears of non-white migrant men as sexual 
predators (Gallo & Scrinzi, 2016; Milivojević, 2018; Vogt, 2018), as also argued by Said (1978) and 
Galtung (1990), which are part of a much longer history of Orientalism through which the West has 
viewed the East (Kaya, 2016). Turner (2015) dates similar narratives to colonial and post-colonial 
European history (U.K.), when non-white male migrants were racialized as highly sexed male subjects, 
based on the concern that white women could become the targets of penetration from these virile, 
racially different subjects. 
Academic research examining male migration is relatively scarce, but noticeably growing (Turner, 
2019a), when researchers shed light on how men’s gender intersects with their experiences of border 
violence. For instance, state authorities and aid providers often make significant efforts to prioritise 
women and children, thus excluding men from any kind of assistance such as authorised border 
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crossing or aid in camps (Arsenijević et al., 2018; Augustová, 2020; Turner, 2019b; Zavratnik & Krilić, 
2018). As the result of this, men appear more likely to attempt unauthorised border crossing and 
navigate direct police violence, as observed along Serbian-Croatian borders (Augustová, 2020). 
Similarly, adult men are more likely to risk their lives than other sub-categories of migrants and cross 
the U.S.-Mexico border (Donato et al., 2008; Doty, 2011). The consequences for them are often deadly, 
with those most commonly found to perish in a remote area of southern Arizona males near the age 
of 30 from central or southern Mexico (Martínez et al., 2014). 
The existing literature therefore shows that association of gender, race, and citizenship with traits as 
violence is seen as hegemonic; that is, they are driven by cultural and ideological norms. Therefore, to 
understand the logic underpinning violence it is fundamental to question the social categories upon 
which migrant men and women of diverse races and ethnicities are affected by border violence, as also 
highlighted by feminist scholars (Butler, 2004a; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000).  Considering diverse 
individual locations therefore proves useful to provide the means for dealing with violence in migration 
at borders. However, the questions of how violence against migrants is constructed within taxonomies 
of gender, race and other locations remain understudied in the European border context, particularly 
along the Bosnian-Croatian borders. Yet interlocking gendered and racialized assumptions provide the 
conditions of possibility for the contemporary violent border security practices in Europe (Basham & 
Vaughan-Williams, 2013), which calls for its examination. 
3.8: Conclusion. 
A key objective of this chapter was to review critically the existing literature examining violence against 
migrants at the EU’s external borders. In doing so, I have pointed to how diverse scholars approach 
and conceptualise violence. 
Firstly, the chapter reviewed the literature on ‘border externalisation and internalisation’ and ‘smart 
borders’, which provides insights into diplomatic relations between the EU and non-EU states and 
techno-scientific border measures, while highlighting their problematic and dangerous consequences 
on migrants’ journeys. Yet these studies say little about either migrants’ experiences of these measures 
or their violent experiences; what violence means, its process across time and migrants’ own 
understanding of it. Also, these two approaches to violence begin with the ‘state(s)’ that inflict 
structural forms of violence, nevertheless, this homogenous perspective of the state as a ‘perpetrator’ 
is problematic as it side-lines more concrete sources of violence. Importantly, these debates on 
violence are significantly under-researched in the context of Bosnian-Croatian borders, which however 
proves to be the focal EU’s external point, where diplomatic negotiations of border externalisation 
take place and smart technologies are increasingly employed to target migrants. This calls for more 
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research attention to be given to the Bosnian-Croatian border, besides moving attention to migrants’ 
experiences of violent border measures. 
Other branches of study discuss the consequences of border externalisation and smart borders on 
migrants’ journeys, when pointing to various harms across transit routes to the EU. The major issue 
with this literature is that it commonly focuses on sea routes and side-lines land routes to the EU. 
Importantly, there is almost no research on the latest passage across Bosnian-Croatian borders. This is 
all the more remarkable given that I observed in this location direct violence to take place, which 
remains underexposed and undertheorized in the debate on border violence generally, yet it 
significantly impacts upon migrants’ everyday life, as we will explore below. It is essential to examine 
this considering that most research tends to treat violence at European borders as ‘indirect’ or 
‘structural’, thus omitting direct and concrete acts of violence that organise migrants’ everyday life. 
Drawing upon this stark contrast between the conceptualisation of border violence in the existing 
studies and the increasingly observed direct attacks EU land borders, this research will ask the 
following research question: What are the forms of violence against migrants along the EU’s external 
border with Bosnia? 
Moving the discussion into the more detailed and intimate perspectives, a further focus was the 
emerging and ethnographic research which examines the impacts of violence on migrants’ daily 
routines and social relations. I have argued that this research significantly enriches understandings of 
violence that predominantly focus on structures and indirect actions, or that perceive violence as 
episodes that come and pass. Instead, research focused on the everyday sees violence against migrants 
as concrete and daily encounters that turn into a process and transforms across time. Nevertheless, 
there are rare encounters of border violence as everyday at the EU’s external borders and no research 
has examined this at the Bosnian-Croatian border. For this reason, I advocate examining border 
violence as an everyday phenomenon at the Croatian-Bosnian border so as to nuance understanding 
of how diverse forms of violence (direct and structural) function in symbiosis and become personal. 
 
The literature further indicates that race and gender are fundamental aspects organising border 
violence. Whilst the existing research predominantly focuses on (migrant) women and children as 
generally most affected by violence, I want to shift attention to the fact that those subjected most to 
violence are predominantly Arab Muslim migrant men. Whilst there is emerging research on male 
migration and its axis with border violence, there are no examples of how migrants are subjected to 
direct and crude force and impacts the everyday, to which end, this research asks: Do race and gender 




As already indicated, I suggest examining the identified research questions along the Bosnian-Croatian 
borders, which generally remains underexamined in terms of border violence. This border is located 
on the symbolic line between the so-called ‘Balkan (Route)’ and ‘EUrope’, in which violence against 
migrants is bounded. To this end, the following chapter aims to critically review the literature on the 
recent history and political developments along the ‘Balkans’ and the ‘Balkan Route’ for migrants on 




Chapter 4: Historical and political background of the ‘Balkans’ and its (transit) 
migration. 
4.1: Introduction. 
While the previous literature review explored diverse forms of border technologies and their use of 
violence in migration, this chapter shifts the focus to the case study examined in this thesis – the so 
called ‘Balkan Route’. Specifically, it provides the historical and political context of migration across 
SEE states, where diverse forms of border violence eventually organised the everyday for migrants, as 
this thesis will argue. Since the existing literature discussed above shows that diverse migration flows 
and violence have been taking place in the SEE region before the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, these need to 
be brought into the discussion. This proves useful to question how this rich local history shapes new 
forms of migration and violence at the EU’s external borders lying in SEE now. 
The chapter begins by looking into how the ‘Balkans’ have been conceptualised within the historical 
contexts of the West-East dichotomy in Europe. By deconstructing this dichotomy, this chapter 
questions how migration has been perceived, narrated and consequently managed (by violence) at the 
EU’s external borders located in SEE. 
Secondly, it aims to review studies that discuss the detailed development of migratory journeys and 
their stoppage across SEE since 2015. The chapter questions how the migratory routes through SEE at 
first functioned as the humanitarian ‘Balkan Corridor’ enabling refugees to pass but then, they shifted 
to a clandestine and criminal ‘Balkan Route’ in policy terms. These developments significantly 
organised violent border deterrents, consequently pushing migrants to move to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Bosnia). 
Finally, the chapter will examine the limited research on the contemporary migration passage in 
Bosnia, its local and international responses and lived experiences that draw a line between the newly 
arriving migrants and the local population. Finally, I will summarise the key arguments and highlight 
the gaps in the research literature on the nexus of violence and migration in SEE. 
4.2: Conceptualising ‘Balkans’ in the past and today Europe 
Migration routes across SEE became the second major transit to the EU, which are commonly framed 
in policy and humanitarian terms as a homogenous ‘Balkan Route’ (Frontex 2018; UNHCR 2019). Calling 
numerous states by the term ‘Balkans’ is intertwined with an important, often discriminatory history 
of West-East dichotomy in Europe (El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). Numerous authors argue that states in 
the region have been Balkanised, and thus, positioned at Europe’s periphery (Todorova, 2009) as 
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Europe’s ‘Orients’ (Mishkova, 2008), together with diverse forms of violence and refugee flows across 
this region in the recent history. To understand the meanings of ‘Balkans’ and its impact on the current 
political and social climate across south-eastern EU’s external borders, I wish to briefly discuss how the 
term ‘Balkans’ emerged and strategically evolved until the post-2015 migration. 
Todorova (2009) suggests that the term ‘Balkans’ per se - a distinct geographic, social, and cultural 
entity - was invented by European travellers (latter-day journalists) only from the late eighteenth 
century. Before then, much of the southeast European peninsula as part of the Ottoman Empire had 
been perceived as a unit within Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam. The term Balkans, however, 
shattered the unitary character of the oriental world. Todorova (2009) argues that the Western powers 
then used Balkans to label the SEE region as unmarked by Western Enlightenment and thus, 
economically backward, the tribal, the primitive, the barbarian (Todorova, 2009). The Balkans have 
been therefore constructed as the opposite of the (self-)presentation of ‘Europe’, coextensive with 
modernity and a symbol of cultural superiority and power for the last three centuries (Mishkova, 2008, 
p 252). 
This stereotypical division of Occident and Orient (Aretov, 2012), Christianity and Islam, ‘us’ and the 
‘other’ in Europe influenced conflicts and humanitarian challenges in SEE during World War II and the 
Yugoslav Wars. Extreme barbarities were committed by Fascist militia forces Ustaša in 1941, when 
Nazi-backed Croatia established Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (the Independent State of Croatia) (Hoare, 
2006). Ustaša committed torture, brutality, and the inhumanity of genocide particularly against Serbs, 
Jews and Roma, which were followed by aggression from the Serb Chetnik forces, leading to an 
onslaught against Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Hoare, 2006). Korb (2010) suggests that the aim of 
Ustaša’s mass violence was to ‘emancipate’ Catholic Croatia from the Balkan ‘burden’; from the 
Bosnian Muslims and Serbian Orthodox Christians. 
The radical struggle for Europeanisation, which Baker (2015) argues was manipulated by external 
powers, also played a crucial role in the wars that were triggered after the collapse of Yugoslavia in 
1991. As Razsa and Lindstrom (2004) suggest, the former Croatian president Franjo Tuđman hoped to 
be recognized as a sovereign state for the first time in its national history to ‘return’ to its rightful place 
in Europe; away from primitive, lazy, intolerant Balkan neighbours to the southeast. Croatia wished to 
resurrect the Ustaša’s state and create true ethnic borders, in which Bosnia and Herzegovina would 
be absorbed into a Croatian state (Pavlaković, 2008). The war created millions of refugees when at the 




World media focused on the specific narrative and justification of the Yugoslav 1990s wars as the 
‘Balkan Wars’, triggered by ancient ethnic hatreds (Baker, 2015; Huliaras, 2011; Razsa & Lindstrom, 
2004). Western portrayals of brutal violence during the wars were analysed as intertwined with 
something inherently ‘Balkan’, distant from the rest of Europe, which made derogatory connotations 
of the Balkans stronger than ever (Hatzopoulos, 2003). 
The imagined divisions between Balkans and Europe continued to be focal in independent nation 
building in Bosnia and Croatia in the war aftermath. The final outcome of the Bosnian-Croatian ‘war 
within the war’ ended with the Washington Agreement in 1994, followed by the end of the Yugoslav 
wars with the U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2013). 
However, the agreements have been criticised for ignoring the situation on the ground, and thus failing 
to promote the sovereignty of the Bosnian Republic and multi-ethnic democracy (Kappler & Richmond, 
2011; Malik, 2000) and poorly serving national interests in Croatia (Manning, 2004). During the first 
after-war elections in Bosnia, the wartime nationalists won by manipulation and legitimised the results 
of wartime ethnic cleansing. People continued to vote for the nationalist parties in Bosnia because 
those were the parties with the surest ability to deliver the resources they needed to survive (Manning, 
2004). In Croatia, the war legacies and opposition of the devaluation of the Homeland War continued 
to be the formula for success for political parties, resulting in the Croatian Democratic Union 
continuing to be the key organiser and political instrument of national extremism, until the party’s 
2003 pro-EU centre-right turn (Jović, 2009). EU integration became also an important national goal in 
Bosnia, based on economic prosperity and the rule of law in a society still suffering the consequences 
of war, populism and corruption by powerbase political elites (Memisevic, 2009). 
It is the (prospect of) EU membership, that is significantly shaping the political and social development 
in SEE countries despite their confined symbolic image of Balkan. According to Dahlman (2016), the EU 
method for ensuring the gradual Europeanisation and integration of the Balkans has been the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), negotiated with each of the countries since 2000 (see 
Figure 2 below). The process primarily depends on transnational justice and cooperation with 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Jović, 2009), and agreements covering free 
trade, political reform, economic development, regional cooperation (Dahlman, 2016), and 
humanitarian values (Jakešević, 2017). Importantly, states ought to adopt migration policies 
complementary to those existing in the EU, such as the Geneva Convention asylum system, and 
collaborate on combating illegal migration and organised crime (Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019). 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Croatia are now EU members, with Croatia waiting to join the Schengen space 
during the time of writing this thesis (Huliaras, 2011; Dahlman, 2016). In contrast, Bosnia was the last 
country in the Western Balkans to sign the SAP with the EU in 2008 and beginning the EU integration 
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process (Memisevic, 2009). According to the local politicians (Sanader, 2008), the memberships re-
shaped these states from the Balkans to liberal and Western democracies of modern EUrope, where 
violence and disorder have been removed from public sight (Elias, 2001). 
Figure 2 A map illustrating what Frontex calls EU’s expansion plans in Western Balkan (Wilms, 
2018). 
However, the existing literature shows that war legacies, Ustaša symbols and fascist tendencies remain 
celebrated in Croatia (Pavlaković, 2008), besides playing an important role in politics. The former 
Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović6, a member of the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union, 
openly sympathises with the Ustaša’s ideology of the Independent State of Croatia (MacDowall, 2018). 
Indeed, violence is also part of states that consider themselves as liberal or EUropean, when reflecting 
its anxieties and vulnerabilities (Isakjee et al., 2020). This indicates that the discourse of the far right 
remains mainstream in Croatia, when finding its place closer to what is considered as European, white, 
and Catholic borders, and seeking division from its south-eastern neighbours, which, as Dahlman 
(2016) argues, are still far away from joining the EU due to the legacies of war, among other factors. 
Countries along the ‘Western Balkans’7, like Bosnia, remain shady places of the EU and Schengen zone 
as stranded in the narratives of having fragile economies, a high unemployment rate, corruption, weak 
institutions, questionable rule of law, and diminishing political rights and civil liberties (Stojić-Mitrović 
& Vilenica, 2019). As a result, the Western Balkan states are stranded in an unclear and constantly 
shifting boundary between Europe and not-quite-Europe (Trakilović, 2020). The existing sources thus 
show that Bosnia is stranded in the image as a post-Ottoman, post-Socialist and post-conflict state 
6 Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović served as a president of Croatia since 2015-2020, the most challenging period of 
migration across the region, which also involved the time of my fieldwork. 
7 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. 
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with a large Muslim population, against whom European borders should be protected (Rexhepi, 2018). 
Razsa and Lindstrom (2004) argue that Croatia particularly has either enthusiastically or grudgingly 
accepted its role as the ‘defence walls of Christianity’ to fulfil such a task, as indicated with the example 
of the recent conflicts. 
Border defence expectations intensified again since 2015, when SEE came to be known not only as the 
(Western) Balkans but also as the route for migrants from Muslim Arab countries across the Middle 
East and Africa to western and northern Europe. Post-2015 migration developed new pressures on 
Croatia as an EU member state to ‘show its teeth’ along its borders with Bosnia and Serbia prior to 
Schengen accession and confirm its ability to secure the EU’s external border (Isakjee et al., 2020). On 
the other side of the border, in Serbia and Bosnia, pressures to improve border externalisation policies 
and smart borders security also emerged, under the promise of eventual EU membership. To this end, 
the states positioned along the ‘Balkan Route’ and along the EU’s margins are once again struggling 
for Europanisation and de-Balkanisation, but now embedded in the EU’s border security expectations, 
in which violence against migrants became the major border tool (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 
2015), as discussed further. 
4.3: Migration across the ‘Balkan Route’. 
As the recent historical context shows, the Balkans is much more than a geographical term (Hoare, 
2006) and this also applies for the migratory ‘Balkan Route’ – its emergence, development, and later 
closures, which resulted in thousands of people navigating diverse forms of violence while migrating 
through there to northern and western Europe. It is important to note that the passages across SEE 
have served as the transitory point for migration and smuggling to western and northern Europe for 
centuries (Ahmetašević & Mlinarević, 2018; Jovanović, 2018). Throughout the 1990s, however, the 
smuggling of goods, weapons and people through SEE ballooned, to which end the ‘Balkans’ became 
known as the ‘Balkan Route’ (Lewis, 1998). Ahmad's (2011) research shows that Macedonia and Serbia 
were transit points for generations of Pakistani migrants, yet their journeys became more dangerous 
and expensive after the 9/11 terrorist attack and the intensification of smart border technologies8. 
More significant migratory transit through the route was marked in 2014 when 150,000 Kosovans fled 
to Hungary, Austria and Switzerland because of chronic precariousness and uncertainty, which 
established the logistics and infrastructure for further migration through here (Stanivuković & 
Neuman, 2019). During these movements, the ‘Balkan Route’ was still hidden from public sight 
(Kasparek, 2016). This changed in August 2015 with the media portraying a ‘(European) refugee crisis’ 
(Chouliaraki & Stolic, 2017); migration to Europe triggered by the  Arab Spring across the Middle East 
 
8 Ibid, Chapter 3.3, p 25. 
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and North Africa (Nascimbene & Di Pascale, 2011), the Syrian conflict (Al Hussein, 2018), the ongoing 
military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and poverty (De Genova, 2017), just to name but a few. 
Yet migratory land routes in SEE have been side-lined in scholarly work in contrast to the 
Mediterranean and Aegean Sea Routes (Rozakou, 2019). Milivojević (2018) explains this academic 
blind spot by the instability of the region since the 1990s wars, and thus the challenges to conducting 
research there, besides the difficulty to gain official access and navigate language barriers for foreign 
researchers. For this reason, scholars who documented and analysed migration events in SEE were 
particularly those associated with the local (academic) institutions or having national roots in the 
region. Their insightful findings reveal that diverse migratory routes are closely interconnected, when 
land routes in SEE were initially an alternative to the more dangerous sea routes, especially for those 
who had lost relatives in the Mediterranean (Isakjee et al., 2020). For this reason, SEE is a vital location 
to research to understand contemporary migration and violence at the EU’s borders. 
This existing research shows that the migratory routes went primarily from Turkey and Greece to 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Croatia; and through Austria, Slovenia and Italy to western 
and northern Europe (Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019; Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019). At this point, 
some EU member states (Germany, Croatia, Hungary) employed ‘open-border’ policies and suspended 
the Dublin Regulation9, which reframed the ‘criminal Balkan Route’ to the ‘humanitarian Balkan 
Corridor’ (El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). The formalised and relatively safe corridor enabled migrants to 
transit from Northern Greece to the EU within two or three days, in special trains and buses that were 
often even free of charge (Beznec et al., 2016; Santer & Wriedt, 2017). The journeys were assisted by 
transit states, issuing 72-hours temporary documents, allowing migrants to transit onwards (Kasparek, 
2016; Lukić, 2016). This ‘open-border’ period in SEE is often described by scholars as the ‘long summer 
of migration’ (Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019; Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019).  
Although Europe as the world’s richest continent was about to host barely 8% of the worlds’ displaced 
population (Kasamani, 2017), the mainstream political parties around EU countries (United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy), started expressing anxiety over the places 
of migrants (Isakjee et al., 2020). Questions of migration became even more precarious for SEE 
Schengen countries, such as Hungary and Slovenia, as well as EU member Croatia, with fragile control 
systems and pressures to prove its EUropean position (Nedoh, 2017; Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019). 
These pressures resulted in radical and fast border measures. 
 
9 Dublin Regulation is an EU agreement that requires people to apply for asylum in the first EU state they reach 
or risk deportation back to that first state if they travel elsewhere (El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). 
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In Hungary, the president Viktor Orbán stated that the country belonged to Christian West civilisation 
and Europe and it had a moral obligation to protect the borders of Hungary that in turn also protected 
Europe. To this end, Hungary decided to construct an US$80 million razor wire fence along its border 
with Serbia in July 2015 (Thorleifsson, 2017).  Also, a new law was passed making illegal entry into 
Hungarian national territory a prosecutable crime punishable by up to three years in prison for those 
who violate it (Nedoh, 2017). The only legal access from Serbia to Hungary was via the newly 
established ‘transit zones’, where migrants could apply for asylum (Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019). 
These new measures criminalized the right to seek asylum in Hungary for most migrants (Nedoh, 2017), 
particularly men travelling without women and children (Augustová, 2020). With the aim to resist 
these, some migrants attempted more dangerous illegalised routes – as shown by the tragedy of 71 
dead bodies that were found on 27 August 2015 in a lorry on an Austrian highway (Santer & Wriedt, 
2017). Over 4000 migrants and local groups who were mobilised to act in solidarity created a 170-km 
march from Budapest to the Austrian border, which is known as the March for Hope (El-Shaarawi & 
Razsa, 2019; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Santer & Wriedt, 2017; Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019). What 
followed was another razor wire fence construction along Slovenian-Croatian borders in October 2015 
(Nedoh, 2017), increasing deployment of paramilitary migrant hunting patrols in Bulgaria (Rexhepi, 
2018), and closure of the Greek-Macedonian border in Idomeni in December 2015 (Santer & Wriedt, 
2017). The European Commission eventually allocated €3.8 billion euros to the whole former Yugoslav 
territory from the EU’s Internal Security Fund to help reinforce border management at the EU's 
external borders (Dobreva & Radjenovic, 2018). 
The humanitarian corridor was officially closed in March 2016 when the European Council announced 
that ‘(i)rregular flows of migrants along the Western Balkans route have now come to an end’ (Santer 
& Wriedt, 2017). The corridor closure was also related to the EU-Turkey agreement on the limitation 
of these movements (Šantić et al., 2017). As the result, thousands became stranded particularly in 
Serbia, where the primary responses of the local population were mostly filled with empathies due to 
their recent war and refugee experience and a perception of migration as temporary (El-Shaarawi & 
Razsa, 2019). However, the same experiences of the recent disorder and violence, fragile economy, 
and the desire for EU membership changed the local responses to hostilities when the Serbian 
Government took down grassroot support, tried to remove all migrants out of public spaces, and 
deployed border militarisation (Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019; Obradović-Wochnik, 2018; 
Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019). A similar shift from humanitarian to securitised approach was 
encountered in Croatia (Jakešević & Tatalović, 2016), Albania (Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019), Kosovo 
and Macedonia (Rexhepi, 2018), and Greece (Obradović-Wochnik & Bird, 2020). 
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These border measures made migration across the region to the EU (Croatia and Hungary) illegal, and 
thus returned its designation with ‘criminal activity’ and its characterisation as the ‘Balkan Route’ (El-
Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). This also became prominent in the political maps by the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency – known as Frontex (see Figure 3), which according to van Houtum and Bueno 
Lacy (2020, p 198), portray migration across the Balkan Route through its ‘risk analysis’ as a threatening 
invasion of migrants taking over a defenceless EU. On the same lines, Bird et al (2020) argue that using 
the term Balkan Route also serves as a specific EU policy tool, which uses the traditional connotation 
of the region as the ‘Badlands’ of Europe, to push and conceal migrants’ precarities and dire living 
conditions out of EU territory. Balkan Route is therefore the shadow space between West and East, 
blurring the boundaries between legality and illegality, and thus produces informal and extra-
governance structures (Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019). The way migration is imagined and managed 
(by violence) along EU external borders therefore stems from the characteristics of the European and 
Balkan projects themselves (De Genova, 2017), which have deep historical roots discussed here in the 
first sub-chapter. For this reason, Trakilović (2020, p 50) argues that the ‘Balkans’ ambiguous position 
in the European imaginary needs to be taken into account in understanding the character of, and the 
response to, the migration phenomenon’. 
Figure 3 A map by EU’s Fontex (2019), portraying what the institution refers to as the Balkan 
Route used by migrants to the EU. 
4.4: Border violence and the Balkan Route. 
Despite the official route’s closure, daily movement across Serbian borders onwards showed that the 
routes continued to be active. Militant and legislative border closures only made the migratory 
movements irregular and more hazardous. The year of the route closures, Frontex (2016) detected 
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130,325 unauthorized entries from Serbia to Croatia and Hungary. Games, how migrants call 
unauthorised border crossings via green zones, became the only option to move from Serbia across 
Croatia or Hungary onwards, when avoiding subjection to border securities (Augustová, 2020). 
However, the game conveyed dangerous and violent processes when Hungarian and Croatian state 
authorities responded to the game players by chain push-backs; which became the key component of 
border security along the Balkan Route (Augustová & Sapoch, 2020). Its definition has been developed 
by Push-Back Map Collective (2020, p 199): 
Push-backs are expulsions, direct deportations, readmissions, or other forms of immediate 
involuntary return across one or several territorial borders. Depending on the regulatory 
framework in place, these forms of forced displacement can be legalized under national law—
as in Hungary— or semi-formalized, for example by relying on bilateral agreements or informal 
practices. 
The involuntary nature of push-backs signifies the regular use of violence, which are academically 
understudied. Push-backs indicate that although seeking asylum is recognized as a right in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 14), in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Art. 18) (among other relevant documents) (Albahari, 2019), the law is systematically violated 
along EU borders. The use of violence by state authorities, which the push-backs often incorporate, 
also go against the absolute prohibition of torture and inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and against the prohibition 
of collective expulsion, which applies to all displaced persons, both irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers (European Court of Human Rights, 2020). No state may permit or tolerate such cruel 
treatments or torture (United Nations, 1975). Finally, according to the EU Directive on Asylum 
Procedures (2005/85/EC), all migrants, including those recognized as ‘irregular’ migrants, are entitled 
to information about asylum, translation assistance, the ability to present their case to a competent 
authority, notification of the outcome, and the right to appeal a negative decision (Vaughan-Williams, 
2015). 
As the consequence of the continuous push-back practices, migration journeys across SEE are not a 
linear singular route, as portrayed in the EU-centred policy and humanitarian language (see Figure 3, 
Ibid, p 58). Instead, as Obradović-Wochnik and Bird (2020) argue, migration across here functions 
through more complex multiple and divergent routes, which are constantly being disrupted, when 
people are being pushed, detained or die on the way; the process called by Stojić-Mitrović and Vilenica 
(2019, p 542) ‘forced circular mobility’. As the result of this, since January 2018 and January 2019, 
NGOs and activists encountered over 21.000 new arrivals in Bosnia, which still had not had the 
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sophisticated border technologies used along Croatia (INFO PARK, 2018; UNHCR, 2019a). Thousands 
arrived and temporary resided in Sarajevo train stations, parks, and other public sites (Ahmetašević & 
Mlinarević, 2018), which was the image previously seen in European cities, from Athens to Budapest, 
Madrid and Paris. 
4.5: Transiting Bosnian-Croatian borders. 
There is little literature discussing in detail Bosnia as the migratory transit route which can be explained 
by its recent emergence, together with the major attention paid to the sea routes, as discussed 
previously. With thousands of migrants coming to the country, the Bosnian population suddenly faced 
what Bobić and Janković (2017) call two-fold challenge mass migration flows, mass emigration and 
mass transit migration. Among the little research that has been conducted on post-2018 migration in 
Bosnia is the report by Ahmetašević and Mlinarević (2018), drawing on their participatory action 
research. The authors point to struggles of the Bosnian Government to coordinate responses to the 
new arrivals due to the country’s post-war dysfunctionality. Ahmetašević and Mlinarević (2018) also 
highlight poorly managed work of the UN agencies (IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF), to whom the funding from 
the European Commission was later allocated due to Brussel’s lack of trust in the government, but who 
barely considered the local context and directly impacted on a further weakening of the state; the 
issue previously encountered during the post-war legacies of the Dayton agreement (Kappler & 
Richmond, 2011; Malik, 2000). Thus, these local dynamics resulted in poor migration responses and 
no chain of responsibility, which differs to other countries in Europe. 
This posed several challenges for migrants navigating the passage here, ranging from legal to material 
support in Bosnia. Besides the bureaucratic problems of applying for asylum, Ahmetašević & 
Mlinarević (2018) suggest that Bosnia particularly struggled to provide shelter for the newly arriving. 
Eight accommodation centres were opened, but most were run in abandoned factories by IOM and 
the two (one run by volunteers) with better living conditions were opened only for families. However, 
the majority of people were heading to Bihać and Velika Kladuša (Kladuša), the towns positioned at 
the northern borders with Croatia, where the EU requested that no centre was placed within a 30 km 
radius of the border. Croatian state representatives were in constant contact with the authorities in 
Bihać and Kladuša (Ahmetašević & Mlinarević, 2018). On the other side of the border in Croatia, 
Frontex has been using airplanes and visual data to stream to the over 1000-strong Croatian border 
police, and technologies such as watchtowers, thermal vision cameras, drones, helicopters, and barbed 
wire acquired through EU funds to assist them with ‘interception operations’ since July 2018 (Isakjee 
et al., 2020). 
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The ethnographic study by Hromadžić (2019) examined one of the urban ruins, Dom penzionera 
(Pensioner home), located by the Bosnian-Croatian border in in Bihać , which became a new home for 
migrants attempting to transit the country. Hromadžić (2019) argues that this empty building has been 
housing ‘human waste’ rejected by local citizens across dozens of years (seniors, rebel youth, migrants) 
and signifies the country’s struggle to transit from conflict to peace and dysfunctional to functional 
state in comparison to the imagined West and Europe. Although Hromadžić (2019) examines violence 
and solidarities in migration in the urban ruins, she omits from her analysis violent push-backs from 
Croatia to Bosnia. However, Isakjee et al. (2020) argue that push-backs construe migrants’ experiences 
in Bosnia, as it had been previously encountered along Serbian borders with Hungary and Serbia. Also, 
whilst Hromadžić (2019) discusses migrants’ narratives in Bihać, Kladuša slipped from any academic 
examination. 
I identified the same knowledge gap on the town Kladuša within war legacies, except Lischer (1999) 
and Christia (2008). These authors point out that the northern Bosnian region transformed during the 
Yugoslav times into a highly profitable industrial centre, in contrast to the poverty of the rest of the 
country, and this economic disparity remains until today. This was thanks to the Agrokomerc company 
established by a Muslim from Kladuša, Fikret Abdić, during the time of socialist Yugoslavia (Christia, 
2008). In 1993, Abdić, declared the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in Kladuša, leading to 
intra-ethnic war and over 25,000 people fleeing from the town in front of the advancing Bosnian Army, 
creating a 30-mile long stream of people. Lisher’s study (1999) discusses that inhabitants of Kladuša 
were living in awful conditions of makeshift camps and destroyed buildings with no electricity and little 
clean water during their refuge on the other side of the border in Croatia. Abdić organised an army 
and attempted to regain control over Kladuša. However, his attempt resulted in the second exodus, 
while many refugees attempting to reach safety in Croatia were said to be pushed back to Bosnia by 
the Croatian army, who were not hesitating to shoot those resisting (Lisher, 1999). While Abdić had 
been convicted and sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment for war crimes (Ivanisevic, 2004), he 
was elected mayor of Kladuša after his release from prison, and remained in the post during the time 
of my fieldwork. Dahlman (2016) also points out that many migrants from Bosnia arriving in Western 
Europe in the early 1990s were prevented from applying for asylum by governments, subjected to 
limited entry to safety and expulsions to the first safe country (Croatia), which seems to be a similar 
experience to those transiting Bosnia now. 
What this shows is that Kladuša is an important but understudied location where migration and 
violence inter-sect across the recent past and presence. To this end, I argue that this location has much 
to show us about the EU’s border violence against migrants, as embedded in the broader symbolic and 
political dichotomy between Europe and Balkans in the Western popular imagination. For this reason, 
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I conducted my research there when questioning how this town and its historic-political context 
shaped the social fabric of the migration route through the area since 2018, when thousands of people 
had arrived here to enter the EU. 
4.5: Conclusion. 
As this chapter outlined, the existing literature shows that Bosnian-Croatian borders remain part of a 
highly problematic dichotomy of the Balkans-Europe margins, frequently used in Euro-centric 
narratives, which had been radically enforced particularly during the 1990s Yugoslav Wars. The post-
war prospect of EU membership did not diminish the confined symbolic image of Balkanism (Todorova, 
2009), which persists in cultural, political and economic tensions, particularly for Bosnia as the last SEE 
country entering the EU integration process. In contrast, the research conducted in Croatia - Bosnia’s 
neighbour drawing the geopolitical line of EU entry - indicated that the country continues to use far 
right discourse when reassuring its position within ‘European’, ‘white’ and ‘Catholic’ borders. While 
we know that this local context along the Bosnian borders with Croatia played a fundamental role in 
violence in the past, there is limited knowledge about violent tensions during today’s ‘liberalisation’ 
and ‘EUropeanisation’ process of the region that is culturally distinguished from violent measures yet, 
as I observed, underpins the management of migration here. 
Indeed, the existing research also shows that the historical dichotomy between Balkan and Europe are 
used as a policy tool for migration management, yet the region still remains underexamined in contrast 
to the Mediterranean Sea, which is a more accessible field location for international scholars. 
Nevertheless, the migratory land pathways across SEE countries have much to inform us about the 
EU’s policies of closed borders and militarisation, which are commonly entwined with the use of direct 
violence, as argued by Jones (2019). However, we know little about the intersections of diverse forms 
of violence and migration and how these are organised by the ambiguous position of the Bosnian-
Croatian borders in today’s Europe, which needs to be taken into account. This is all the more 
remarkable given that the Bosnian border with Croatia turned into the latest transit spot in migration 
but remains absent in the existing literature. 
Deriving from the literature on the historical Balkan-Europe dichotomy, war and post-war period, and 
contemporary migration and its academic blind spots, this thesis explores how the local context of 
Bosnian-Croatian borders plays in violence that migrants experience. While examining diverse forms 
of violence against migrants, and their impact on the everyday, this thesis considers the local dynamics 
discussed in the existing literature and bring it into the analysis of contemporary violence observed at 
the borders. Drawing upon the critical review of the studies examining the background of the Bosnian-
54 
 
Croatian border, I will thus ask the following question: To what extent does the context of Bosnian-
Croatian border organise migrants’ experiences of violence? 
To be able to empirically examine this research equation, together with other questions highlighted in 
the literature review above, the following chapter will outline and reflect on methodologies and ethical 
considerations while living and conducting research at the Bosnian-Croatian border for eight months.  
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Chapter 5: Ethnography of violence and activism: navigating methodological 
and ethical research choices with migrants at the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
5.1: Introduction. 
This chapter will firstly provide the rationale behind diverse methodological and ethical decisions that 
guided the research process. It will firstly focus on the epistemological thinking of what violence 
means, in line with the theoretical concepts guiding this thesis (Crenshaw, 1991; Galtung, 1969, 1990; 
Scheper-Hughes, 1992), which considers the cultural construction of violence according to 
participants’ own lived experience and interpretations. It will also discuss the choice of qualitative 
research and how this complements the theoretical grounding of the study and research questions. 
The chapter will then move onto the discussion of specific research choices and ethnographic methods, 
and how these were used in the course of the fieldwork. 
Since self-reflective writing - the capturing of ideas, curiosities, intellectual wanderings, and ethical 
concerns - is a crucial part of (ethnographic) research practice (Doty, 2010), it will be incorporated 
throughout this chapter. I will specifically reflect on the degree to which access to specific fieldwork 
place and sites is a matter of choice in migration and ethnographic fields; how possible it is to 
undertake research that is genuinely collaborative with participants; whether or not researchers can 
establish relations of reciprocity by volunteering and through border violence report collection; and 
how cultural differences between researcher and participants can be navigated. All these issues will, 
of course, be discussed in relation to my own fieldwork choices and practices. The chapter will then 
continue with an account of how the fieldwork data was thematically analysed. Finally, it will discuss 
ethical considerations and especially participants’ anonymity and the commitment to do no harm, 
which turned out to be the most problematic to navigate in the constantly changing violent field of 
borders. 
5.2: Epistemologically approaching violence in migration research. 
Extensive academic work on violence (Arendt, 1970; Benjamin, 1996; Derrida, 1967; Fanon, 1961; 
Foucault, 1975; Galtung, 1990; Lazreg, 2008) signifies that thoughts of what violence means are often 
fraught with ambiguities. What violence means depends upon meanings attributed to violence across 
diverse contexts and situations (Keane, 2004; Lazreg, 2008; Perry, 2006) as what some people 
recognise as violence, may not be considered violent by others (Hume, 2009). Since violence is 
communicated through systems of meanings shared between people, including a researcher and her 
participants (Pedelty, 2011), this study undertakes the epistemological stance of interpretivism. The 
interpretivist paradigm therefore allows us to approach violence and the experience of it as depending 
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on the context, here the Bosnian-Croatian border; and people, here the Arab Muslim migrant men 
who are subjected to it. 
The interpretative paradigm thus proves useful to move beyond the state-centric analysis of violence 
that commonly occurs in migration studies and as discussed above (de Vries & Guild, 2019). In contrast, 
the interpretative paradigm explores migrants’ everyday experiences of violence in their own terms 
(Scheper-Hughes, 1992), and thus opens up understandings of violence based on the social and 
political arrangements in which it is experienced (Galtung, 1990). This further enables participants to 
be treated as agents in defining what violence means to them, based on their different social and 
political practices and traditions, rather than assuming that European juridical definitions and the 
experiences they produce are the norm (Fiske, 2016; Jamar & Chappuis, 2016). 
To explore the daily life at borders and migrants’ subjective understandings of the violence it involves, 
thus requires a qualitative approach (Hammersley, 1990). Yet Jacobsen and Landau (2003) suggest that 
quantitative methods are necessary to produce statistically representative samples and scientifically 
sound knowledge in migration research. Also, Galtung and Höivik (1971) highlight that violence ought 
to be measured in numbers of deaths. In contrast, Farmer (2009) argues that numbers of deaths 
provide only one crude measure of violence since they cannot reveal the meaning and the nature of 
suffering that people experience in an array of violent situations. Moreover, violence cannot be 
objectified and quantified so that a check list can be drawn up with positive criteria for defining any 
particular act as violent or not (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). This means that a quantitative 
approach already makes assumptions about how migrants’ world is (Rodgers, 2004) and so it cannot 
capture the complex nature of borders, their everyday complexities and the place of violence within 
these. In order to question migrants’ subjective and daily experiences of violence a qualitative 
approach is most appropriate. 
5.3: Using ethnographic research methods along the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
Before moving on to the discussion of the research methodologies used in this research, I wish to firstly 
establish a rationale for these. It has been argued that understanding violence in the everyday has 
been predominantly anthropological work, which calls for participatory and extended fieldwork. 
Existing migration studies provide insightful analysis into violence, but most drew upon non-
participatory and short visits in the field, mostly using interviews, which resulted in examination of 
structural violence but neglected direct and concrete acts of violence. For this reason, Brambilla and 
Jones (2020) suggest that border and migration research will benefit from ethnography. Ethnographic 
methods offer useful fieldwork tools to better explore the relationship between borders and diverse 
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forms of violence, as embedded in the local context (Brambilla & Jones, 2020; Vogt, 2018). What 
follows is an account of the ethnographic methods used in this research, and reflections on their value. 
5.3.1: Fieldwork site as a researcher’s choice? 
Vogt (2018) raises important questions when she asks where, exactly, is ‘there’ in the field when we 
are talking about ethnographic sites of migration, given that these are often fluid and involve transient 
populations? I use this question as the lens for reflections on (not) choosing and accessing my fieldwork 
site. Due to the quickly evolving migration movements and its violent stoppage, leading to the 
perpetual re-direction of the routes, I struggled to choose the fieldwork place. When choosing a 
research location, I excluded sea routes leading to Greece, although the existing studies indicated that 
migrants and activists established numerous makeshift camps there, which were perpetually illegalised 
by numerous state rules – the topic I was initially interested to research10. I did so due to the concerns 
about the problem of over-research in Greece, where extensive portrayals of ‘refugee flows’ were 
entwined in the ‘flow of various researchers’, which could restrict my access or result in a lack of critical 
attention to struggles of migrants in other locations (Cabot, 2019; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2013). 
In contrast, I found that little was known about migration in Serbia, which was the second largest 
transit for migrants at EU borders. Besides the research lacunae, my previous research in refugee 
camps in Serbia and the consequent knowledge of migratory routes here, together my Slavic 
background, were all conducive to identifying Serbia as a promising fieldwork site. However, since the 
migration patterns were perpetually evolving, and academic studies were deficient in understanding 
these changes, I decided to leave for a one-month pilot study in Serbia during my first year of PhD, 
when I learnt that the makeshift camps were growing in this location. It was this that motivated a 
future eight-months of fieldwork I then negotiated there, beginning in May 2018. To my surprise, when 
I returned to Serbia, I found the camps almost empty. ‘Everybody left for Bosnia because there is new 
game now. Here, border is closed (because of) too much (police) beatings. I go to Bosnia tonight’, Badih 
told me, a young Afghani man, who was preparing for the further journey with his friends. 
As Hage (2005) points out, in many ways, ethnography is not a matter of choice but a function of one’s 
degree of immersion. I travelled by bus from Belgrade to Bosnia, to follow the migratory routes there. 
When I arrived in Sarajevo, my previous cooperation with activists gave me the opportunity to become 
immediately involved in food distribution for migrants arriving in the city from Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Turkey and other locations, where they had been previously stranded. I was observing for a week the 
migrants trying to enter overcrowded public transports heading to the northern towns Bihać or 
 
10 I discuss the rationale for changing the research focus later on, Ibid, p 61. 
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Kladuša, from where their new games were going to begin. I was informed that there was only little 
aid for migrants in Kladuša and offered to join activists there as a long-term volunteer and a researcher. 
I wished to be committed to the new surprises that, although they caught me off-guard, had a potential 
to result in fruitful data collection, as commonly happens in ethnography (Gille, 2001). I left to Kladuša, 
which based on the unexpected chain of situations, reaching beyond my pre-fieldwork pilot 
assessment, became my research site for the following eight months. As Bliesemann de Guevara and 
Kostić (2017) point out, messiness and uncertainty are not encouraged as outcomes of policy-relevant 
research. Yet messy and uncertain practices are part of doing fieldwork (Bøås & Bliesemann de 
Guevara, 2020). Interestingly, my messy entry to the field proved useful to learn about how border 
violence had triggered secondary migration movements and develop my relations and cooperation 
with migrants bounded in this messiness, leading me to Kladuša. 
5.3.2: Militant research and volunteering in refugee camps in Velika Kladuša. 
Using volunteering in refugee camps as an ethnographic research choice was inspired by the ideas of 
militant research, which places at the centre problems of a community, with the objective to both 
understand and confront them (King & Learmonth, 2015; Stringer, 1996). Militant research is premised 
on intensive and reflexive research collaboration with our participants, in which researchers assume 
the role of active political practitioners to try to make our work relevant to those who we study 
(Apoifis, 2016; Juris, 2007). In practice, as Graeber (2009) argues, militant research means that a 
researcher is involved in direct actions in her ethnographic field, which is a common approach used in 
(Women) Social Movement studies (Maeckelbergh, 2009; Voss, 1996; Zald & Ash, 1966). 
This methodological approach also fits well in violence research with migrants due to its political and 
ethical commitments to participants, who strive for acute transformation of their living and travelling 
spaces that expose them to harms (Jordan & Moser, 2020; Juris, 2007). Some scholars (Albahari, 2015; 
Esin & Lounasmaa, 2020; Iliadou, 2019; Isakjee et al., 2020; Jordan & Moser, 2020; Kasparek & Speer, 
2013; Mould, 2017; Vogt, 2018) used volunteering with migrants to examine violence and borders. 
However, it seems that despite its benefits, long-term volunteering is not commonly utilised as a 
research method due its unpaid, time-consuming and physically and physiologically exhausting nature. 
All these are issues even more difficult to navigate in an increasingly neoliberal academic outlook and 
fast operating academic context, limiting physical or social access to the field (Bliesemann de Guevara 
& Kostić, 2017; Routledge & Derickson, 2015). However, my monthly doctoral stiped, one year of a 




It is important to note that I had been previously involved in volunteering for refugees in Serbia and 
the U.K, and for people with disabilities in the Czech Republic and Ukraine, for years before entering 
my doctoral programme. In doing so, I wished to question the political categorisation and social 
marginalisation of certain groups of populations, and particularly in the post-Communist background, 
which I come from. I grew up in a slow process of political and social rehabilitation after the totalitarian 
regime in the Czech Republic and political violence and the questions of migration were inherent in my 
family history. Yet, the Czech Republic is one of the most reluctant countries to sympathise with the 
current migration to Europe. As a Czech who is simultaneously the EU member enjoying free 
movement and political freedom, this paradox was bothering me and resulted in my interest in the 
topic. I did not wish to only hear through interviews about migration and violence in their abstract 
forms. Instead, I wanted to see and participate in a refugee community and politically act. I believe 
that direct actions are more likely to have an impact on transformation of such crucial issues such as 
border violence, at least on the micro level while supporting people in the camps. Hence, my research 
interest and methodologies were inevitably affected by my family history and political and social 
backgrounds. I thus agree with Lumsden (2013, p 3) who argues that ‘you are what you research’, and 
I would also add, ‘and how you research it’. 
I was volunteering and using activism for eight months in Kladuša, with a two weeks break in 
September and four days in December, which enabled me to conduct intensive fieldwork with daily 
access into the life at the borders, its patterns and transformation across the four seasons of the year. 
The majority of the fieldwork was conducted in the makeshift Trnovi camp (see Figure 4), as well as 
numerous abandoned houses around the town, where smaller groups of migrants lived. I was 




Figure 4 Trnovi camp in the summer (phot by Aliah, Iraq11). 
 
Volunteering was mostly guided by the emergency needs of migrants and the challenges of navigating 
permissions and restrictions to provide aid by the local authorities. After my arrival in the spring, myself 
and three other volunteers focused on a mobile shower and clothes exchange provision nearby the 
camp, run from two regular washing machines in an old house where we lived. My days started around 
seven in the morning in the showers, where around seventy people per day could wash themselves, 
shave, exchange their dirty clothes for clean ones, as well as seek medical aid, rest and socialise. From 
late afternoon we cleaned the showers and drove dirty towels and clothes back to the house to wash 
them, stopping on the way at squats to deliver drinking water. On other days, I was helping a group of 
local war veterans to distribute food in a local restaurant. During the evening, we returned to the camp 
to distribute clothes, tents and blankets to dozens of newly arriving people, (re-)building shelters, 
organising activities for children, or teaching English. The autumn brought the rainy season and the 
winter snow, with temperatures reaching – 20°C, which also meant new challenges and needs, such as 
the provision of warm clothes and wood for fires to prevent hypothermia. 
I was aware of the potential research pitfalls that could result from my dual role of a volunteer and a 
researcher, which could slip into what Cabot (2019) criticises as ambulance chasing, being immersed 
 
11 Published with the consent of the author of the photograph. 
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into aid and omitting research duties. A number of steps were taken to prevent this. Firstly, I ensured 
that besides living in the field for an extensive period, I would also ‘hang out’ with migrants and local 
communities, after my volunteering finished, which Rodgers (2004, p 48) identifies as intensive, 
informal and interpersonal interactions research. Secondly, to understand the local context in which 
border violence took place, I regularly talked with the local volunteers and residents about their 
histories and opinions on the migratory situations. Importantly, I was almost every night spending time 
in the camp. I used this time to establish a rapport with migrants and learn about what had preceded 
their arrivals in Bosnia, their plans for the games, the day-to-day practices, challenges at borders, and 
hopes for their future. Finally, I was learning Arabic with my participants to develop my conversation 
skills in their language and to further my understanding of their interpretations of violence. 
Volunteering gave me a unique opportunity to daily observe and participate in both mundane 
practices, rituals, relations in camps as well as observe daily returns of injured people after their cross-
border journeys. I was daily engaging in informal conversations, especially with migrants who were 
aware of my role as a researcher, to understand their encounters and interpretations of various daily 
situations emerging at the borders, without audio recording them. Instead, I was audio-recording 
myself or writing down bullet points on my phone to capture major points after conversations, as well 
as my daily observations. I was then transcribing these in further details together with my reflections 
into my laptop research diary during the nights. After few months of intensive fieldwork, I was 
recording my research diary on a weekly basis. 
Using volunteering as an ethnographic method was analytically demanding and physically exhausting 
particularly the first few months. To jot down, reflect on, and incorporate so many situations in my 
research diary was often challenging, but I always managed to find a few minutes on the side of my 
volunteering duties during the day and then dedicate 30-60 min in the night to write this up more fully. 
When the voluntary work grew, the limited living space I had became a new challenge. After weeks of 
sharing a bed with another volunteer, I moved to my car, parked in the garden, where I slept for three 
months. This allowed me to stay close to the camp, while simultaneously creating privacy for myself 
and writing up my research data in the night. It is a measure of the conditions in which I was working 
that my car actually provided the bigger sleep space. It was also more secure, since I could lock the 
door, and it offered much more reassuring accommodation than the volunteer house, with its insecure 
doors and missing windows. However, when the winter started approaching, myself and another 
volunteer, Rosalinde12, decided to rent a flat. In doing so, we wanted to live in a warmer environment 
 
12 All participants’ names have been changed to protect their anonymity, which is discussed in greater detail 
later on in Chapter 5, Ibid, p 70-71. 
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and create more space where we could invite my closest participants for dinner and offer a couch if 
they had nowhere else to stay, which was happening almost on a daily basis. This brought a new 
dynamic to my research, when I was in much closer contact with my closest participants, which 
resulted in our more transparent relations and collaboration. 
 
Although Jordan and Moser (2020) assert that volunteering offers a reciprocal engagement with 
research subjects, I argue that volunteering itself does not address reciprocity in research knowledge 
production. When using direct solidarity actions, researchers need to further question how the 
knowledge produced through research could be of use to migrants and their social struggles, beyond 
re-inscribing their academic interests (Routledge & Derickson, 2015). Indeed, Sukarieh and Tannock 
(2013) argue that a common issue in migration research is that participants have no say in what is 
being studied about them, which may result in a lack of relevance on the ground as well as missing a 
research information on violence in participants’ own understandings. In line with this, I noticed that 
participant’s illegal and makeshift living places mattered less to them than my research questions 
assumed, and that the most pressing issue identified by my participants were the police attacks and 
push-backs from Croatia to Bosnia. I came to realise that the attacks together with other forms of 
violence significantly shaped their daily life at the borders; themes large neglected in research and 
which I wanted to explore further. 
5.3.3: Border violence report collection. 
Placing the focus on border violence, however, posed new methodological and ethical questions. I was 
meeting daily migrants after their push-backs, as they approached me and other volunteers in the 
camp to communicate their experiences of verbal and physical attacks. Importantly, no organisation 
was present to record evidence of either individual cases of direct violence or the scale of this violence. 
Migrants commonly said during our conversations that ‘no one knowing about attacks meant violence 
to continue’, which turned out to be true, when I observed the increasing brutality and scale of border 
attacks across a few weeks. This made me re-think my research methodologies and ethics. 
Scheper-Hughes (1995) argues that when a researcher observes violence at close quarter, returns to a 
safe environment and closes the findings in academia, she collaborates with the relations of power 
and silence that allow destruction in the field to continue. Yet scholars commonly avoid any political 
stand on the working out of violent events due to a fear of abandoning scientific objectivity and 
dangerous immersion in the emotional worlds of our participants (Woon, 2013). However, Jamar and 
Chappuis (2016) argue that it is absurd to believe that a researcher does not bring his own normative 
and political predilections into the research. Also, when a researcher observes violence in the field, 
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she also recognises the possibilities for changing such realities (Vrasti, 2008). Not to speak out about 
these abuses or remain detached is ethically impossible (Lundy & Mcgovern, 2006), and can lead to 
the researcher’s lack of personal control and even trauma in or after the fieldwork (Jamar & Chappuis, 
2016). Therefore, researchers need to ask themselves whether they should turn a blind eye to abusive 
and predatory behaviour when conducting research (Goodhand, 2000). To this end, numerous scholars 
(Bird et al., 2019; Brambilla & Jones, 2020; Dhesi et al., 2015; Frank, 2019; Isakjee et al., 2020; Jamar, 
2017; Kasparek & Speer, 2013; King & Learmonth, 2015) call for research practices that are in line with 
the militant research approach; that is, to document violence and its effects, when making their 
knowledge accessible to policy makers, practitioners, civil society actors, and ordinary people. 
Drawing upon this, I further used reports compiling instances of violent push-backs when conducting 
semi-structured interviews with migrants. The interviews proved useful to capture information about 
direct violence, which I could not otherwise collect via observations due to the unexpectable, 
clandestine and dangerous nature of violent push-backs. I firstly developed the standardised interview 
framework, based on the previous examples of border violence monitoring by activists and NGOs13, 
and further incorporated other volunteers’ and migrants’ suggestions to the reporting format. I was 
also discussing the interview format with a medical organisation and independent lawyers, with 
previous experiences of border violence monitoring. As my research progressed, I also attended a one-
day training session on border violence monitoring organised by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. 
The semi-structured format of my interviews allowed me to ask specific questions that captured 
evidence about push-backs, such as dates, times, geo-locations, descriptions of officers and their 
weapons used, photos of injuries and caused damage, medical reports (see Figure 5), while at the same 
time giving migrants a chance to explore in-depth issues that they felt were important in their own 
narratives. These key points extracted from the interviews and evidence material were used for activist 
purposes, while the whole interview narratives were together with informal conversations and 
participant observations analysed and used for the purpose of this thesis. 
The interviews were conducted either in English, or in the language that participants felt comfortable 
to communicate in14 and translated to English by their friends or other camp inhabitants, due to having 
no possibility to cooperate with professional translators. The interviews were mostly conducted in a 
café, participants’ shelters, nearby the mobile shower services or other calm places accessible to me 
 
13 I was inspired by the reports about border violence compiled by No Name Kitchen Serbia, Rigardu, Fresh 
Response and Hungarian Helsinki Committee along the Serbian-Croatian and Serbian-Hungarian borders. 
14 All languages in which the interviews were conducted with the help of translators are listed in Appendix, 
Table 1, Ibid, p 194. 
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and my participants. In total, I conducted 68 formal, recorded interviews about violent push-backs, 
which ranged between 15 to 90 minutes in length. 
 
Figure 5 Allocating the location of push-back (photo by author). 
 
The dissemination of the data, for both activist and academic purposes, was discussed with the migrant 
community in the camp, when following their proposals about what was going to happen with the 
data. However, this was re-negotiated with each participant individually before the interviews started, 
besides obtaining consent to use the data for academic purposes. As the result of this collective 
process and consent of each individual participating in the interview, I transcribed all interviews into a 
word document and identified extracts proving the evidence of the attack, for writing monthly 
‘violence reports’. These reports served as practical guidelines to humanitarian organisations15 and 
competent authorities16. By doing so, I wished to bring attention to migrants’ experiences, ideas, and 
wishes for change beyond an academic audience. 
When collecting the data for both activist and academic purposes, I was learning about detailed violent 
strategies and migrants’ understanding of it, yet I was daily reflecting on both mine and my 
 
15 MSF, IOM, Amnesty International, UNHCR. 
16 Croatian Ombudswoman for Human Rights, Members of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, LIBE committees, FRONTEX, and lawyers opening 
litigation cases in the European Court of Human Rights. 
65 
 
participant’s positionalities to spot biases throughout the research process. To reflect on these 
positionalities, the following section will outline the recruitment of my participants and in detail discuss 
our cooperation. 
5.3.4: Participant selection and collaboration: European female researching violence with Arab 
male participants. 
To examine quotidian dimensions of violence and also open up its subjective dimensions for the 
migrants based on their gender and race, the research focused predominantly on young adult (18-40) 
able-bodied men, stranded in Bosnia, whom I observed to be the major group exposed to border 
violence. Nevertheless, among my interviewed participants were also an elderly individual and two 
men with physical disabilities, who despite their visible vulnerabilities were also subjected to diverse 
forms of violence. I was also informally approached by several unaccompanied minors in the camp 
who wished to tell me about their accounts of border violence. While no people younger than 18 years 
old were formally interviewed for the purpose of this thesis, their accounts are considered here based 
on our informal communication in the camps, while navigating ethical considerations specific to 
research with minors, which I return to discuss later on17. To examine further the argument about 
border violence as dependent on the construction of gender, race and other social categories, I also 
conducted interviews with 8 women. My participants were originally from the Middle East, Asia and 
Northern Africa18. 
Interviewees were selected on the basis of circumstance and snowball sampling techniques that 
allowed flexible recruitment within the context of unpredictable violent incidents and participant’s 
availability (Cohen & Arieli, 2011). In practice, migrants approached me or other volunteers when they 
returned from the border following push back, and while using our services in the camp they would 
often tell us about the violence perpetrated against them. Firstly, our group ensured medical care for 
them and then, if appropriate, asked if they would like to be interviewed for the purposes of legal and 
public advocacy and academic purposes. The objectives of the ‘violence reports’ described above were 
explained consistently to the whole community of migrants in the camps. This helped to create a 
snowball effect, when people in the camp were passing the option to record violent incidents to others, 
who later approached me or other volunteers voluntarily. 
A second line of investigation involved participant observation and informal conversations in the camp 
and with a particular focus on a group of twelve young men (18-27) from Syria. I first met them after 
 
17 Ibid, Chapter 5, p 69-70. 
18 For more information about nationalities, age, sex, interview language, and other migrants involved in the 
push-back together with the interviewed, see Appendix, Table 1, Ibid, p 194. 
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they had been attacked by Croatian border patrols and participated in the interviews for border 
violence reporting and my research. One of them, Rashid19, had broken ribs as the result of the attack. 
I was driving Rashid to a hospital for several hours and was frustrated by my inability to understand 
his pain due to my limited Arabic and his inability to speak English. Over the next few days, I kept 
visiting Rashid to see whether he was recovering, and his friends, who could speak English, invited me 
for a dinner to their heima. Rashid asked me whether I wanted to teach him and his friends English in 
return for them teaching me Arabic. After a few weeks of our language classes and dinners, I explained 
to them in more detail the purpose of my stay in Bosnia as a student researcher, and asked them if 
they would like to collaborate in my research, and they agreed. Our daily interactions continued for six 
months. 
While Reedy and King (2019) argue that an activist approach aids the researcher in coping with 
emotionally difficult situations due to collaboration in activist communities, in my experience support 
and reflections on events at the borders did not come only from activists but from the community as 
a whole. Since most volunteers stayed in the field for only a few weeks or months, my long-standing 
connections in the field was with my closest participants. My participants were often helping us in aid 
provision and informing me and other volunteers about push-backs. I appreciated my participant’s 
presence not only for my research and mutual support but also for my safety, as similarly encountered 
by Vogt (2018) at the U.S.-Mexico border. While migration research commonly refers to migrants’ 
vulnerabilities and impossibility of avoiding violence, I found this narrow portrayal to be false and 
problematic as it replicates colonial logics of apartheid and marginalization. Certainly, it was 
challenging for migrants to deal with border violence. However, I found my participants, 
predominantly men coming from war zones, as better skilled at navigating violent fields due to their 
previous experiences than me. For instance, my participants were able to stop regular inter-communal 
fights in the camps and to ensure mine and other volunteers’ safety by intervening in the fights and 
communicating peacefully in their mother tongue. 
Importantly, I often reflected on my research process through discussions with the participants, which 
is a fundamental aspect in ethnographic practice (Berry, 2011), yet mostly described as solely 
researchers’ practice. These discussions also reflected on those processes in daily life at borders that 
were crucial to identify and to understand diverse positionalities of privilege and power (Manning, 
2018), including those between researcher and participants. 
 
19 All participants’ names have been changed to protect their anonymity, see more information in Chapter 5, 
Ibid, p 70-71. 
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This latter point is important because despite my attempts to increase reciprocity between me and my 
participants through volunteering, our relations were shot through with insurmountable power 
asymmetries. My positionality as female, white, non-Muslim, and an EU citizen presented power 
differences between me and my participants that affected the way they construed and interacted with 
me. My participants were all Sunni Muslims, following everyday traditions of Islam. Most of them had 
had restricted interactions with women in Syria, except female family relatives. They originated from 
rural Syrian towns, where the local population rejected the regime of Bashar al-Assad and wished to 
remain living a traditional patriarchal Muslim life without governmental interventions. All lost some 
relatives in the Syrian Civil War; some had family members in prison or had been recruited to the Syrian 
Arab Armed Forces against their will. 
Our diverse positionalities were often reflected during our interactions but were observable 
particularly when we first met. The first day, a few men, including Tahir, refused to talk to me or even 
make eye contact due to my being a foreign woman. However, when they found out I that I had 
transported Rashid to a hospital and attempted to report the attack against them at the border zone, 
they hosted me in their tent and offered me a chai, but with reluctance. A few months later, Tahir 
explained this initial hesitation: 
Tahir: It is haram (forbidden in Arabic) to look into eyes of a woman. No touch woman! 
(Foreign) woman should not sit with men and talk. 
Me: But Tahir, you are looking to my eyes now. And I sit with you and talk with you every night. 
This is not haram? 
Tahir: Before it was. Now, you are my sister, so no haram. I can sit with you and talk because I 
love you as my sister. Even if I hug you, it is not haram because I have no haram thoughts about 
you. Now, I know that you are good because you help me. 
The above narrative shows that our daily co-existence in the camp could positively impact mine and 
my participants’ gender and cultural performativity. As Butler (2004) points out, the concept of gender 
and cultural performativity are socially constructed and not definitive, when Herbert (2000) adds that 
gender and culture are challenged and spatially inscribed in daily processes. Thus, positionality barriers 
between me and my participants were mitigated when I was daily present in the camp for eight 
months, trying to communicate in my participants’ language, and teaching each other about our 
backgrounds. These resulted in closer research participation even with the men, who came from 
monocultural backgrounds with traditional conceptions of gender relations. 
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However, my methodological approach did not totally remove the differences emerging from our 
diverse backgrounds. Particularly, me being an EU citizen and able to enter the borders to Bosnia and 
leave at any moment without risking my life was in sharp contrast to the positionality of my 
participants, and this difference between us was ever present. Also Irwin (2006) argues that a 
researcher’s ability to leave the field poses the major ethical questions of unequal research relations. 
Indeed, while the roles of an aid provider and a friend were fluid, the role of a displaced person was 
solid. Consequently, the distance did not collapse, and I could never fully enter my participants’ violent 
realities and their community due to our different social and political locations despite direct actions 
and developed relations in the field, which highlights the major limit of my research knowledge about 
border violence. 
Moving beyond collaboration with my closest participants, I found establishing research relations with 
trust and legitimacy a challenging task in the makeshift camps, which due to their open space attract 
journalists, researchers, smugglers, police, tourists and many unidentified visitors, leaving question 
marks about their intentions. Long-term volunteering mostly proved a useful way to overcome being 
considered as suspicion and to establish trust. However, once I was asked by a young Iraqi boy: ‘Are 
you a smuggler? Some people think you are smuggler because you live here for long time and speak 
Arabic with people’. For the same reason, I was also considered by an older man to be a spy working 
for the Syrian Government. This shows that being daily present in the field as a volunteer/researcher 
and learning insiders’ language is only a partial answer to conduct methodologically and ethically 
sound research. This methodological approach can paradoxically create new suspicious assumptions 
about a researcher and thus, the role to be trusted must be daily re-negotiated individually with 
participants. 
5.4: Thematic data analysis. 
This fieldwork produced a unique and, I would argue, significant data set. The 68 interviews were 
transcribed verbatim from the audio records. My data also included 137 typed pages of observation 
and conversations taken from my research diary. To identify, organise and analyse this data this 
research drew upon thematic analysis (Nowell et al., 2017). The data was analysed both during and 
after the fieldwork. 
During the fieldwork, the data analysis concerned only the interview-data analysis in a Word 
document. I transcribed all formal and recorded interviews each month to a Word document for the 
purpose of writing policy-oriented ‘violence reports’. This proved useful for my thesis because I was 
inductively selecting themes and generating basic codes within this set of data on direct violence. This 
means that I was identifying varied themes across line-by-line interviews, focused on direct forms of 
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violence (theme 1), such as strategies of direct violence, its impact on migrants’ health, weapons used 
by police, verbal threats, and destructions and robberies of migrants’ private possessions. I also 
identified broader/structural violence (theme 2) at this stage when coding administrative procedures 
that migrants said to experience at police stations. 
After the fieldwork, the data analysis focused on all cross-material data set from the 8 months of 
fieldwork, when questioning the complex forms of violence identified by migrants and how these 
impacted their day-to-day life. I used the qualitative data analysis software NVivo, which allowed me 
to more easily navigate finding insights in unstructured data. Firstly, I identified varied themes across 
line-by-line field notes and interviews concerning border violence and everyday life. While asking the 
questions, ‘What are the most crucial and the most repetitive daily events and actions by my 
participants in the camps and at the borders?’, ‘How do my participants interpret and understand their 
actions and events in their everyday life?’, and ‘Which individual characteristics as well as external 
factors influence such events and actions, particularly those of violence?’. As the result of the thematic 
analysis, six major themes were generated: masculinity and race, police attacks, broader inequalities, 
violence in the everyday, Europe-Balkans dynamics. Then, I identified important sections of the text 
within each theme and attached codes to them, to identify interesting aspects of each theme and the 
patterns that underlie them (Nowell et al., 2017). The coding resulted in three levels, which was 
particularly used in the theme of the ‘violence in the everyday’, where hierarchical coding proved 
useful to capture diverse layers of the men’s transformation of the everyday as the result of border 
violence (self-perception, relations with others, daily routines). 
After completing the data coding in the NVivo software, I used the codes and their narratives to write 
four data analysis pieces (each 8000 words long), each discussing one of the major themes together 
with my personal memos and reflections. Emerson Fretz and Shaw (1995) call this process ‘integrative 
memos writing’, and argue that the purpose is to re-experience, rethink and gain new insights into the 
ethnographic data as well as to reflect on how a researcher understood what she saw within the data 
and in which order. This stage of writing encompassed the first attempt to structure and analyse the 
data by creating a cohesive narrative capturing detailed patterns identified within codes, with contexts 
and backgrounds. The final stage focused on developing theoretical prepositions; drawing the link 
between my data and existing theory. 
5.5: Ethical questions and do (no) harm in violence research. 
This fieldwork and collection of data was guided by a number of ethical considerations. Firstly, I will 
outline how I obtained consent from my participants with respect to the border research settings in a 
migration context, to possible fault expectations and to young age. Whilst conducting research on 
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violence, I further identified two ethical concerns – anonymity and do no harm - which presented the 
major disparity between ticking the boxes of ethical approval before the fieldwork and then navigating 
its problematic consequences while collecting the data. These are discussed in the following section.  
5.5.1: Obtaining consent. 
This study has been informed by the British Sociological Association’s ethical guidelines and Aston 
University’s Ethics guidelines. I had obtained ethical approval from the Aston Ethics Committee in April 
2018 (before entering the field). I re-submitted the ethical approval again in June 2018 when I 
incorporated interviews about violent push-backs to my study, which was also approved. I obtained 
oral consent from all the interviewees, my closest participants, as well as people, whose conversations 
and comments were incorporated to my research diary. I considered written consent inappropriate in 
the context of the migratory routes I was intending to explore (Langmann & Pick, 2014). Participants 
said they had had to repeatedly sign forms that had undermined their rights and mobility; when being 
forcibly moved from makeshift camps to detention centres, apprehended in border zones, or arrested 
in police stations during the games. Consequently, migrants were suspicious of signing official-looking 
documents, and for this reason it was avoided. Instead, I dedicated considerable time to establish 
dialogue and trust with the participants in the ways detailed above and discussed with them at length 
my research in order to provide the basis for them to provide informed consent orally. Consent was, 
however, re-negotiated in different phases of my research, when my closest participants were actively 
involved in defining research questions, formatting the interviews, reflecting on the data, and decision-
making about dissemination of the data for public advocacy purposes. 
As noted, children travelling with adults and (unaccompanied) minors were not the focus of my 
research yet their voices appear in my data as they matter in making sense of border violence and 
diverse groups of migrants it targets. Firstly, violence against a few children is discussed in this thesis 
while using data collected during the interviews with their parents, who gave me oral consent to do 
so. Secondly, I met several young males between 14 and 17 years old who wished to tell me during our 
informal conversations about their experiences of violence. While researchers usually use adult 
gatekeepers to obtain their consent from minors and include their voices to study (Hopkins & Bell, 
2008), these young people were travelling without parents and adult family members and no formal 
services with social workers were available in Kladuša. This made the obtaining of parental/adult 
gatekeeper consent impossible. They also identified themselves as adult men based on their cultural 
backgrounds and the past violent experiences. Indeed, many showed the cognitive and emotional 
capabilities to decide to talk about their push-backs, navigating difficult life in the camps, and indicating 
independence on their journeys. This goes against conventional ideas of how minors epitomise 
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increased vulnerability and lack agency. As Chase et al. (2020) argue, the category ‘(unaccompanied) 
minor’ is dependent on geographical and legal contexts, which are all time and space contingent. Since 
I did not wish to ignore or silence the young people’s voices, yet I also wanted to respect European 
academic guidelines around the ethics of informed consent, I do include their testimonies gathered 
through our informal conversations in the camps, even though they were not interviewed. 
As another important ethical concern related to obtaining voluntary informed consent, I identified 
potential unrealistic expectations from the research project with all participants when conducting 
interviews about push-backs. To address this, I explained before each interview the aims of the 
research with my participants to ensure they understood the possible implications of reporting violent 
incidents and to avoid them having false expectations and hopes. Indeed, the danger of unrealistic 
expectations is great particularly in situations of widespread distress and only limited external means 
of support (Goodhand, 2000). Before the beginning of the interview, some participants contested that 
they hoped to use their recorded testimony of violence to access legal transit to their destination 
and/or obtain asylum in the EU. I then explained clearly (and apologetically) that the research project 
could not achieve this, clarified the aims of the interview. As a result, a few people felt an interview 
would not be useful and thus decided not to proceed. For the remainder who accepted, I orally 
acknowledged before each interview that they were free to pause the interview or withdraw at any 
time with no need to specify the reason. As pointed out to previously, I used the help of other migrants 
to translate the interviews with people who had no or limited knowledge of the English language, to 
avoid involuntary consent and prevent misunderstanding of the research objectives, process, and 
dissemination. 
5.5.2: Anonymity and do (no) harm. 
Ensuring participants’ anonymity is crucial in violent fields, to not only protect their privacy and dignity, 
but also to minimise the potential forms of harm (Knott, 2019). A number of steps were taken to do 
so. Firstly, all information about the individuals participating in the research process has been 
anonymised; all names and identifiable information have been changed. Secondly, all collected data 
(e.g. audio/digital files, notes, and research diary) were stored securely on my password protected 
computer. I transcribed all interview audio files to word documents, stored in my laptop, when all 
paper version of interview notes was destroyed, and the audio files were stored securely online and 
deleted from my laptop. Finally, when disseminating any data publicly on websites and social media to 
raise the awareness about border violence, all names and identifiable features have been also 
changed. However, medialisation of the migrants’ practices and places along the borders, where my 
participants temporarily lived, had a negative impact on their privacy in the camps. 
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On the one hand, the public sharing of violent narratives has impact on social transformation (Esin & 
Lounasmaa, 2020), and facilitates democratic discourse (Persson, 2019). On the other hand, Knott 
(2019) argues that when a researcher decides to publicly disseminate research data in a conflict area, 
it is imperative to think about the potential for harm to research participants, the researcher herself, 
and the wider context, by what material is published. However, the question is whether researchers 
are able to predict all potential impacts of public dissemination in violent fields, which, as Knott (2019) 
argues, are quickly evolving. While from the wider context, the media strategy had a positive impact 
on state authorities’ decisions to acknowledge border violence and in some cases investigate the cases, 
it had indirect negative effects on my participants’ privacy, although no one was identified within the 
data that I disseminated. 
The first published information about violent push-backs took place in The Guardian newspaper, 
followed by an influx of media, which significantly harmed the social context where my participants 
lived in. While professional journalism is crucial to explore what images and stories can tell the public 
and social scientists about more ambiguous aspects of life at borders (Langmann & Pick, 2014), 
practices of many omitted any collaboration with migrants. Journalists were often stepping into private 
lives of people in the camps, with no consent and empathy, taking images of peoples’ faces and injuries 
from the most dramatic angles, and after a few hours disappearing, as also observed in Serbian camps 
(Augustová, 2020). Participants wished and consented to publish the materials in which they were 
anonymised, but they had not consented to the greater visibility and the politicisation of themselves 
and their living spaces afterwards, which I had unconsciously triggered when engaging with media. 
 
On the one hand, drawing on the militant research significantly impacted my own research practice as 
a politically committed and trying to ‘do good for my participants’ in the field. However, I also found 
that to do help is often on the edge to do harm in violence research because violent fields are 
constantly changing and the fact that the participants have no legal protection and do not live in 
private and protected places. Thus, although using ethnographic methods with direct political actions 
was identified as the most suitable research tool at the borders, as discussed throughout the 
methodology chapters here, I identified numerous ethical pitfalls in these methods, besides the 
analytically, psychologically and physically demanding nature of being daily present in the refugee 
camp. Reflections on these, however, stimulate discussions on research methodology and ethics when 
calling for more engaged academic knowledge with participants and advocating for transparent and 




This chapter detailed the methodology that was used for this study exploring border violence against 
migrant Arab Muslim men, as daily experienced and interpreted by them. This objective and seeking 
to understand violence through the theoretical lens of the everyday (Scheper-Hughes, 1992) 
influenced the adoption of a qualitative methodological approach. This study particularly drew upon 
ethnographic methods and ideas of militant research, conducted in my role as a volunteer for eight 
months and using daily participant observations and semi-structured interviews with migrants to 
compile reports on violent push-backs. 
I began this chapter by posing the question: ‘Where is the fieldwork place?’, which enabled me to 
reflect on how migratory pathways as fieldwork places are constantly on the move, as those crossing 
them. While moving from the primary selected field – Serbia – to the newly emerging camps in Bosnia 
was an inherently messy process, following these fast changes allowed me to immerse myself into the 
field on the move, as organised by violence and solidary responses to it, and develop positive and 
trusted bonds with my participants. Thus, ethnographic methods allowed me to enter and engage with 
the field and the people there under difficult to navigate and perpetually evolving conditions. 
The focal part of this chapter then reflected on methodological choices guided by ethnography and 
militant research, as well as my personal values. These choices presented a number of methodological 
and ethical challenges, particularly the one of inherent power inequalities between me and my 
participants and navigating the dual role of a volunteer and a researcher. However, the chosen 
methods proved to be the most suitable to understand violence as everyday and the reflections on 
them contributed to the calls for more politically and ethically committed research practice (Bird et al., 
2019; Cabot, 2019; Jamar, 2017; Jordan & Moser, 2020; Juris, 2007; King & Learmonth, 2015; Scheper-
Hughes, 1995; Vrasti, 2008). While daily volunteering in makeshift camps proved an intensive and 
often exhausting fieldwork, this allowed me to daily observe violence as a process and to question how 
it organises the everyday at the border across the four seasons of the year, which is a difficult task with 
the increasingly fast operation in academia. 
The triangulation of the participant observations with border violence reports collection via semi-
structured interviews with the migrants then enhanced my knowledge on direct violence. The 
interviews allowed me to encounter detailed strategies of the police’s crude attacks, which I could not 
directly observe due to the clandestine and dangerous nature of police operations. Thus, using the two 
sets of data from participant observations and interviews encompassed violence as a comprehensive 
everyday phenomenon, ranging from structural forms of violence in the camps to direct police attacks 
against migrant men at borders, as bounded in the local context of the Bosnian-Croatian margins. This 
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research approach, I believe, resulted in a significant and novel data set created under demanding 
conditions. 
The final section laid out the range of ethical concerns that rose before and while conducting the 
research. Despite various precautions to address potential ethical issues before setting off for the 
fieldwork, the borders scored with violence are constantly evolving fields, where academic ethics 
forms are not enough to address numerous ethical questions. I argue that it was rather the daily 
reflexive thinking and discussions within the whole camp community, including the migrants, which 
alerted me to ethical pitfalls and led to me continually developing the ways to address them. To this 
end, like Chase et al. (2020), I advocate that research ethics should cease being viewed solely as an 
institutionalised, tick box process within academia but as a process that involves messiness and 
failures, as also Bøås and Bliesemann de Guevara (2020) argue. For this reason, I suggest questioning 
what equal research is and transparently reflect on it as researchers, friends and public advocates of 
our participants, who are living with us in the field and are impacted by our actions. This proves useful 
to conduct our research according to ethical practices, which I hoped to demonstrate in this chapter.  
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Chapter 6: The role of the historical Balkan-Europe dichotomy in violence 
against migrants at Bosnian-Croatian borders. 
6.1: Introduction. 
This chapter uses fieldwork data to examine present-day migration and violence along the Bosnian-
Croatian border, and especially the border town Kladuša, where the research was conducted. While 
this border point is commonly assumed to be just another transitory point along the Balkan Route, it 
has been historically scored with violent struggles for Europeanisation between Croatia and Bosnia 
throughout the recent war conflicts and remains stranded in a problematic dichotomy of the Europe-
Balkans margins (Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004; Trakilović, 2020). Whilst this historic-political context 
impacts migration policies here (Bird et al., 2020), it remains unclear whether and how it also shapes 
direct and concrete acts of violence against migrants along the EU’s borders, such as Kladuša. In line 
with this, this chapter aims to answer, ‘to what extent does the local context of the Bosnian-Croatian 
border organise migrant’s experiences of violence’? 
It answers this question, firstly, by presenting the data collected at the time of my arrival in Sarajevo 
and the early research in Kladuša. I specifically discuss how the migratory passages across SEE re-
routed to Bosnia, while questioning how this transformation had been managed by migrants’ previous 
experiences of border violence along the whole region marking the so called ‘Balkan Route’. I outline 
this broader SEE context as vital to understand before moving into the discussion of how the passage 
across Bosnia, where violence soon occurred, was experienced and narrated by those living and 
migrating through Kladuša. 
It then moves onto the exploration of the migrants’ movement across the Bosnian-Croatian borders 
onwards and their meaning makings of this passage, as shaped by their new experiences of border 
violence as well as solidarities here. Migrants’ understandings of the region are compared with other 
actors’ interpretations of these passages, such as the local population, volunteers, but also policy 
makers, humanitarian agencies and the media. The purpose of this comparison is to develop analysis 
of how the Bosnian-Croatian border has been conventionally narrated from diverse European 
perspectives, as rooted in discriminatory history, and how these narratives then organised violence 
against those trying to cross this border. 
Building upon this, the chapter re-thinks the EUro-centred conventional understanding of what 
Balkans and Europe mean by focusing on the narratives of migration and violence told from Kladuša. 
The attention is paid to personal histories of the local population and the present experiences of 
migrants. I specifically question how these narratives matter in the everyday life in this small border 
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town scored with solidarities, when coping with violence from the other side of the border – Croatia. 
By doing so, the analysis adds another layer for understanding how the local context influences 
migrants’ experiences of violence at the border, yet, it simultaneously triggers solidarities that stands 
against such violence. 
The final part looks at the everyday life at the Bosnian-Croatian border from a broader time scheme - 
eight months observations - when pointing out the major transformations in the local responses 
towards the migrants. These will be placed into the broader context of what Bosnia, similarly to other 
former Yugoslav countries, aspires to be in relation to its place in Europe and the EU particularly, and 
how this impacted the local responses towards migrants and their daily experiences of violence in 
Kladuša. By doing so, this chapter will bring the local developments at the border into the perspective 
of the EU’s broader security approach in SEE to highlight the empirical implication of this micro context 
to macro violent border patterns against migrants. 
6.2: Arriving to the last ‘open’ border in Bosnia. 
After getting off the bus from Belgrade in Sarajevo in June 2018, I walked to the History Museum, to a 
meeting organised by volunteers aiding hundreds of newly arriving displaced people in the country. 
When I entered the meeting room, my gaze was caught by a photo exhibition on the walls, which were 
titled as the ‘journeys across the Balkan Route’. The photos captured border checkpoints with 
thousands of people waiting, escaping police batons, adults carrying children and walking via fields, 
and men covering their injuries. While this violence was visually captured in the EU margins of Greek, 
Hungarian and Croatian borders, using their police forces to facilitate and stop the movements, its 
narratives of chaos and violence were linked to what is considered as the ‘Balkans’. Serbia and 
Macedonia, lying by these EU’s peripheries, as Razsa and Lindstrom (2004) argue, became vulnerable 
to the vagaries of the changing social and political map of Europe, which now was represented in the 
images of police brutality that I was looking at. 
The meeting started and the main organiser, Bosnian activist Nadja, firstly said she had been lucky to 
survive the siege of Sarajevo in the 1990s, like most of the people coming from war zones and now 
sleeping rough around her city. With the longer time spent in the country, I noticed that Bosnians 
began our conversations about the newly arriving migrants with their stories from the recent wars. 
This showed, as I became aware, that the locals’ own narratives of violence and displacement mattered 
in their responses towards migrants; for some, shaping solidarities, but for others rejection. Indeed, 
there were many locals who distinguished themselves, their culture, religion, and experiences of 
fleeing from the newcomers, which was also previously encountered by Hromadžić (2019) in her 
research conducted in Bihać. 
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The meeting focused on how to fill the gaps of the state’s system by volunteering initiatives; to provide 
food, blankets, medical aid, and occupy an abandoned building in the city and use it as temporary 
accommodation, due to the only one state organised accommodation centre Delijaš, only having 
capacity for 160 people. Then, the talk moved on to the re-emerging violence along the northern 
Bosnian borders with Croatia. ‘Croatian police is beating them (migrants) like they have been beating 
them by Serbian border and in Hungary before’, said one girl. The subjection to the direct border 
violence, that I kept hearing about from the activists and the newly arriving migrants, showed that the 
secondary migration in the region had not been driven only by the search for new alternative ways to 
the EU, as argued by Ahmetašević and Mlinarević (2018). Essentially, trying to move from the previous 
transit spots in SEE became impossible due to the perpetual direct violence by border guards and police 
harassment. I encountered border violence as the major trigger of the secondary movements in the 
region, yet, leading to new episodes of border violence. 
Indeed, the border between Bosnia and Croatia had been always an option of transit but increasing 
deployment of violence elsewhere made this option the only one. To this end, I later learned that 
migrants standing in the train station in Sarajevo often referred to Bosnian borders with Croatia as the 
‘last open’ transit point from South-Eastern Europe to the EU. Albeit, Croatia as an EU member used 
smart border technologies, such as EUROSUR and EURODAC (European Commission 2019) and Bosnia 
was on the way to improve its own smart border security system since 2001 Europeanisation process 
(Geiger, 2016). Hence, migrants’ understanding of the ‘open (Bosnian-Croatian) border’ referred to 
the lack of militarisation and the use of direct violence rather than the ‘open Corridor’, which used to 
be a relatively safe and state-assisted transit across the region in 2015 and 2016 (El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 
2019). 
After the end of the meeting, I walked to the main train station to join volunteer-led food distribution 
for the displaced people sleeping rough around Sarajevo. From the line of people waiting for food, I 
could hear someone shouting my name. I turned around and saw Badih, whom I had talked to one 
week ago by the Serbian-Hungarian border, from where he was making his journey to Sarajevo20. While 
helping to distribute food and chatting with the people there, several others told me that they had 
also walked from Serbia, where they had spent months or years trying to cross the border, but their 
attempts mostly resulted in beatings by Croatian and Hungarian border guards and forced returns. The 
journeys from Serbia to Bosnia, however, were not easy, as the 375 km long border mostly consisted 
of the Drina and Sava rivers, resulting in several people drowning as the year progressed. Others said 
to travel from overcrowded camps in Greece, which Iliadou (2019) previously examined as inflicting 
 
20 Ibid, Chapter 5, p 54. 
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enduring and repetitive suffering and pain to migrants through endless time and waiting. A few men 
also walked from Bulgaria, where the existing research showed the borders being enforced by the 
brutality of ‘migrant hunters’ (Jovanović, 2018), and prison sentences for unauthorised entries to the 
country (Augustová, 2020). For a week, I was seeing overcrowded buses making their journeys to the 
northern borders, Kladuša and Bihać, from where migrants began their journeys onwards to the EU 
territory - Croatia. 
During the first few weeks of my research in Kladuša, I observed that while new people were daily 
arriving, almost none were leaving, and increasing numbers were returning due to what I quickly 
understood to be the push-backs. While migrants arrived in Kladuša with hope to avoid police 
interceptions and attacks, the border which was recently involved in the war, conflict and mass 
migration (Baker, 2015) soon undertook a new face and forms of violence. The Croatian Ministry of 
the Interior reported a 70% increase of so considered ‘illegal border crossing attempts’ in 2018 
(European Commission, 2019), which however mostly included migrants seeking asylum in the EU 
states. Under this legal framework of ‘crime’, the sounds of helicopters soon emerged and larger 
numbers of police patrols were deployed at the Bosnian-Croatian border, closing the migrants’ ‘last 
open’ transit from SEE to the EU. 
I opened this chapter by introducing migrants’ new journeys in Bosnia, which as I argued, resulted from 
the border push-backs and violence employed across SEE region. Bosnia has been seen as another 
transit spot along the (Western) Balkan Route in border security terms (Frontex, 2020b). However, the 
research on the history of Bosnian-Croatian relations shows that the events from the Ottoman Empire 
until the Yugoslav Wars are intertwined with discriminatory dichotomy between Balkans and Europe 
and violent struggles in this specific location (Baker, 2015; Huliaras, 2011; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004; 
Todorova, 2009), and well-established smuggling operations here (Ahmad, 2011; Bliesemann de 
Guevara, 2013). Due to this context, it would be therefore inaccurate to discuss Bosnia merely as 
another transit spot of the Balkan Route when examining violence against migrants along its borders 
with Croatia. To this end, the following sections question how the meaning makings of the Bosnian-
Croatian borders by the newly arriving migrants and the local population are affected by the recent 
history and violent struggles for de-Balkanisation and Europeanisation, now embedded in the EU’s 
expansion of border controls to the SEE region. 
6.3: Rihla and games across the Balkan Route and the European Union’s borders. 
Whereas Frontex visualises the migratory journeys across ‘Balkan Route’ as singular and linear 
pathways leading to the EU, portraying ‘threats’ of undocumented migration  (van Houtum & Bueno 
Lacy, 2020), I found that migrants’ experiences and understanding of their journeys significantly 
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differed. The expression ‘Balkan’ as inherently intertwined with the past war conflicts and Frontex’s 
migration risk analysis of the ‘Balkan Route’ got lost in the camps. Yet, the experiences of violence did 
not disappear from the migrants’ journeys but shifted closer to where Balkan assumes to 
conventionally end, and Europe begins – Croatia. It is the experience along the EU’s external as well as 
internal borders, away from Bosnia, that strongly resonated in migrants’ understanding of the borders 
and their crossings, and which this section explores. 
In late September, I was sitting in the Trnovi camp by a fire next to Cala, a 50 year old woman from 
Iraq, travelling with her two teenage daughters. She and her daughters returned from the Sedra Hotel, 
a formal accommodation centre for families, back to the makeshift camp, before trying go on rihla 
(journey in Arabic and an expression for the unauthorised border crossing) to Croatia for the third 
time. Cala had a close friendship with a Bosnian woman, whom many in the camp called ‘Mama’, who 
equipped her with warm clothes and food for the journey. Cala was cutting up chicken but did not 
seem to have an appetite as she worried about her upcoming trip: having no money to pay a smuggler 
for what she considered ‘safer’ car transport and facing danger to walk for weeks in mountains, with 
only little knowledge of the terrain, and a high possibility of being pushed back again. While expressing 
her worries, she was telling me about her whole journey from Iraq to Turkey and then, to the SEE - 
Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia. She described each border that she had crossed, how 
and with whom. After, she started talking about her plan to walk from Bosnia to Croatia – the EU entry, 
and then to Slovenia - the Schengen Zone, from where she wanted to freely take a bus to Belgium due 
to no more border controls. ‘This is the border between hell and heaven’, she said, ‘from here until 
Italy, it is hell. Everybody would do everything to cross this border. But they go and come back, go and 
come back, go and come back.’ 
Cala’s and other migrants’ journeys consisted of perpetually moving onwards and being forced 
backwards across diverse EU and non-EU border zones and inner states, towns and mountains, rivers, 
highways, makeshift camps and state-run accommodation centres. During the conversations with 
migrants, I learnt that their clandestine travels were (mis)directed by human smugglers, rumours heard 
across camps or read on Facebook, and, as previously pointed out by Obradović-Wochnik and Bird 
(2020), by various maps, flyers and signs passed on the way. People knew better which places to avoid 
rather than which to follow and often chose to travel across dangerous natural environments with the 
least possible human detection, such as rocky terrains and heavily-mined fields surrounding the 
Bosnian-Croatian border in Kladuša and Bihać (see Figure 6, below). I commonly saw my participants 
using their mobile maps, where they were inserting small red points, signifying new locations of police 
violence against those who just returned to the camp after their push-back and used their experiences 
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to create a common strategy. Most of these maps were filled with dozens of red points, each carrying 
a story of mistreatment, which migrants wished to avoid during their next attempt. 
 
Figure 6 A map on the wall of a makeshift camp in Bihać, showing dangerous areas contained 
by mines (photo by author). 
These journeys, however, mostly ended by push-backs to Bosnia, where they were waiting in camps 
and then, travelling again – the cycle that many were repeating for months or years until succeeding 
or, for some, dying. This ongoing multifaceted and multi-layered movement matches the ‘forced 
circular mobility’ (Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019, p 541), which was previously examined in Greece 
and Serbia (Obradović-Wochnik & Bird, 2020). What we can read from these migrants’ narratives is 
that increasing the EU’s externalisation of smart and militarised borders, merging various EU and non-
EU borders into a more synchronised apparatus (Andersson & Keen, 2019; Norman, 2020), rerouted 
migration to Bosnia, rather than stopped the movement. This turned the country to a new transit spot 
of forced circular mobility, albeit, now managed in different local political and social contexts. As the 
result of the EU’s expanding border operations, using various forms of violence across the wider 
neighbourhood, Cala’s understanding of borders from Bosnia, to Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy also 
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merged into a synchronised geographical zone that she described as the ‘(one) border between hell 
and heaven’. 
During our conversation, Cala did not once use the term ‘Balkan (Route)’, which was lost in the camps. 
Instead, Cala and other people in Bosnian camps referred to border crossing as the game, the term 
previously used by migrants in Serbia (Augustová, 2020), which is the same theatrical term that 
Andersson and Keen (2019) attribute to the externalisation border politics. Many Arabic speakers also 
commonly called their cross-border journeys simply rihla (journey in Arabic). When discussing 
locations of game and rihla, migrants commonly named individual countries marking their journeys in 
SEE and merely spoke about the ‘Balkan Route’. Interestingly, I also hardly heart the term ‘Balkans’ to 
be used by the local population, who perceived their place of living as Bosnia, an independent state in 
the heterogeneous region. 
The way that the people living and migrating across Bosnia perceived their living and travelling spaces, 
thus, significantly differed to the language of the EU’s border agency, who usually talks about the 
‘Balkan Route’, the term that is inherently linked in Frontex’s reports to the combat of cross-border 
crimes (Frontex, 2020a). In the similar manner, humanitarian agencies (IOM, 2020b; UNHCR, 2019a) 
and media (Townsend, 2015; von der Brelie & Salfiti, 2018) commonly used the term ‘Balkan(s) (Route)’ 
in their titles to portray humanitarian issues and narratives of border violence in a homogenous SEE 
region. These only reinforced the derogatory connotation of the Balkans as again a problematic and 
violent region and not-quite-Europe (Trakilović, 2020). Following this narrative, the only actors talking 
about the ‘Balkan Route’ on the ground were international volunteers, when one told me: ‘I am not 
surprised that this (violence against migrants) is happening here because this is Balkans.’ 
This comment echoes Hatzopoulos' (2003, p 26) argument how violence in SEE has been often analysed 
in public and political narratives ‘as intertwined with something inherently ‘Balkan’, conditioned by 
dark aspects of Balkan history. Such narratives became a powerful EU policy tool to frame migrant’s 
precarious living conditions in SEE as ‘normally’ occurring in ‘other’ places (Bird et al., 2020). Yet, I 
argue that the ill-informed ‘Balkan’ devastating face as a region-specific predicament (Hatzopoulos, 
2003) now also proves useful to perceive even more direct and crude forms of violence as occuring in 
the Balkans ‘as usual’. Paying attention to the terminologies of what Bosnia and the SEE region mean 
in migration and violence context of the EU’s border external management is thus fundamental due to 
its politically powerful West-East dichotomy in Europe that this language carries (Razsa & Lindstrom, 
2004; Trakilović, 2020). This terminology now plays an essential role in the management and 
concealment of violence against migrants from Croatia and Slovenia, as the EU members, to Bosnia, as 
also pointed by Isakjee et al. (2020). 
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However, as Cala’s description of ‘border of hell’ shows, migrants’ experiences of violence were not 
physically bounded in Bosnia -  the assumed location of Europe’s periphery of Islam and violence 
(Huliaras, 2011; Mishkova, 2008; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004; Todorova, 2009). Instead border violence, 
particularly the direct and the most crude forms, were daily taking place in the internal ‘liberal and 
Christian’ EU’s territories (Isakjee et al., 2020; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004), which will be considered in 
greater detail by the interview data on push-backs21. These divisions, thus, function to legitimate 
border violence (Galtung, 1990) in places where violence and cross-border crime have been historically 
normalised within the West popular imagination from the Ottoman Empire (Todorova, 2009), across 
WWII (Hoare, 2006; Korb, 2010), and the Yugoslav Wars (Baker, 2015). For this reason, the violence 
(against migrants) is not shocking to hear about or see for EUropean and western observers in the 
context of post-2015 migration, which itself has been portrayed as ‘crisis’, and thus, requiring radical 
measures, such as violence (de Vries & Guild, 2019).  
6.4: Violence and solidarities along Bosnian-Croatian borders: re-thinking ‘dangerous 
Balkans’ and ‘safe Europe’ from Kladuša. 
Building upon the discussion in the previous section, the question arises as to how those living and 
migrating across the Bosnian-Croatian border understood this border organised by the old and 
discriminatory dichotomy of what Europe and Balkans mean. In seeking to answer this question, I now 
turn to the narratives by migrants and the local population in Kladuša, whom both daily exchanged 
their experiences of violence, struggles but also solidarities emerging from these dominant narratives. 
By doing so, I wish to re-think how to locate violence at the Bosnian-Croatian border from the past 
conflicts and the present border measures. This provides further insight into how the local border 
context and the life there, scored with the histories of violence, organises the violence against migrants 
taking place at the time of the research. 
Whilst around 40,000, predominantly Muslim, Bosnians in Kladuša were personally affected by the 
recent wars through displacement, exile in precarious living conditions, violent push-backs from 
Croatia, and the denial of asylum application in the EU (Christia, 2008; Dahlman, 2016; Lischer, 1999), 
they had to deal with hundreds of people trying to migrate through their small town, but being pushed 
back and remaining. Residents of Kladuša commonly said during our conversations that their families 
had emigrated during the war and did not come back. Although a few new villas stood shining next to 
old houses in the town, built by Bosnians who lived in northern Europe or the USA and returned only 
for holidays. Others, predominantly young people, left Bosnia after the war due to the economic and 
political destabilisation of the country, while following better work opportunities. The youth 
 
21 Ibid, Chapter 8, p 109. 
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remaining, including volunteers, often remarked that they wished to leave to western and northern 
Europe but struggled to obtain visa and working permissions as EU non-members. Hence, both those 
who were born and lived in the town and those who were trying to transit through there lacked an EU 
passport and faced restricted access to the EU, although the existing research asserts that Bosnian 
citizens ought to be granted e-passports and visa-free travel to the Schengen Area in exchange for 
integrating the EU’s smart border system (Geiger, 2016). In addition to the common experiences of 
war and violence, economic struggle, migration, closed mobility to the EU between the residents from 
Kladuša and many migrants, many also shared the same religion – Islam. These all had a significant 
impact on the communal living. 
However, I observed that particularly the fights and violence happening in Kladuša in the 1990s seemed 
most significant in shaping the daily co-existence and solidarities between the local people and the 
newly arriving displaced population. The local owner of a restaurant, Imran, who was a war veteran, 
was providing with his friends around 500 dishes per day, free of charge. Volunteers, including me, 
were helping to clean dishes and serve food in the restaurant. At the end of the day, Imran would give 
us food and tell stories about the war, how him and other men were defending their families and saw 
their friends dying: ‘It was difficult time. All men in this town were fighting. But we are here, we are 
alive. No one died of hunger during the war. So, no one will die of hunger here now.’ Reminders of the 
war violence, that Imran often talked about, was visible when meeting the local men in their forties 
and fifties without a limb or dependent upon a wheelchair, who were full of various stories from the 
war. 
In an abandoned aeroplane hangar called the ‘Helicopter Place’, another local war veteran, Adin, was 
daily coming and giving food to around thirty Afghan men. Adin had close friendships with these men, 
whom many like him fought in conflict zones and now faced other attacks at the borders, as he said 
during our conversation. Adin’s family had migrated to Germany and he told me he had to find a new 
family to look after in the ‘Helicopter Place’. Like the former plane hangar, dozens of other buildings 
around the town turned into provisional shelters for male migrants since they had been abandoned, 
ruined, filled by holes during the war, their business went out, or their construction had been 
interrupted by war and post-war events. 
I further became aware that the direct attacks played a fundamental role in the dynamics of the newly 
emerging struggles for survival by migrants, firstly, allowed by the post-war urban architecture visible 
with every step around Kladuša. In the old buildings around the town, many of which were missing 
windows, walls and facades, migrants’ few possessions mixed with dusty and damaged furniture that 
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had reminded due to these past war experiences of the local populations. The biggest provisional 
homes for migrants particularly occurred in several abandoned Agrokomerc buildings, which had 
played an important role during the Yugoslav Wars. The previous research (Ivanisevic, 2004; Lischer, 
1999) showed that the businesses run in these buildings had financially allowed their chief executive 
officer and the current mayor of Kladuša, Fikret Abdić, to claim his personal autonomy over the town 
during the wars; the events that led to mass migration and Abdić’s conviction for war crimes. Thus, the 
urban ruins of Agrokomerc in Kladuša, like the Dom penzionera (Pensioner home) in Bihać (Hromadžić, 
2019), carry historically encountered conflict sites and decay, which now provided a shelter to migrants 
trying to transit Bosnia to Croatia. 
It was not only the devastating architecture that carried the past and present narratives of violence 
and organised the everyday life in Kladuša. Essentially, the local population was seeing and hearing 
about the new violent struggles at the border, which seemed familiar to them and triggered their 
responses. Many local residents told me during our conversations that they had experienced flash-
backs of war fear while hearing screams and gunshots from the nearby Croatian border, daily seeing 
the migrant men slowly moving around the town with fractured and broken limbs, and listening to 
their stories of police attacks during the push-backs. Although the push-backs of migrants from Croatia 
had a different face of violence – certainly incomparable with the mass killings portrayed during the 
Yugoslav Wars (Baker, 2015) - the migrants’ harms were an ominous reminder of the war violence in 
this border town. 
Interestingly, a few locals also told me that they believed the push-backs were overseen by the same 
Croatian officers who once fought against them, the Bosnian Muslims, during the war, and remained 
in the military and police. This comment indicated that ethnic and religious difference was again 
encouraging violence in this border location, stranded in the old Croatian struggle of ‘defending walls 
of Europe and Christianity’ (Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004) from the ‘backward East and Islamic Other’ 
(Rexhepi, 2018), with the aim to prove its independent state position in the EU and the future 
Schengen zone. This also demonstrates the following public comments by the Croatian president 
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina is an unstable country’, which is ‘now controlled by 
militant Islam (of migrants)’ (Sarajevo Times, 2019), and in line with this, ‘a little bit of force is needed 
to push them (migrants) back’ (Kreizer, 2019). These narratives of Bosnia as the dangerous Balkans, 
now reinforced by migration from the Middle East and Africa, are also re-produced by remarks by other 
EU politicians, such as the French president. Emmanuel Macron has recently stated that Bosnia as the 
Balkans presented the ‘problem of returning jihadists’ and a ‘ticking time-bomb’ (Aljazeera, 2019). 
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The encounters and analysis so far pursued in this chapter illustrate deep discriminatory connotations 
of Bosnia as the Balkans and post-conflict state with radical Islam within the EU political discourse, 
especially Croatia, enforcing violent responses against the migrants at the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
The Europe-Balkan dichotomy impacts the migrants’ everyday life at the border today. As the above 
narratives show, the past violent conflicts echo in contemporary police border violence against 
migrants in Croatia, while triggering everyday solidarities in Bosnia. The old political narratives about 
where Balkan lies have proved useful to mark a line where Europe should be divided and protected 
from the backward East and Islamic Other (Rexhepi, 2018). This old legitimisation of ethnic and 
religious violence against those labelled as threat, which ought to be pushed from ‘Europe’ to the 
‘Balkans’, proves useful in the today’s violent migration management. Through the interview data it 
will be shown that the history of ethnic conflicts often triggered racialized direct attacks by individual 
Croatian policemen against Muslim migrants during the push-backs, which I discuss in greater detail in 
the following chapter22, besides remaining fascist and racist tendencies in Croatia (Pavlaković, 2008). 
It needs to be said that these official legitimised narratives about from where a threat is coming and 
where violence and disorder (in migration) belongs significantly differed to the daily lives of migrants 
and the local population in Kladuša. While the injuries of migrants were directly inflicted by police in 
EU’s geographical spaces, on the other non-EU border side – Bosnia, the injured people were often 
medically treated, provisionally sheltered, clothed, fed and locals often tried understand them by the 
Bosnian citizens and volunteers and aid providers. The Bosnian people feeling empathies and engaged 
in bringing donations to the Trnovi camp or were hosting minors and families in their private houses. I 
observed on several occasions staff in restaurants and cafes to say to the displaced men not to pay if 
they saw they were injured or distressed. One day, I was sitting with Haji, an old Iraqi man in a café, 
while he was telling me about the conflict in Iraq and his confusion about how to get to Germany to 
his family. Suddenly, one older Bosnian man, sitting by the next table stood up, came to Haji and 
hugged him: ‘We know how you feel’, he then said based on what he could hear from our conversation. 
I could see one tear dropping from his eye: ‘Good luck’, he said to Haji. One cafe owner also admitted 
to me that welcoming migrants presented a new economic opportunity in an otherwise calm town 
with not enough customers and income. A few locals were also known to facilitate clandestine car 
transports to the other side of the border when trying to improve their economic situation. 
Despite the rich empathies, hospitality and help, people in makeshift camps often stressed that they 
could not stay in the country due to its poor economy and lack of life opportunities as well as 
 
22 Ibid, Chapter 7, p 93. 
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complicated administrative system of asylum claims. As Aziz (21, Afghanistan) noted: ‘People in Bosnia 
are very good, but life here is not good. Here is no camp, no work. Bosnian people are trying to leave 
themselves.’ Indeed, there needs to be drawn line between personal and institutional level when 
support by Bosnian citizens differed to the state, which provided no or only limited aid. 
When focusing on the Bosnian borders with the EU, Croatia and Slovenia, the question remains how 
migrants perceived their onwards movement there. The official rhetoric of transnational justice and 
humanitarian values that Croatia and Slovenia had to employ as new EU members (Jakešević & 
Tatalović, 2016), and which symbolically re-shaped them to liberal democracies of modern EUrope 
(Sanader, 2008), seemed confusing and controversial to many migrants. For instance, Hisham (22, 
Pakistan), who was sitting with me in a café after he had been pushed back from Croatia to Bosnia, 
told me during our recorded interview: 
Croatian police caught us and started beating us, kicking us, punching us. I am completely 
confused why they were beating us. Is this really Europe? They don’t have right to beat us. 
There are the rights we have. Even animals have the rights in Europe and we are humans. … 
Why the European Union does not take any action? Why do they allow them to beat us? Why 
the hell Croatia is denying the refugees to stay? This is illegal action. 
Hisham’s expectations of what he considered as the entry to the EU had deviated from the reality. 
Hisham, like most people walking to northern and western Europe, had mostly imagined the EU 
territory in line with the officially framed European values and way of life that emphasised human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights (European Union, 2020). However, 
people pushed from Croatia back to Kladuša daily put these values in question: ‘Is this really Europe?’, 
‘Is it legal to push us back?’, ‘Where are the human rights?’. Even those who heard about border 
violence in the previous transit locations, or in their home countries before starting their journeys, 
struggled to locate violence in EUrope as incompatible. This also demonstrates Iman’s (19, 
Afghanistan) comparison of violence in Europe with violence in his home country, while sitting on the 
broken matrass in the Helicopter Place and looking at the injured arm of his friend from police attack 
during the push-back from Croatia: ‘Fuck Europe, Taliban would be better than this’. 
What emerges from the fieldwork is that the socially and politically accepted idea of where violence 
commonly takes place versus where it is not tolerated, as well as which nations and regions are more 
violent than others, makes violence look, even feel, right or not recognised at all (Galtung, 1990). These 
justifications of borders and states play an important role in migration management at Croatian-
Bosnian borders through violence. The official rhetoric of the EU member states, including Croatia and 
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Slovenia, as ‘humanitarian’ and ‘democratic’ (European Union, 2020), is set in comparison to Bosnia, 
as the historically portrayed opaque of Europe and ‘dangerous Balkans’ which encourages us to 
imagine that the country as a violent, criminal and mass-migratory place is usual. 
As Taussig (2004) argues, direct violence and terror are always in An-Other places, always elsewhere, 
in troubling worlds, where the rule of order is deeply suspicious and wild order historically exists. This 
has been also portrayed in scientific research on violence in migration, which focuses predominantly 
on Africa, (Cuéllar, 2005; Malkki, 1996; Onoma, 2013), Middle East (Khalili, 2008; Shahid, 2002) and 
Asia (Akhter & Kusakabe, 2014). With Arab and Muslim migration taking place in Europe, the new An-
Other place within the discourse of border violence is northern Bosnia, an assumed violent and Muslim 
outskirt of Europe. This assumption proves useful to absorb border violence under discriminatory 
assumptions of what Bosnia historically means to the rest of Europe, with the aim to eliminate border 
violence visibility. Although the migrants’ injuries are inflicted elsewhere (Croatia and Slovenia), Bosnia 
as the ‘Balkan’ state therefore functions as a place where harmed bodies can be thrown away and 
hidden from the EU’s sight, although visible while walking through Kladuša. This geographical 
concealment of violence matches to the previous migration research in Greece, Serbia and Bosnia (Bird 
et al., 2019; Isakjee et al., 2020), yet, it is positioned within the narratives of the local population and 
migrants here, which have not been examined before. 
In contrast, the EU’s symbolic dimension and cultural superiority are not compatible with state’s 
violence against individuals or groups (Mishkova, 2008; Trakilović, 2020). Therefore, direct infliction of 
violence against the migrants participating in this research is successfully denied as unimaginable in 
the EU. This is in line with the previous argument by Isakjee et al. (2020) that the use of violence against 
migrants sits uncomfortably with the liberal, post-racial self-image of the EU, which paradoxically 
allows and justifies the violence to happen. Indeed, what the research here reveals is that the direct 
attacks, tortures of migrants, and lack of aid in the Bosnian camps are handled with impunity as they 
are portrayed as unrelated to EUrope. The case of Croatia particularly demonstrates this. Croatia is 
self-presented as a real European Christian state, which, as the existing research (Korb, 2010; Razsa & 
Lindstrom, 2004) shows, historically distances it from the ‘primitive and lazy Muslim Balkans’ - Bosnia. 
As the result of this, the responsibility for border harms are not only difficult to reject in the EU territory 
– Croatia, but even logical to reject as there are no injured bodies to see due to their push-backs to 
Bosnia. Thus, the attacks can successfully continue as unimaginable but also as non-existent. 
However, the lived experiences and meaning makings of Bosnia by migrants and the local people 
presented here are far away from the historically rooted discriminatory assumptions of what the 
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‘Balkans’ mean. The data here, thus, allows us to re-think how to locate violence (in migration) in 
Europe and Europe’s self-location in (no) use of violence. The question remains how the local 
responses and lived experiences evolve across longer time, when Bosnia aspires for eventual EU 
membership. This means that the country, similar to other former Yugoslav states, obliges to 
collaborate in combating illegal migration and organised crime across Europe (Stojić-Mitrović & 
Vilenica, 2019), which consists in particular of using various forms of violent measures, which target 
migrants who seek asylum rather than criminal organisations. 
6.5: The European Unions’ border control expansion in Bosnia 
The co-existence between local residents and the migrants and the daily life in Kladuša were in motion 
and significantly changed when migration no longer seemed as temporary and exceptional but became 
the condition of daily life. This section aims to track these changes and their impact on the migrants 
stranded here across my eight months spent in Kladuša. It also questions how these changes were 
triggered and organised by the EU’s broader approach to border controls, under the promise of Bosnia 
eventually entering the EU, as it has been previously observed in other SEE states. 
I became aware that long-term migration clearly placed migrants, their aid providers, local population 
and its governments under pressure. Being stranded in Kladuša for months and facing various forms 
of violence in daily life resulted in many young men living in camps and squats using more alcohol, 
drugs, increased inter-communal tensions, fights and robberies. The atmosphere in the town 
particularly changed with the murder of a young Moroccan man in June 2018, who was stabbed by his 
friend in an argument while both were drunk. These events quickly jeopardised the whole migrant 
community in the town. The restaurants that once had an open door for displaced people with no 
money were shouting at anyone with darker skin to get out. When I was sitting in a local hotel, two 
Iraqi boys, Hassan and Mostafa, came to me and asked if I could try to speak with the bar staff about 
a possibility of renting a room there, ‘They don’t speak to us. Maybe they don’t understand English’, 
Hassan said to me. When I approached the bartender, he started shouting at me: ‘You, fuck off and 
your friends! Tell them to get the fuck from my country!’. When I tried to explain their situation, he 
pushed into me. Another day, when I was walking from the camp an old local man started shouting at 
me: ‘Why have you been feeding them? They are big problem and they have to leave now. Fucking 
migrants. Stop helping them!’ 
All hotels and most restaurants in the town claimed to be ‘full’ or were ‘not open for foreigners’. Some 
of their workers were not so direct, apologising that ‘Sorry but I would have problems with boss if I 
serve you’. On another occasion, an Iranian woman, who just arrived in the town, asked me if I could 
cut her hair because the local hairdresser rejected her: ‘I wanted to go to have my hair done but when 
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I went to a hairdresser, she said that it was just for Bosnians. So, I think today is maybe some Bosnian 
day or celebration or something.’ She smiled innocently, without an understanding the sudden 
changes that I had been observing daily. Men and boys living in squats around the town also said their 
places were subjected to police raids and evictions. The evictions escalated in the winter and were 
happening in late night hours when the town was covered by snow in December and January. Random 
squat evictions turned into the daily forced relocations of all people with dark faces and no 
identification documents, who were just walking around the town, to the newly established Miral 
camp. 
Simultaneously, local people who maintained contact with the migrants became harassed by Bosnian 
police. For instance, Emina, who was hosting in her private flat two minors said she was to be charged 
2000 euros for a ‘new law’ of accommodating undocumented migrants who did not apply for asylum 
in Bosnia, which was the majority. Those who were subjected to controls and policing were also 
international volunteers, including me. Bosnian police started regularly visiting our shower trailer 
nearby the camp and places of accommodation, asking for passports and controlling our permissions 
to stay in the country. Landlords of the houses, where volunteers lived, were told to visit police 
stations: ‘They (police) were telling me that you are dangerous and that for sure you are smugglers’, 
our landlady told me, after one of the visits. 
Soon, another new law was announced that international volunteers needed a special ‘volunteering 
visa’, but those who had tried to obtain them were denied one. Police used these new laws and 
obligations as an excuse to criminalise all aid in the town, based on the assumptions that our services 
functioned as the pull factor. They believed that if the aid would disappear, all migrants would have 
no reason to stay. As the consequence of the criminalisation of solidarities and aid, the volunteering 
activities became clandestine, trying to be moved out of public spaces and police sight. I moved to a 
small flat nearby a forest at the end of the town. All people visiting me from the camp for a shower, 
dinner or just to have a rest after push-backs, had to come to my flat in the night to avoid being seen. 
I often worried when I heard a car parking outside of my flat or a sudden knock on my door, which 
could mean a police investigation. In January 2019, just before my departure back to the U.K., a female 
volunteer, Maria, came to me really frightened as assuming that we were under daily police 
surveillance, intensifying the above described harassments: ‘The police stopped me, and they were 
telling me to leave the country. They were telling me that they knew where I stayed and in which bed 




While certainly many locals had not sympathised with migrants since their arrival to the country, open 
hostilities towards migrants were rare. However, the hostilities quickly became omnipresent for 
migrants and all who were known to provide aid in makeshift camps around the town. A similar shift 
in responses from governments facilitating migrants’ transit and locals sympathizing with the newly 
arriving migrants due to similar past experiences of wars into criminalisation of aid provision, police 
harassments, direct attacks and even killings of migrants were previously encountered in Croatia 
(Jakešević & Tatalović, 2016), Serbia (Beznec et al., 2016), Albania (Stanivuković & Neuman, 2019), 
Kosovo, Macedonia (Rexhepi, 2018), and Greece (Obradović-Wochnik & Bird, 2020). 
On the local level - in Kladuša, some residents’ change of their approaches towards the migrants can 
be referred to the increasing disorder visible around the town; abuse of drugs and alcohol, and inter-
communal violence. However, the further chapters will explore how migrants’ everyday precarious 
choices, harmful routines and distorted relations are closely interconnected with the broader violence, 
in which they live23 rather than in individual misbehaviour. These were simultaneously accompanied 
by the everyday policing of the migrants and the efforts to forcibly relocate them out of the public 
spaces as well as to develop pressure on all supporting them. When the local population saw these 
happening, many started perceiving the migrants in the state official’s narratives as ‘criminals’, and 
consequently adopting this narrative. Others began avoiding contact with migrants due to the fear of 
being subjected to the police measures. Under these pressures, migrant men particularly were 
excluded from the (public) life in the town, which proved to be a powerful policy tool, when Obradović-
Wochnik (2018) asserts that migrants’ removal from public spaces in urban cities and borders result in 
their exclusion from aid and social network. 
The national police responses, however, were managed by the governmental and district orders, as 
examined in the research by Ahmetašević and Mlinarević (2018), who were pressured particularly by 
external factors and the neighbouring state, Croatia. As Rexhepi (2018) argued, the national interests 
of the former Yugoslav states are often effectively managed by the external powers, and that 
particularly ‘eventual EU membership’ as well as financial support for migration and border 
managements, which now proves to be the case of Bosnia. Albeit, it needs to be remembered that 
Bosnia is differentiated from its neighbours in terms of negotiating with Brussels due to the furthest 
stage of EU succession process (Memisevic, 2009), the local government not being trusted by Brussels 
(Ahmetašević & Mlinarević, 2018), as well as Bosnia being viewed as problematic and in need of 
constant surveillance (Rexhepi, 2018). 
 
23 Ibid, Chapter 10, p 146. 
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Due to these issues, it can be expected that Bosnia adopted the EU’s migration, border anti-migration 
and violent approaches as necessary for improving its EU succession process. Importantly, such change 
in the local responses towards migrants were previously observed in other former Yugoslav states, 
whom are relatively ahead of Bosnia in their EU succession or are now EU members. The data here 
shows that this adoption of new measures under external pressures are the policing of public spaces, 
harassments, forced relocations of migrants to closed camps, and adopting new legislations that 
sought to criminalise aid in makeshift camps and public spaces. To this end, Bosnia became the latest 
state of the EU’s border security externalisation, which stretches across countries like Niger, Libya, 
Turkey, to internal states, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia (Andersson, 2014). Indeed, 
each state has a different role in border controls, in line with its power, and uses different forms of 
border violence (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017), which also applies to the borders stretching between 
Bosnia and the EU states – Croatia, Slovenia and Italy. 
Thus, the EU Croatia and Slovenia play the role of the most common direct perpetrators of border 
violence – with easy managed impunity due to its geopolitical location. In contrast, Bosnia as the 
‘Balkans’ functions mainly as the space to absorb the results of this direct border violence, as Isakjee 
et al. (2020) argued and this research confirms. Yet Bosnian state authorities also comply with these 
border practices through removing migrants and their supporters out of public sight through the active 
use of oppressive laws and harassments, often leading to the migrants’ exhaustion. I observed that 
when migrants had no more strength to continue their journeys due to severe mental or/and physical 
harms, they were either offered the humanitarian voluntary return by IOM to their home countries, 
funded by the EU Commission, or some died of overdose or committed suicide in makeshift camps, 
which resembles de Vries and Guild's (2019) findings on exhaustion as a policy tool in migration. This 
more passive approach of violent border measures in Bosnia, therefore, stems from the country’s 
integration to the EU, while getting rid of the label ‘Balkans’. Hence, the daily life, co-existence and 
transitions in the microscope of the small Bosnian town of Kladuša, reveals broader border approaches 
of violence and its externalisation patterns across the SEE, while simultaneously points to the specific 
historical conflict and discriminatory context of Bosnian-Croatian borders, which now plays a 
fundamental role in border violence against migrants. 
6.6: Conclusion. 
The analysis pursued in this chapter reveals the developments of migration and violence along the 
Bosnian-Croatian borders, with the locus on Kladuša. By doing so, this chapter sought to show how the 
local context of this border town as well as its transformation that I observed during my eight-months 
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long research significantly organised the migrants’ experiences of violence, but also generated 
solidarities. 
This evidence was firstly outlined by mapping the migrants’ secondary movement from other SEE 
states to Bosnia, which had been triggered by violence along Serbian borders with Hungary and 
Croatia, imprisonments and attacks in Bulgaria, as well as waiting in overcrowded Greek camps. These 
attacks and struggles were portrayed in the EUro-centric narratives as taking place along the ‘Balkan 
Routes’ – ‘other’ places with wild and violent order, now leading to a new transit spot in Bosnia. In the 
same lines, Bosnia has been framed by the prominent EU politicians and border agency (Frontex) with 
discriminatory connotations; the Balkan state stranded in ethnic violent hatred, militant Islam, and 
designated with the ‘criminal’ Balkan Route. Moreover, Bosnia’s neighbour Croatia has a far-right 
government that distinguishes itself from the Balkans as part of the ‘real’ (i.e. Christian) Europe and 
radically re-assures its position in the EU. I found this local context important in organising the border 
measures in Kladuša, particularly triggering crude forms of violence against the migrants during the 
push-backs from Croatia to Bosnia. 
However, the migrants’ meaning makings of their journeys across Bosnia significantly differed to the 
dominant narratives about the ‘Balkans’ and thus challenged the derogatory connotation of Bosnia as 
problematic and violent. In contrast, the migrants understood their journeys based on violence when 
calling their journeys games, daily occurrences in many EU states, most commonly in Croatia rather 
than what is considered to be the Balkans, Bosnia. This sheds light on how violence can be sanitised by 
the language of cultural superiority, such as Europe over Balkans and Christianity over Islam, which 
helps to make violence more legitimate or not recognisable at all (Galtung, 1990). Thus, framing Bosnia 
as the Balkans proves useful to legitimise the injuries and poor living conditions seen in Bosnian camps, 
a further example of how powerful and dangerous the term ‘Balkans’ is as a policy tool in migration 
(Bird et al., 2020; El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019; Isakjee et al., 2020). In the same way, EU membership 
symbolically designates the adoption of democratic and liberal values, and this is utilised to legitimise 
radical border measures in Croatia and conceal the use of violence as controversial or incompatible 
with the EU (see Isakjee et al. 2020). 
Nevertheless, I argue that the discriminatory portrayals of  histories of violence and migration in the 
1990s at the Bosnian-Croatian border did not only generate new forms of violence, but also triggered 
solidarities in Kladuša, which are important to highlight when exploring how the local context organises 
the migrants’ journeys. Although the analysis finally revealed that the local context was transforming 
when migration in Kladuša turned from temporary to permanent. This developed not only put pressure 
on the Bosnian government, but particularly on its EU neighbour Croatia, triggering further border 
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externalisation policies and violence from the EU to Bosnia. This ranged from the Bosnian government 
introducing a new law criminalising solidarity with the migrants, the local police evicting the makeshift 
camps, business owners closing their services for the migrants, to the police threatening the migrants 
and all those supporting them. This transformation in the local responses has been also observed 
elsewhere in SEE states, as managed by the governmental and district orders pressured by the 
neighbouring EU states and the promise of ‘eventual EU membership’ (Ahmetašević & Mlinarević, 
2018; Rexhepi, 2018). While this research provides only little information about international 
diplomatic negotiations, it contributes to the literature on migration in SEE region when revealing the 
evidence of the concrete adoption of new border measures in Bosnia, which are in line with the border 
externalisation in the whole SEE region. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that the location of Bosnia as historically rooted as the 
‘outskirts of Europe’ vs. potential ‘future EU member’ generated new forms of violence against the 
migrants at the Bosnian borders across time, besides legitimising and concealing the attacks from 
Croatia here. Thus, the ethnographic observations presented in this chapter captured the border and 
its organisation of migrants’ subjection to violence as a process, influenced by the local histories of 
violent conflicts, yet, constantly in motion under new (international) political pressures. 
Importantly, not only spaces of migration but also migrants themselves are culturally legitimised as 
the subjects of violence, particularly upon their gender and ‘race’, when those experiencing violence 
at the Bosnian-Croatian borders are predominantly migrant men of colour. The following chapter 
explores the intersections of gender and ‘race’ in migration when asking how these social categories 




Chapter 7: Construction of gender, race and other social categories in border 
violence. 
7.1: Introduction. 
While the previous chapter shed light on the legitimisation of violence through ideological distinctions 
between Europe and Balkans, this chapter develops this by shifting its focus to the ideological 
construction of migrants as ‘others’. Specifically, it encompasses how gender and race are constructed 
in border violence against the migrants and how they intersect, while exploring the question: Do race 
and gender organise experience of border violence, and if yes, how? It aims in particular to reconsider 
masculinities and race within border violence in more nuanced ways. To do so, it will draw upon 
literature on race and gender in violence (Butler, 2004a; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000; Isakjee et al., 
2020) and cultural legitimisations of violence against certain groups of migrants (Galtung, 1990). 
The chapter firstly discusses the migration category of single men, as imagined construct within its 
opposite category of ‘real refugees’ women and children. It questions the experiences of border 
violence as dependent upon dominant cultural assumptions of manhood, predicting the perception 
and treatment of migrants at the borders. To do so, I firstly focus on lack of legal border crossing 
options from Bosnia onwards, games, and the violent push-backs that follow, and then discusses the 
withdrawal of the aid in the camps, as dependent on gender in migration. Moreover, I shed light on 
race and religion and discuss how these intersect and mediate border violence against Arab Muslim 
single men within the context of the Bosnian-Croatian borders. 
The final section summarises the main arguments, before moving onto the chapters that will in greater 
detail examine diverse forms of border violence and what these mean in the everyday life at the 
borders. 
7.2: ‘Men have to feel pain to be men’. 
It was July and the Trnovi camp was dusty and hot, although the sun was slowly setting. In the middle 
of the camp, the so called ‘Syrian centre’, a young boy was sitting, rocking his body front and back, 
holding his torso and screaming out loud from pain. Several men were standing around him and 
speaking loudly in Arabic, some turning their heads around like they were searching for someone. One 
of them saw me and started running to me. The only word that he was saying repeatedly in English 
was “doctor”, taking my hand and leading me to their tent. When I saw the faces of the others, a few 
had scratches and black eyes and others had red marks on their legs and arms. One pointed at two 
destroyed phone displays and shouted in English: ‘Fuck Croatia police!’. The boy on the ground, whose 
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name was Rashid, said that he had pain in his ribs. ‘He thinks that his ribs are broken. They (Croatian 
border police) pushed him on the ground and were stepping on his back and kicking him’, his friend 
Mohammed, who could speak English, translated to me. A nurse from our volunteer team arrived, 
gave Rashid a cream and pain killers, and told him to wait for the next day to transport him to the 
hospital for x-ray. 
The men tried to go on rehla (trip in Arabic), and as Mohammed explained, their plan was to walk from 
Bosnia to Italy but if they had been apprehended in Slovenia, they would apply for asylum there. 
However, the Slovenian police ignored their asylum request and handed them over to the Croatian 
patrols, who drove them in a white van to the Bosnian border. There, the similar scenario happened 
as to dozens of other men every day. Police took them one by one from the police van and attacked 
them with batons. The boys talked about their pain and fear they felt. The adult men were expressing 
mainly anger and repeated that they had not a chance to protect themselves against the patrols with 
guns. 
After smoking a few cigarettes while sitting around the fire, the atmosphere calmed down. The men 
started re-playing the whole scene of the border attack, making fun of the tragedy that had happened 
to them a few hours ago. They began pushing each other and fighting like children. The largest one, 
Sajid, pushed Rashid and wanted to kick him in his injured ribs. This made others shouting and laughing. 
‘No, stop. Let him!’, I tried to protect Rashid. ‘Men have to feel pain to be men’, Mohammed said. I 
looked around the mud field covered by plastic sheet shelters, broken tents, and rubbish, which was a 
playful target of street dogs running around. I could hear hundreds of male voices speaking, laughing 
and shouting. I thought that all these men had either passed such a test of manhood, some many 
times, or they were going to pass it soon. 
All men in the camps were aware of the pain awaiting for them at the borders when discussing rehla 
and games, drones and helicopters, patrols, detention rooms and cells, white deportation vans, insults, 
batons, guns, broken bones, stolen money, destroyed phones, and fear of being pushed back to the 
camps again. It did not matter whether they did not perceive violence and pain as a part of their 
manhood or whether they considered themselves as strong and tough like Mohammed; they were 
made to feel the pain to eventually cross the border. Awareness of the violent and difficult nature of 
these journeys is one important reason why most men came alone to this border and left their wives 
and children behind in camps in Greece, Serbia, Turkey or Lebanon, with hope that their families would 
follow them safely through family reunification programmes after their arrival in the EU. However, 
their manhood and dark faces were simultaneously the essential presumption of the everyday pain at 
the borders. Mohammed, Rashid, Sajid, Zakaria and their friends were then planning the next rehla, 
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which they set off after their injuries had healed, when feeling ready to test again their fears and 
manhood. 
This example from my field diary shows that those who were narrating various forms of border 
violence, ranging from physical attacks perpetrated by border patrols to deprivations in makeshift 
camps, were mainly men travelling without women and small children. These men were recognised by 
humanitarian agencies and state authorities as single men; the label that rests upon a social 
discrepancy between masculinities and vulnerabilities (Myrttinen et al., 2017; Schulz, 2018). Being a 
man stranded along the EU’s external borders is perceived in policy terms within the already limited 
support there as being ‘strong’ and ‘able to cope’ with harms due to the stereotypical assumption of 
masculine agency. Travelling ‘single’ further attributed to a man his ‘independence’ from family as well 
as aid in transit camps. However, these men were not single as they had families in their home 
countries or other transit locations who relied on their journeys. Consequently, single men were 
positioned on the other side of those considered vulnerable real refugees; women, children and 
families (Griffiths, 2015; Helms, 2015; Malkki, 1996; Turner, 2019a). 
These assumptions had seriously affected the way border security and humanitarian organisations and 
diverse actors in the camp treated single men as a demographic despite their rich diversity in 
nationality, ethnicity, languages, and the past history. As showed in the above diary excerpt, security 
border regimes violently targeted the men’s movement across the borders as ‘illegal’, considering 
them as not deserving of protection and suspicious when they did so, leading to their push-backs to 
Bosnia. There, however, humanitarian initiatives often positioned the men at the bottom of their 
priorities, when the majority were left to limited or self-managed aid. Hence, the single men were not 
only made invisible at the borders, as argued by Charsley and Wray (2015), but their masculinities 
made them a further visible threat during the games, leading to their exposure to the most crude forms 
of border violence. This constant movement between visibility and invisibility indicates that 
categorisation of a migrant as a single man, dependent upon his gender, had serious consequences on 
the men’s not having the possibility for authorised border crossings, violent attacks and push-backs, 
and support in the camps. 
I argue that this struggle of moving between visibility and invisibility within border violence as driven 
by gender, together with other social locations, is fundamental to explore the border violence as a 
subjective experience. As Zolberg (1983) and Vaughan-Williams (2015) suggest, violence in migration 
historically targets specific group of migrants. However, migrant men with Arab and Muslim origins, 
such as the majority of single men stranded along the Bosnian-Croatian borders, are often excluded 
from these groups in academic discussions, which often focus on browned-skinned women and 
97 
 
children as the genuine victims of violence. Nevertheless, I found the migrants’ male construction of 
gender and race at the EU’s borders significant in how violence was organised, and, thus I include them 
into the analysis of border violence here. 
The lack of focus on masculine experiences within migration and border violence in scholarship 
appeared to be paralleled within public discourse, both along and beyond the EU’s external borders, 
where masculinity and virility and protection were not compatible and imaginable. After my return to 
the Czech Republic where my family lived, I was collecting donations of blankets and male clothes, to 
bring them back with me to Bosnia. When my neighbours found out that the donation was for the 
men, some refused to contribute: ‘I would rather burn those blankets than give it to male migrants’, is 
what some told me. I then discussed with my parents the demographics of the migrants in Bosnia, 
explaining that volunteers struggled to obtain donations for the men but were overloaded by clothes 
for children and women. ‘I don’t understand why men are coming here. They are men. Why did they 
not stay in their country and fight for freedom?’, remarked my father. 
These reactions suggest how frequent notions of masculinity and the male roles embedded in them 
frame understandings of migration; the men are expected to protect others, such as his country, nation 
and family, rather than to be protected, as also suggested by Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1996). It is these 
‘failures’ that intensifies in times of violence, as studies of gendered violence in military and war 
research suggest (Helms, 2015; Myrttinen et al., 2017; Schulz, 2018). Abandonment of the role of a 
protector emasculates a man, and simultaneously turns him into a default figure within the protection 
system in migration. As Helms (2015) argues, male migrants are often accused of being cowards, 
shirking their duty toward family and country by not fighting. 
However, these dominant assumptions do not only make specific groups of men invisible, but often 
turn to be dangerous when a migrant man demands protection. ‘Tell me. Is not strange that all these 
refugees are young, healthy strong men? You have never thought who possibly send them here? 
Maybe they are dangerous to us’, a young Serbian man told me on the bus while traveling to northern 
squats, where hundreds of male migrants temporarily lived. His comment highlights that able-bodied 
migrant men are seen as suspicious and potentially dangerous when asking for protection, and thus 
undermining their patriarchal assumptions to be strong. It also suggests that when male gender further 
intersects with young people of ‘military’ age (Turner, 2019), and a country of departure is considered 
as war zone (Myrttinen et al., 2017), a man is then disproportionately liable to be perceived as an (ex) 
combatant and a security threat rather than a refugee (see also Carpenter, 2005). This shows that the 
pathological portrayal of the men (of colour) as violent (Galtung, 1990; Harris, 2000), terrorists (Bank 
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et al., 2017), or even sexual predators (Gallo & Scrinzi, 2016; Turner, 2015), is reinforced in the context 
of transit migration, as it is commonly reinforced in war and military contexts (Myrttinen et al., 2017). 
The gendered stereotypes repeated by my father, my neighbours and a Serbian passenger may seem 
in the first sight not politically significant as distanced from the border managements. However, these 
stereotypes often emerge in political discourses, which tend to justify the violent border measures. 
For instance, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán pointed out that ‘70% of the migrants are 
young men and they look like an army’ (Bank et al., 2017), besides framing ‘illegal migrants as poison 
and a public security and terror risk’ (Milivojević, 2018). Such stereotypical notions of gender, framing 
racialized migrant men as suspicious, inferior and in need of control result in material practices in forms 
of survey and control (Razack, 2004), as border violence against migrant men at the Bosnian-Croatian 
border illustrates. 
Specifically, as the result of linking male migration with a terror, the single men are stranded in a 
parallel movement between being considered as a visible threat and directly attacked versus being 
considered as not vulnerable enough and rendered as invisible in the humanitarian aid in the camps. 
The tendency to consider single men as not-enough-refugees, cowards failing to protect their home 
countries or dangerous (ex) combatants, has thus a significant violent impact on their everyday life at 
the borders, which the following section explores in great detail. 
7.3: ‘Single (migrant) men’ moving between visibility and invisibility in border violence. 
While the previous research in Serbia shows that single men were excluded from the legal transit 
onwards in comparison to families, and thus, left to play the games (Augustová, 2020), I found that all 
migrants (men, women, children) arriving in Bosnia  had no legal channels onwards. This also differs to 
the U.S.-Mexico borders, where those attempting unauthorised border crossing and risking deaths are 
particularly young adult men (Donato et al., 2008; Martínez et al., 2014). In Bosnia, gender and the 
family unit diminished within the state-managed border transit system as no individual was classed by 
the state authorities or NGOs as vulnerable and prioritised to legally enter the EU and claim asylum 
there. 
However, I found that gender soon played into priorities within unauthorised border crossing 
management as well as who appeared to be most at risks of daily border attacks. Whereas the men 
were regularly departing for the games and rehla in Bosnia with their GPS locators their only 
possession, families told me during the interviews how they had walked for weeks in mountainous 
terrains and with limited food, while also trying to avoid detection by border guards with loud or crying 
children. For this reason, most families explained how they would pay thousands of euros to human 
smugglers, to transport them in various vehicles faster and safer to Italy. Families also pointed out that 
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they were given priority on the waiting lists of smugglers-run transports, offered better prices and 
treatments by people smugglers than the men. 
Importantly, gender also impacted on the men’s experiences of direct and crude forms of violence 
during the push-backs. The families, who were discovered and apprehended by the border patrols, 
either managed to claim asylum in the country of apprehension (Croatia or Slovenia) or were pushed 
back to Bosnia, mostly without the use of physical violence, in contrast to the men. Single men 
recognised that border guards avoided using attacks during family push-backs and for this reason, 
many sought to leave for the games with families. This strategy stemmed in the men’s belief that 
border guards would not attack them in front of the women and children, whom they felt in most cases 
to be considered as vulnerable and protected from violence, unlike the men. However, the men 
regularly told how they were violently targeted in front of the women and children, and a few women 
shared stories of how they had to observe with their children physical attacks against their male 
companions. For example, Eram (47, Iran, August 2018) said during the interview: ‘They took all single 
(men) on the side and started beating them. We (women and children) were standing by and watching. 
Police were beating them with batons. 5 policemen on 5 single (men). Every policeman was beating 
one single man and kept beating them. One man was crying and another was vomiting. They stopped 
but after started beating them again.’ 
Hence, within the established border deterrents along the Croatian-Bosnian borders, which were over 
time increasingly brutal, the single men were the dominant demographic group targeted by border 
patrols. While the women and children were often told to step aside, the men were attacked, as Jalal 
(22, Syria, November, 2018) stressed during the interview: ‘When the police see small children, they 
don’t beat them, but when they see me and I am a man, they beat me’. The consequences of the daily 
border attacks were visible in the camps, where dozens of male injured bodies struggled to move 
around while cleaning and covering their injuries. Although it needs to be highlighted that the women, 
in contrast to the men, told me how they would be sexually harassed by border guards through 
inappropriate body searches or being forced to remove their clothes. Nevertheless, more extreme 
forms of violence, such as severe beatings resulting in serious injuries, broken and fractured bones 
were reported only by two women, compared to dozens of single men. Here, at least, the violence 
against women and children appeared to be a more random behaviour of individual police officers 
rather than something systematic when compared to the experiences of the men. 
Interestingly, those women and children who were physically attacked pointed out that the attacks 
were often initially targeting their father or brother but turned against them when they stood up to 
protect their male family members. For example, Fatima (40, Iran, July 2018) told me during the 
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interview that the officer attacked her 15 year old daughter while she wanted to save her father from 
the attacks during the push-back: ‘My daughter was walking as the last one (during the push-back from 
Croatia to Bosnia) and she saw her father being beaten. When my daughter saw her father being 
beaten, she said to the police: “Please, stop beating my father and beat me instead of him.” And the 
police started beating my daughter.’ Similarly, within different interviews, the men said that their 
wives or children got injured while they were instinctively protecting them, but the attacks were not 
initially targeting the females or children. 
While the cases of women and children being directly attacked or injured during the push-backs were 
rare, in contrast to the regular direct attacks of single men, abused and injured women and children 
returning to Bosnian camps attracted high levels of attention and concern. This firstly demonstrate the 
responses of the local residents, who often searched for medical care and food and clothes or even 
accommodation for the families, after they had been forced to return to Bosnia, while the men struggled 
to obtain basic medical attention and shelter after their return from the border. The women’s and 
children’s wounds were also attracting the attention of journalists, who arrived in Bosnia to portray 
stories of border violence and misery. The wounds on a female’s or a child’s body were more likely to 
satisfy the media demands as these were depicting the so considered real vulnerable victims, who were 
too weak to protect themselves against violence. 
Similarly, the attention of lawyers involved in legal advocacy of border violence victims, with whom our 
organisation cooperated, often rejected the abused men as not worth of their work. When I asked one 
lawyer from an anonymous organisation to help to open a litigation case for an Iranian adult man, she 
responded: ‘One hearing at the court costs 500 euros with the discount and it will be lots of work. If 
we would do this all effort and money would be spent for this, we should pick the case of some child 
or a woman’. As she said, a few cases of families mistreated at the borders opened their litigation cases 
and their pushbacks attracted attention by the competent authorities. While migrant women and 
children certainly need academic attention and ought to be protected as the most vulnerable, I agree 
with critical scholars who argue that such heteronormative assumptions lead both to migrant women’s 
infantilization and to the needs of migrant men being overlooked (Helms, 2015; Turner, 2019b), and 
more importantly, as the data here shows, the violence against the men to continue with impunity. 
I further learned that gender then impacted more subtle and structural forms of violence within the 
everyday living conditions and humanitarian (non)provision of aid in Bosnia, where people returned 
after their push-back. Little support in the camps provided by NGOs, related differently to the single 
men than to the women and children. While in the spring 2018, families lived by the side of the single 
men in the makeshift Trnovi camp, in July the same year, UNHCR and IOM workers arrived in this camp 
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and started selecting ‘vulnerable’ individuals for their relocation to the newly opened formal ‘Hotel 
Sedra’ camp, while writing down names of families. The rumours spread how Sedra was a nice hotel, 
where private rooms, three meals per day, clean water, hot showers, and medical care were provided; 
all lacking in the Trnovi camp. While the men were looking at the last families entering buses and 
leaving, they started questioning: ‘So, what will happen with us now? We will keep living here like 
animals? Can we go to the normal camp? We have been here for six months and we are tired.’ The 
men were relocated after snow and rain severely destroyed the makeshift camp in December the same 
year, to a former factory camp ‘Miral’, which differed from the Trnovi camp only with a shelter, but 
poor hygiene, no privacy, and limited aid remained. Miral, a male-dominated camp, also became 
known as a place where security guards commonly using violence against male residents, resulting in 
the death of Ahmed, a 53 year old man from Iraq, in March 2020. 
State-run humanitarian gaps, such as accommodation and aid in makeshift camps, were filled by 
sensibilities of local and international activists and the local population, whom all however, also 
thought differently about single men than other demographics. While volunteers in the Trnovi camp 
acknowledge single men and were interested in their needs, their limited donations and capacities 
excluded the men when priorities had to be established. For instance, in the spring 2018 with the high 
influx of the newly arriving migrants, families were given most of the donations; tents, blankets and 
sleeping bags, while many males were seen to sleep rough without any cover. Furthermore, voluntary 
donations were filled by women’s and children’s items, and therefore, the men often struggled to 
obtain shoes and clothes. When alternative accommodation was established by international 
volunteers in Sarajevo, it was also available only for the families: ‘No, we never take any single guys. 
Just families because they are much more vulnerable and at risk’, said Paul, a volunteer. Hence, 
marginalisation and the consequent invisibility of single men in humanitarian support commonly 
stemmed from the limited resources and capacities of aid providers, who prioritised women and 
children as their struggle for aid was considered as more in need than the one of single men. The 
priority was established based on gender and family unit, like in state-managed border systems 
discussed previously, perceiving single men as able to cope with harm. 
Similarly, dozens of Bosnian citizens shared their private accommodations with families, women, and 
children. The local population also entered the Trnovi camp to share their food with those in need, 
particularly during Muslim religious celebrations. For example, dozens of residents arrived in the camp 
by cars during Bayram (Eid). The local people were walking around the camp with boxes full of food, 
looking into tents and searching for children and women. When they found out that in most cases the 
tent was occupied by single men, they left without donating, and continued searching for their right 
receivers of their aid. The men started making fun and kept shouting: ‘Here, we have a baby!’, and 
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pretended to cry out loud like a baby with laughter but remained ignored. Through these jokes, the 
men made a serious point about their role on the bottom of hierarchy of aid that excludes them and 
reproduces violence. Thus, single men are perceived and treated as based on the dominant cultural 
assumptions about masculinity and its role in migration by diverse actors, ranging from state 
authorities, humanitarian organisations, international volunteers to local residents. 
This shows that (single) men have an uncertain and controversial position in migration, as highlighted 
in an emerging research on male migration discussing border technologies and border practices 
(Arsenijević et al., 2018; Augustová, 2020; Bigo, 2011; Milivojević, 2018) or humanitarian technologies 
(Carpenter, 2018; Charsley & Wray, 2015; Turner, 2019a; Turner, 2019b). Turner (2019a) argues that 
this uncertainty particulalry impacts the men’s position in humanitarian aid; the men still endow with 
power, agency and independence even in the precarious context of migration, and thus, are side-lined 
in the hierarchy of support, which this research confirms. However, the encounters here also shed light 
on other forms of violence – direct attacks, which work on the premise that the men coming from 
conflict-affected societies are ex-combatants due to the discrepancy of their masculinity with 
victimisation (Myrttinen et al., 2017), which are generally underexamined in the research on male 
migration. Thus, the assumptions about men’s role in migration at the Bosnian-Croatian borders as 
‘independent’, ‘strong’ or ‘threatenig’ predicted the complex experiences of violence, when on the 
one hand, rendering the men invisible in humanitarian aid, but on the other hand, constructing the 
men as a visible threat during the games, triggering police attacks. Whilst gender is assumed to 
organise violence against women (Crenshaw, 1991; Shepherd, 2007; Stubbs, 2015), the migrant men 
became the most prominent victims of gendered violence within so the considered liberal European 
police security at the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
To this end, I argue that it is the direct and brutal forms of violence from which the specific dynamic of 
how the migrant men are perceived and treated at the EU’s external land borders stems, which has 
been also previously observed by the Serbian borders with Croatia and Hungary (Arsenijević et al., 
2018; Augustová, 2020). The single men migrating across the Bosnian-Croatian borders are considered 
agential, powerful, and violent particularly by state authorities, such as border patrols. Deriving upon 
Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005), these assumptions 
allows predominantly male state authorities to exercise force and re-assure their power in competition 
within masculinity over other-migrant men. Although I observed that the anti-male-migrant anxieties 
are premised on fears of Arab Muslim men, which suggests that gendered violence is racialized, which 
means that it is further legitimised by race and religion (Carr & Haynes, 2015). In line with this, the 




7.4: Racialized violence? Making sense of Arab Muslim male identities in border violence. 
Whilst the importance of gender on border violence is clear, it is fundamental to further stress that 
those living in the makeshift camps and trying to play games were mainly men, who commonly shared 
other social locations, such as race and religion despite rich differences among them. The majority 
were men of colour and came from Arab countries either in the Middle East or North Africa. Most were 
Muslims, while only a few were Christians, Hindu, and almost none were atheists. Since the northern 
Bosnian population were also predominantly Muslims, the men often told how they were treated with 
respect and care in the camps around Kladuša. Imran, the ex-veteran and the owner of the restaurant 
hosting migrants would often say: ‘Bosnian or Syrian, (it) does not matter. We are all Muslims.’ 
However, Muslim men were trying to hide their religion when moving only a few kilometres across the 
Bosnian border into Croatia. They feared being mistreated by Croatian patrols, who were mainly 
Christians with the recent histories scored with Muslim-Christian violence (Hoare, 2006; Razsa & 
Lindstrom, 2004) and the right-wing government striving for ‘white’ and ‘Christian’ borders 
(MacDowall, 2018; Pavlaković, 2008). Participants pointed out during the interviews that their Arab 
Muslim identities were stressed by the border guards, who were stripping them naked, destroying 
their phones, and attacking them during the push-backs. When Muslim men revealed their religion to 
Croatian border patrols during the pushbacks, this often triggered verbal or/and physical attacks. For 
example, Abu (54, Iraq) told to Croatian police officers that he was a Muslim, with the intention to 
show that he had good values without any violent intentions, and asked the patrols to let him go: ‘One 
police told me: ‘So, you are a Muslim? Muslims killed my cousin during the war! Fuck Muslims!’ He got 
very angry when I said that I was a Muslim and he was horrible to me. He was shouting at me and 
kicking to my legs and deport (pushback)’ (Abu). 
‘When you say I am Muslim, I am Arab, Croatian police don’t like you. They are racists’, also pointed 
out Majid (24, Algeria, July 2018). Indeed, discriminatory assumptions about race and religion were 
explicit when police officers were insulting the participants before or while violently pushing them 
back to Bosnia. These insults were mostly stressing the men’s origins, upon which the police 
considered them as not deserving to enter the EU territory: ‘You don’t go to Europe, fuck you, go back 
to Bosnia!’ (Houmam, 22, Syria, November 2018) or ‘Police said to us: ‘Go back and not come, fuck 
you!’ They were saying: ‘You are terrorists, Taliban!’ (Ferdous, 17, Afghanistan, June 2018). The men 
described that these insults made them to feel ‘scared’, ‘humiliated’, ‘less than human’, ‘criminal’, 
‘terrorist’, or ‘savage’, as they pointed out during the interviews. 
This shows that the men were attacked based on their biological and cultural characteristics, such as 
skin colour, nationality and religion, besides their migration status and gender. Bhui (2018) suggests 
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that practices against Arab Muslim men, such as surveillance, violence and imprisonment are observed 
across Europe when policing system legitimises violence against Arabs and Muslims, as also discussed 
by Fanon in post-colonial France (1961). Such practices call to perceive and treat this group of men as 
a homogenous terrorist group, as illustrated by the interview narratives here, which goes in line with 
the war on terror approach, in which male gender and racialization of Arab Muslims construe the focal 
social categories to target those considered as dangerous (Razack, 2004). 
However, it needs to be said that a few women, like the men, reported that the police were using their 
race and religion while inappropriately body frisking them or forcing them to remove their clothes. For 
example, Madina, who was travelling with her children and husband, felt that her religion and country 
of origin played an important role for the border guards, who were pushing them back: 
I said to the police that I was a Muslim and refused to take off my clothes. But they said, ‘No 
problem’ and took off all my clothes. They forced me to take all my clothes off and kept 
repeating to me: ‘Pička ti materina (fuck you in Slovenian, meaning go back from where you 
came from)’ … After, the police told me and other women maybe five times or six times to take 
off our scarfs, but I did not want to. My son was scared and told me: ‘Mum, please, remove 
your scarf because otherwise maybe they hit you’ I was crying. And the police removed the 
scarf from my head and threw it on the ground. It was very difficult for me. The policeman told 
me: ‘This is the last time that you wore your scarf. Here is not Afghanistan, here is Slovenia, 
here is no Islam!’ (Madina, 47, Afghanistan, August 2018). 
This illustrates how Arab and Muslim identities are racialized in the exercise of border violence, mostly 
for the men, and that in the crude attacks, but also for a few women and their children, while being 
subjected to body searches and sexual harassment. The participants considered their race and religion, 
particularly triggering violence when intersecting with male gender. We can read from the migrants’ 
narratives that their subjection to violence was organised by racial purity and gender domination, 
when white, Christian and predominantly male border forces used violence when racializing migrants 
as Others. Indeed, race and gender are framed in feminist literature as the pivotal social categories for 
the particular distribution of social resources, causing structural violence, but also leading to 
experiences of direct violence and its legitimisation  (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1996; Crenshaw, 1991; 
Harris, 2000; Mills, 1996; Razack, 2004; Stubbs, 2015; Yuval-Davis, 2006), as illustrated here. 
However, how can we make sense of border violence targeting specifically racialized men when most 
feminist literature considers women of colour as in greater risk of violence? Although I met a few 
women reporting violence, which cannot be side-lined, I place in the centre of the discussion here Arab 
Muslim men. It is these men that I found as more prone to direct and brutal violence in the specific 
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context of the Bosnian-Croatian borders due to the different cultural categorisation of gender and race 
in migration. Here, uncontroversial refugees in need of help are portrayed as brown-skinned women 
(Griffiths, 2015; Malkki, 1996), while illegal migrants, criminals, terrorists and combatants are 
portrayed as brown-skinned Muslim men (Milivojević, 2018). From this is evident that to understand 
violent realities at the border, we must understand both men’s and women’s perspectives to overcome 
gendered and racialized categorisations such as violent and dangerous Arab Muslim masculinities, 
victimised and imperilled Arab Muslim femininities framed in modern civilised western subjectivities 
(Razack, 2004). This is of great importance given that Harris (2000) argues that mostly men of colour 
are subjected to the crudest police security practices in liberal democracies, which also implies for 
border violence at the EU’s external land borders. 
The men told of their awareness of the border violence as gendered and racialized, and attempted to 
prevent it in different ways. For instance, one boy coming from the north of Algeria told me that he 
was scared to go in the game with his close friend from a southern region of Algeria, whom was darker 
than him: ‘I am worried to move with him although he is my friend and I respect him. But you know, 
his face, when someone will see us, they will immediately call the police and you know what follows’, 
he said. A few Muslim men also told of how they would shave their beards or wear a crucifix around 
their necks when departing for the games, as they believed that looking like a Christian or being a 
Christian would have protected them. As Ibrahim, a 26-year-old Christian from Algeria, explained that 
being a Christian saved his life during the push-back, when he escaped with severe back injury: 
It was in the forest in the night and I could see almost nothing. There were some men in 
black masks and black clothes. They started beating me and I fell on the ground and I could 
feel blows everywhere and electric (shocks) in my neck. They kept beating me and beating 
me. For a moment one stopped because he was tired from beating me, but others 
continued the beatings. I started shouting loud for Jesus to help me and saying a prayer, 
and suddenly, they stopped and let me go (Ibrahim). 
Ibrahim’s testimony allows us to further map how diverse forms of violence closely intersect with the 
assumptions about gender and race and function as key features of the everyday experiences along 
the EU’s borders with Bosnia, as shaped by racism and patriarchy (Crenshaw, 1991). From the data it 
is clear that gendered and racial violence did not occur randomly, but rather underpinned the logics of 
the crudest border attacks. Also, Isakjee et al. (2020) argue that the racial nature of border violence 
cannot be contingent on the explicit avowals on behalf of the oppressor. 
How race underpins the logics of treating diverse migrants is not only visible on the ground but also in 
political and humanitarian statements presented across the media, which further demonstrates 
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racialization of border violence against the men of colour. The narratives about ‘defending Christianity’ 
from the ‘virus of terrorism’ and ‘mixed-race nations’ have been heard from the countries on the EU’s 
edge, such as Croatia and Hungary, who use brutal attacks of migrants along their southern borders 
(Fekete, 2018; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004). Such racialized and gendered language of border control has 
transferred from the far right to the mainstream in SEE (Milivojević, 2018, p 88), which significantly 
mediated the men’s experiences of border violence presented here. 
The racializing of Muslim migrants as unwanted ‘others’ within a white Europe is not only visible 
through the direct attacks in Croatia and Slovenia. It has been argued elsewhere that race in migration 
predicts more subtle and structural forms of violence, such as the denial of aid in the Calais camps 
(Isakjee et al., 2020) or closure of legal transit in SEE region to maintain ‘homogenous ethnicity’ in the 
EU (Milivojević, 2018; Pajnik, 2019). The use and obscuration of violence, in its direct forms, is 
particularly explicit along the Croatian-Bosnian borders, where injuries are pushed from Croatia to 
Muslim and ‘other’ not-quite-European places in Bosnia, where violence is assumed to belong and 
remains unquestioned24. Simultaneously, Croatian border practices are being financially supported by 
the EU Commission and praised as an outstanding job by prominent EU politicians25. Importantly, 
gendered and racialized violence against migrant men has been also observed beyond Europe. For 
example, Bigo (2011) argues that the imagined threat in the U.S. border controls racialize Hispanic 
migrant men the same way as Arab Muslim men in Europe. 
Indeed, racialized and gendered logics of violence, particularly in its structural forms, has been 
imminent to the liberal and modern democracies across the world, which adds to the encounters how 
race and gender organise border violence presented here. Profiling based on the intersections of 
gender and race is a crucial aspect of broader smart ‘open’ and ‘liberal’ border approaches across 
Europe, the U.S. or Australia, which target those classified as potential threats (Amoore, 2006; Didier 
Bigo, 2014; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Reece Jones & Johnson, 2016). For instance, in February 2020, the 
chief executive officer of Ryanair Michael O’Leary said that Muslim men travelling alone should be 
profiled at airports as potential bombers as ‘this is where the threat is coming from’ (Aljazeera, 2020). 
In the same way, fear of non-white migrant men, who pose a rape threat to ‘our white women’, is a 
tried and true formula that reinforces the notions of white male actors across Croatia and Hungary 
(Helms, 2015), which was similarly used as the governmental technique to control white family units 
colonial and post-colonial Britain (Turner, 2015). 
 
24 Ibid, Chapter 6, p 74. 
25 Ibid, Chapter 8, p 109. 
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Indeed, these political narratives are not new as the rich literature shows that race in violence has 
been imminent to European colonial histories (Fanon, 1961; Foucault, 1975; Lazreg, 2008). The racial 
and gender roles are shaped by assumptions about migrants’ social and cultural backgrounds in post-
colonial European white states, particularly those re-assuring their position there, such as Croatia. 
These narratives producing and re-producing fear of the migrant Arab Muslim men as terrorists or 
threats are thus used as an anti-immigration politico-cultural strategy.  According to Kaya (2016), these 
narratives do not only legitimise violence against racialized migrants but also reinforce European 
power and identity, similar to how other forms of racism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries operated. To this end, the violence experienced by the migrants cannot be understood 
outside racism, nationalism, and patriarchy as these create social conditions in which such violence is 
rendered as natural, expected, and even to be regarded as deserved (Vogt, 2018). 
Essentially, border violence is rationalised (Galtung, 1990; Said, 1978) when violence is sanitised by the 
supposed superiority of Christianity over Islam, white face over brown face, and Europeans over Arabs. 
Legitimisation of racial hierarchies can be encompassed in the history of how Europe orientalised Arabs 
and Muslims as the most recurring images of the Other across colonization (Said, 1978), to the post 
9/11 Western military interventions in the Middle East within the war on terror (Basham & Vaughan-
Williams, 2013), and border practices against racialized migrants at the EU’s borders today (Isakjee et 
al., 2020). 
I found that these assumptions are not random, but rather are reinforced structurally when formalising 
rules or orders at the Bosnian-Croatian borders (i.e. right to asylum, legal border access, humanitarian 
aid, who is subjected to push-backs and direct violence). Once such behaviours become integrated into 
laws and social mores, state authorities and others involved in border violence may find themselves in 
positions of rationalizing their acts simply because ‘I was only doing my job, following orders’ 
(Schneider et al., 2017, p 69), which echoes reaction of a Croatian border guard to one of my 
participants during the push-back, who told him: ‘We have orders to beat you all’. This argument also 
finds support in the previous research that shows that political ideologies of European states go hand 
in hand with racially converting Muslim migrants from Arab states to ‘backward’ and ‘dangerous’ 
cultures, towards which exploitation in home states or diverse forms of violence along borders are 
triggered and justified (Helms, 2015; Isakjee et al., 2020; Mafu, 2019; Milivojević, 2018). 
Hence, some border practices are indeed made possible by certain operating logics that are always 
already both highly gendered and racialized (Basham & Vaughan-Williams, 2013, p 510). To this end, I 
argue that the negative symbolic positioning of Arab Muslim migrant men at the European borders 
does not only allow violence to be triggered against them, but importantly, it also allows this violence 
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to operate with no visible marks as the men’s lives are culturally imaged as not quite refugees, not 
quite men, and as Butler (2004) argues, not quite lives, besides the fact that their injured bodies are 
thrown away in the not-quite-Europe – the Balkans, where violence supposedly belong. 
7.5: Conclusion. 
By highlighting how male gender with Arab Muslim origin and other social locations intersect and 
shedding light on how these organise border violence, this chapter has offered a critique of the existing 
research that argues that violence impacts specifically women and children (Hladnik, 2016; Pajnik & 
Bajt, 2012; Zavratnik & Krilić, 2018). The encounters from the Bosnian-Croatian borders and their 
analysis instead showed how the neglect of the men in migration research treats migrants as would-
be refugees, which often slips into their perception as non-vulnerable. I found such dominant cultural 
assumptions common among state authorities, humanitarian agencies and other actors who manage 
the migrants’ journeys, which proved to be dangerous. This echoes Harris’ (2000) argument that 
cultural fantasies of race, nation, and gender in white liberal societies result in violent police security 
to overcome non-white male evil, as also illustrated in the context of the Bosnian-Croatian border. 
I have argued in this chapter how single men appeared to be at the highest risk of diverse forms of 
border violence. This was firstly explained by the dominant assumption of masculine agency; men are 
considered as ‘strong’, ‘not vulnerable’ and ‘independent’, in contrast to genuine refugee women and 
children (Griffiths, 2015; Malkki, 1996). This chapter also showed that when masculinity intersects with 
migration, particularly from war zones, the men travelling ‘single’ were deemed ‘unreal refugees’ and 
‘threats’. As the consequence of this, the men were perpetually moving between violent invisibility in 
the camps – left out of the aid provision and legal support, and violent visibility during the games – 
subjected to interceptions, direct attacks and push-backs. Data on male migration in scarce (Arsenijević 
et al., 2018; Augustová, 2020; Carpenter, 2005; Charsley & Wray, 2015; Turner, 2019a, 2019b) and my 
argument here highlights how it is intertwined with the experiences of diverse forms of border 
violence. However, direct violence along the borders as a predominantly masculine experiences 
remains underexamined in the studies on male migration, which construes the main contribution of 
this chapter. 
I further argue how race intersects with gender to organise violence against these ‘single’ men, who 
were predominantly Arab Muslims. The dominant ideologies about race and religion were explicit 
themes in my conversations with the men as they explained how their Arab Muslim identities were 
stressed by the border guards as they stripped them naked, destroyed their phones, and attacked 
them. While the intersections of gender and race in violence are dedicated to women in feminist 
literature (Crenshaw, 1991), it is my argument here that these intersections also play a crucial role in 
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men’s lives. I have argued that race allowed for cultural legitimisation (Galtung, 1990) of the violence 
against the male participants; it made it feel ‘right’ or at least ‘not wrong’ as those subjected to 
beatings were positioned as ‘others’. 
Whilst racialized violence has been imminent within the past colonialization and today’s militant 
presence of Western states in Arab Muslim states, how race and visible difference in particular 
organise violence is also illustrative along the Bosnian-Croatian borders. This border context is 
particularly significant to understand also due to its recent Muslim-Christian violence and the Croatian 
far-right government. Violence against Arab Muslim male migrants thus signifies the ongoing struggle 
for pure ethnic – white and Christian borders in Croatia, under its struggle for Europeanisation; most 
recently the succession to the Schengen Zone.  
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Chapter 8: Games and push-backs: the direct border violence. 
8.1: Introduction. 
It has been argued in the previous chapters that geographical distinction between what is considered 
as Balkan and Europe is used to legitimise violence against migrants, when this context clearly 
organised the men’s border games, and violence that followed them. Moreover, the pre-existing ideas 
about gender and ‘race’ within European liberal discourse in the same manner predict and mediate 
violence against Arab Muslim migrant single men in the context of the Bosnian-Croatian borders. 
Following this we are still left with two important questions. First, what are the migrants’ experiences 
of violence when playing games from Bosnia into EU member states, where they are being deterred 
by state authorities and pushed back? And, second, how do the migrants understand that violence? It 
is the first of these questions that will be considered in some detail in this chapter by asking what forms 
of violence against migrants take place along the EU’s external border with Bosnia. 
This chapter begins by setting out the process of what many migrants call the ‘dirty work of push-
backs’, which often ends their border games, when most commonly Croatian border guards inflict 
harm on game players and their possessions. It explores the extent of the direct violence on migrants 
and its everyday detailed processes. By doing so, this section aims to further our understanding of the 
direct form of border violence, which is commonly side-lined in academic literature. 
The chapter will then shed light on how this direct border violence evolved across time, when 
discussing its perpetrators and broader mission to combat cross-border crimes that underpins the 
objective of the direct violence. This topic will be narrated from a horizontal perspective – that is, 
migrants whom are at the heart of this study, rather than the vertical perspective of state-centred 
approaches as discussed in Chapter 3 (Ibid, p 33). As we have seen, the focus on the latter often results 
in only partial answers to what violence means in its ‘structural’ forms, without concrete persons and 
direct actions on the ground. In line with this, the chapter focuses on the direct attacks and seeks to 
identify its ‘structural’ origins which in reality, construe concrete smart and military technologies, 
bilateral agreements and international cooperation during ‘push-backs’ stretching between EUs’ 
external and internal borders. 
From there, the chapter will explore the detailed patterns of violent police strategies targeting border 
crossers’ bodies, possessions and persona, as narrated by the migrants. Drawing upon the men’s 
subjective experiences encountered during the interviews, it will explore where exactly this direct 
violence takes place and what these places, together with the violent police strategies, indicate in 
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terms of a broader understanding of how the direct border violence functions and sustains with 
impunity. 
Finally, the conclusions will summarise the major arguments of this chapter, when pointing to how the 
direct violence functions in the border enforcements and how the migrants experience it. It will 
establish a foundation for further examination of the research question that asks in which forms border 
violence functions at borders after migrants are pushed back to Bosnian makeshift camps, before 
moving to the focal examination of this thesis of how these diverse forms of violence impact migrants’ 
everyday practices and relations. 
8.2: ‘Dirty work of push-backs’. 
One morning when we arrived at the shower trailers with Rosalinde, there was already a long queue 
of men waiting to wash themselves. I saw many familiar faces greeting us. Some other faces were new, 
who were either pushed to Kladuša the previous night or came to prepare for the new game. The day 
was cold and all standing in the line were nervous while waiting. Some were arguing about overtaking 
each other in the line, resulting in arguments. As the day passed, again, another man was trying to 
jump the queue, while slowly walking directly to the door of the shower trailer. He was arguing, but in 
low voice, that he just returned from the game, was injured and needed to have a shower immediately. 
Others got angry and started showing him dirty clothes and their bruises: ‘You are not the only one 
who got punishment yesterday! We all need to shower! Go to the line!’, a man with Pakistani accent 
shouted out in English. But while others could stand and wait, this man fell on the ground. When I 
helped him to sit down, he told me his name was Saad. He explained that he had taken some 
medication to kill a pain in his chest, which made him feel dizzy: 
Croatian commandos kicked me into my chest. It was horrible. They were deporting us around 
3 in the morning and for three or four hours after, we were searching for each other in a forest. 
They were beating also an old man, who was there with us and now has broken finger. They 
were humiliating us badly … Do you have a cigarette? I have money (pulling ten Bosnian marks 
out of his pocket), but I cannot go to the supermarket because I feel so dizzy and tired. I keep 
vomiting blood. I can’t eat anything as I vomit it back out. I think, I have maybe internal 
bleeding from so many kicks into my chest (Saad). 
Later, while Saad was being treated by a medical volunteer, I went to see the other three men who 
had been deported with him and agreed to meet me for a coffee and interview. When entering a café, 
I saw a tall man in his thirties, with a dirty leather jacket that was probably two sizes bigger than he 
needed. His name was Mahmoud, and he was half Palestinian and half Syrian, as he later noted. Next 
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to him, was an old man with wrinkles on his face, greeting me in Arabic: ‘Marhaba’, with a smile. He 
introduced himself as Haji, which in the Arabic language means a title of a respected elder. Indeed, this 
former Iraqi army general was sitting straight during our whole conversation, talking about the border 
attack with his head up and covering his broken finger into his jacket sleeve to prevent anyone from 
seeing it. Haji insisted on paying for my coffee from his last money, which he managed to save from 
the Croatian police during the push-back. ‘If you pay, I leave’, Haji said. The last one sitting by the table, 
Saad, was an Iraqi young-looking boy with light moustache and broken glasses on his face. I wanted to 
sit next to Mahmoud because he was fluent in English and had offered to translate for others if I did 
not understand, but he refused: ‘Sorry, but please don’t come too close to me because I smell horrible. 
I had no shower for one week because during the game, you can’t shower. I am sorry but I feel ashamed 
of my smell. All hotels refuse to rent a room to refugees. So, no shower for us.’ I moved my chair 
further to make him feel comfortable and switched on the voice recorder on my phone. Mahmoud 
then started narrating what had happened to him and the other 16 people travelling with them during 
their pushback the previous night: 
Croatian commando put all of us into very small van, into a boot. For thirty minutes, they were 
driving us, very fast, like on purpose, stopping and driving. There was not enough air inside. 
Saad started vomiting, and children started crying. It was really awful. On the way, they 
stopped the van and let the family with children go. I don’t know where they are now. But all 
men, they left us inside and transported us into different location to beat us. At the border, 
they opened the car, and Saad was still vomiting, and they saw him vomiting but they started 
beating him. They hit him on his arm with a baton. They made us to sit down, closed the van, 
one by one, and they asked me: ‘Where are you from?’ I said to him: ‘I am from Syria.’ He 
answered: ‘What is the matter with Syria?!’, and he started beating, beating, beating. And 
after, he told me: ‘Go!’. Ok, so, when I started walking from the van, I had to pass all of them 
(police officers). They made different lines and while passing these lines, they were beating 
me with batons. I was falling, and they kept beating (me). When it was Saad’s turn, his glasses 
fell from his face. So, when he run, there was a tree in front of him and he crashed into that 
tree because he could not see properly (all men laughing). 
When Mahmoud paused, Saad then described how a commando poured water on his head, and when 
he felt water and could see nothing just water over his face, they started attacking him with batons to 
his back and arms. Finally, the commandos pushed him down a hill and he broke his arm while falling. 
At the end of our conversation, Mahmoud stressed that he will have a rest for two days, before 
returning to the game. 
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I have quoted Mahmoud at length because men like him, as like many others, considered the attacks 
as ‘horrible’. Nevertheless, they would conclude that they were planning to risk being beaten again as 
they believed it was necessary to eventually reach their destinations. This is attributed to having no 
legal and safe transit options since the official closure of the ‘Balkan Route’ in March 2016 (Santer & 
Wriedt, 2017), when policies were put in place to stop the migratory movements. However, direct 
violence was called into an action when structural violence crumbled, which is a vicious cycle pointed 
out by Galtung (1969) when one form of violence is always ready to reinforce the other. This cycle, 
when legal and safe passages are closed, giving migrants no other option than to attempt unauthorised 
border crossings, harms and deaths, are known to exist along the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas to 
Italy and Greece (Albahari, 2015), in the desert between Mexico and the U.S. (Coutin, 2005; Doty, 
2011), to the shores of Australia (Parsley, 2003), as well as internal EU borders between France and 
England (Jones, 2019). 
While I was chatting with dozens of men waiting for showers the mornings following their push-backs, 
I could see how tired they were and often screaming from pain, but most had no doubts to start new 
games. As Abdullah (19, Syria, October 2018) said to me while cleaning his face full of scratches after 
being pushed out of the hill by the Croatian police the previous night: ‘Wallah! (I swear by God in 
Arabic), I rest and sleep and in two days, again to Croatia!’ Abdullah and his friends were lucky as they 
stayed in Kladuša for only a few weeks: ‘I see you in England soon!’, he joked when leaving to the 
Croatian border. After one month, I found out that he was in London, the end point of a journey that 
for the majority of people took years or was never completed. While Abdullah got lucky, the regular 
game scenario, however, resulted in more black eyes, sprained ankles, broken or fractured limbs, and 
footlong bruises from baton strikes. 
Those pushed out of the EU appeared again in Bosnia, with their phones destroyed and no money, 
waiting in long lines for voluntary medical assistance, to wash themselves and clean their muddy 
clothes in the provisional showers. Similar narratives were common rather than exceptional when the 
vast majority of men in the camps said to me during our conversations that they had been either 
subjected to physical attacks or witnessed others being beaten while being pushed back from EU’s 
states throughout their journeys. While living in Kladuša across the four seasons of the year, I was 
learning how this violence functioned on the ground through its systematic organisation and 
deployment of diverse perpetrators and their weapons, based upon the migrants’ experiences and 
interpretations of this violence, which the following section explores. 
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8.3: Understanding structural organisation and perpetrators of direct border violence. 
Those stranded in Bosnia shared a collective experience of the direct violence, which I observed was 
dependent and flexible upon the wider EU’s as well as national Croatian border managements and 
their trending securitising tools; as changing and increasing over the time of my fieldwork and the 
weather. Upon my arrival in Bosnia in the spring 2018, most people in the camps who had been 
apprehended during the games described being driven to Croatian borders with Bosnia. There they 
were expelled by police officers in blue uniforms matching those of the Croatian regular police 
(Temeljna policija). According to the migrants’ narratives, these officers mostly damaged their phones 
and stole their money, and in several cases hit them with plastic batons while shouting at them to go 
back to Bosnia. 
During this time, it seemed that police used slaps, kicks, punches, blows with batons and physical force 
only occasionally, and then only when suspecting that an apprehended person was a human smuggler. 
A 17 years old Ferdous from Afghanistan, who lived in Bosnia for about seven months and was trying 
to walk across the Bosnian-Croatian border almost every week, was attacked as an assumed ‘smuggler’ 
several times. When Rosalinde and myself drove the van to bring water to the ‘Helicopter place’, where 
Ferdous lived with thirty other men, we noticed him standing by with a broken arm. ‘They (Croatian 
police) saw I had GPS and information was in my mobile. He (policeman) asked me if it was my phone 
and I said yes. He said that I was a smuggler and he started beating me into my head and slapped me, 
‘tack’ ‘tack’! and he said that I was a smuggler’, Ferdous explained about his injury from his last game. 
This and other police accusations of smuggling, however, were based on weak evidence, for instance, 
finding an open GPS on a phone or a person’s ability to communicate in English, upon which he was 
considered as leading the whole group across the borders and then attacked. These attacks served as 
a punishment outside of juridical procedures for possible criminal activity. While combating human 
smuggling has been the major part of the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 
2015) and Frontex’s mission (2020), the attacks, however, were generally targeting migrants wanting 
to apply for asylum in Croatia or Slovenia or pass further. The similar disparities in fighting crimes and 
saving lives have been extensively researched in the Mediterranean Sea, where humanitarian values 
are used to enforce border controls (İşleyen, 2018). For instance, Sekulić (2017, p 45) pointed out the 
Joint EU’s Operation Triton actions fighting smugglers: ‘The narrowness of the operations’ mandate – 
i.e. only targeting traffickers – leaves open questions of the migrants’. In line with this, it has been 
argued that the combat of smugglers at sea – pushing the boats back to their places of departure 
(Andersson, 2014; De Genova, 2017; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2018; Stierl, 2018) and withdrawing of aid to 
boats in difficulties (Cuttitta, 2018; Squire, 2017) - function as strategies of non-arrivals for migrants 
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from the Global South (Weber & Pickering, 2011) rather than combating human smugglers. This also 
applies in the security operations across the Bosnian-Croatian-Slovenian borders, with the difference 
that the violence is inflicted by a human direct force, which substitutes for the inhospitable nature of 
the Mediterranean Sea or the desert between Mexico and the U.S. (Doty, 2011; Martínez et al., 2014). 
However, when the numbers of people arriving in Bosnia to attempt the games increased in July 2018, 
when warm weather made it easier to migrate, I observed that the perpetrators of the direct border 
violence and their tactics changed into more systematic and brutal ones, despite the EU’s repeated 
calls for humanitarianism (Avramopoulos, 2018). Simultaneously, the helicopter above the camp was 
flying more regularly and pointing strong lights over the camp and forests. When I went to smoke on 
the balcony of our volunteer house in the night, I could hear gun shots from the nearby border. 
Rosalinde was sitting next to me in silence, waiting to know if more shootings were going to be heard 
and after, saying: ‘Tonight will be many push-backs and tomorrow, many sad faces in the camp again, 
pfff.’ 
Interestingly, the study by Isakjee and colleagues (2020) shows that it was after July, 2018 that Croatia 
started receiving more EU funds for ‘interception operations’ to deploy airplanes and visual data to 
stream to the over 1000-strong Croatian border police, and technologies, such as watchtowers, 
thermal vision cameras, drones, and helicopters. With the deployment of these smart border 
measures, I observed more visible bodily injuries across the camps, which rather confirms the 
argument by Kraska (2007) and Jones and Johnson (2016) that the techno-scientific borders are deeply 
intertwined with a military approach and the use of direct violence, rather than mere symbolic or 
structural violence (Amoore, 2006; Bigo, 2014). This echoes Galtung’s (1969) argument that there is a 
causal relationship between structural violence, such as border policies and technologies, and direct 
attacks. In confirmation, those returning to the camps from the Croatian border stressed they were 
often detected by drones, and then attacked and expelled by the special border units dressed in black 
army-like uniforms. 
People across the camps commonly referred to these police groups as ‘commando’ or ‘military’ and 
described them as big men with masks. For this reason, several Iraqi and Syrian participants said that 
their perpetrators reminded them of combatant and terrorist groups from their home states, for 
instance Daesh causing them flashbacks of previous harms. Others also pointed to the sword symbol 
on the commandos’ uniforms; identifying the Croatian Special Police (Specijalna policija), and to dark 
blue uniforms and berets that match to the Croatian Intervention Police (Interventna policija); both 
units are under the authority of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. Further camera evidence 
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confirmed the Croatian Ministry of the Interior’s Police as consistently participating in push-backs 
(Border Violence Monitoring, 2018). 
Although the Minister of the Interior, Davor Božinović, repeatedly denied that the Croatian police units 
would be expelling the migrants or using violence against them (Dambach, 2018), he said during the 
interview for the Aljazeera Balkans (2019) that all three police units (Temeljna, Specijalna, Interventna 
policija) were deployed to protect Croatian and EU’s borders. A police whistle-blower also shared with 
the Croatian press that the specialised border force units, that aim to catch smugglers and migrants 
out of legal procedures, were often exchanged with ordinary police officers with a reputation for 
conflict, problems or were deployed due to their acquaintances (Klancir, 2019). Several interviewed 
migrants also alluded to the international (EU’s) police forces when they said that their perpetrators’ 
language sounded like Dutch, German, and Spanish. In line with this,  the European Commission (2019) 
refers to a significant and intensive cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans, EUROPOL, 
INTERPOL and the bilateral international police cooperation agreements. For instance, Croatia hosts 
foreign police officers through joint Frontex operations and the Frontex aircrafts are used for 
monitoring migration movements on the border with Bosnia (European Commission, 2019). This 
indicates the international planes and police forces were involved in violent push-backs during the 
time of my fieldwork, however, more evidence ought to be collected with the border police forces, 
besides political elites representing these international security organisations, to verify this. 
What the data shows are the migrants’ experiences of the push-backs that stretched across several EU 
countries – Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, leading to the migrants’ expulsions to Bosnia. Game returnees 
described being either detected by commandos in the southern Croatian mountains or forests, or 
handed over to them after being caught further inside Croatia by regular police. Those who were 
apprehended in Slovenia said they were driven in vans to Croatia by regular police who then 
transported them to the southern border areas, where a group of commandos was waiting to attack 
them and push them back to Bosnia. A few men were also returned from Trieste (Italy), where they 
were apprehended by the local police, who then triggered their chain of push-back: police officers in 
Italy drove them to Slovenia, where they handed migrants over to the local police, who then drove 
them to Croatia, resulting in physical violence and push-back to Bosnia. 
To this end, the most visible violence against the migrants was when the Croatian and Slovenian state 
authorities intentionally used physical force to cause them various bodily injuries while pushing them 
back to Bosnia from EU space. While listening to my participants’ stories, seeing their dirty clothes and 
injured bodies, and recognising their disgust and shame from their own smell and body after the attack, 
I could encounter the reality of what Galtung (1969) calls direct violence. This most obvious form of 
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violence, when border forces intentionally hurt migrants somatically or destroyed their possessions 
(Galtung, 1969) is surprisingly often forgotten in migration analysis of violence but daily taking place 
at the land borders, such as the Bosnian-Croatian borders, as well as previously examined the Serbian-
Croatian borders and the Hungarian-Serbian borders (Arsenijević et al., 2018). 
Thus, I found that the direct violence during the push-backs was initially randomly occurring in the 
spring, seemed to be organised by individual police officers, and driven mainly by the aim to combat 
human smuggling out of legal procedures. Over time, however, the violence appeared to be taking 
place more regularly and in more organised manner when net of international (EU) police forces, such 
as Croatia, Slovenia, Italy took over. The daily attacks involved regular police, who had the role of 
apprehending the migrants, and the special forces, whose task was to use various strategies to inflict 
harm as well as destroy their private possessions while pushing them back to Bosnia, as the further 
data will show in more detail. Thus, the narratives collected across camps uncover a complex structure 
of police groups, individuals, technologies and weapons employed by them on the ground that stand 
behind the infliction of the direct attacks within push-backs. 
Several participants noted that individual officers told them to follow orders while pushing them back 
or inflicting violence on them, which also indicates that violence was not triggered by unexpected or 
random individual police anomalities. This is for instance explicit in the interview with an Afghan family, 
who pointed out that an individual police officer did not want to push them back to Bosnia but he did 
so due to the orders from his superiors: ‘He (police officer) said to us: ‘Please, don’t cry. Sorry. I don’t 
want to do this, but I have to follow the orders.’ I could see little tears in his eyes.’ 
What this reveals is that structural violence and direct violence are inherently interconnected and 
operate in causal relationship at the Bosnian borders with the EU (Galtung's, 1969), despite migration 
and border studies usually examining only structural violence, as a separated out phenomenon from 
direct violence. Whilst police operations are organised by state(s) based upon their policies, they use 
direct and personal actions against migrants (Galtung, 1969). From the testimonies I collected there 
appears to be international cooperation within push-backs, directed to police departments across 
Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, and which result in violent attacks of concrete individual police officers 
against the migrants on the ground. This causal relationship between direct and structural violence, 
observable in migrants’ daily narratives, is fundamental to highlight to avoid seeing border violence as 
inflicted by an anonymous chain of structural orders (Jones, 2019), but human decisions and humans 
directly enforcing such decisions (Farmer, 2009). This confirms Vogt's (2018) argument that most 
violence experienced by migrants are not caused randomly by ‘bad guys’  - criminal organisations or a 
‘few bad apples’ among corrupt authorities or migrants themselves. Instead, ‘violence is routinised 
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and central to state security and enforcement practices’ (Vogt, 2018, p 63). The migrants’ regular 
accounts of being pushed back across several countries and international police cooperation, when 
the same patterns of violence were used indicate this. 
However, even if the narratives here identify concrete human actions at the borders, it is not possible 
to identify all concrete people involved in structural orders, leading to direct infliction of the harms. 
Importantly, the violent border management stands upon the international cooperation of numerous 
EU and non-EU states, diverse political institutions (i.e. EU, NATO, UN), non-governmental and civic 
organisations, in which endless chains of actors have different political, economic and social interests. 
To this end, what is considered as ‘state security’ remains a long and highly ramified causal chains and 
cycles, which results in no accountability for the attacks and the continuation of the status quo 
(Galtung & Höivik, 1971). The fundamental question remains how this violence takes place through 
police strategies during push-backs and how migrants’ experience and understand it in their own 
terms, which the following section aims to discuss. 
8.4: Police strategies and traps. 
It was almost midnight and I was sitting in the Syrian heima and drinking tea after a long day of work. 
In the night, the camps’ ugliness disappeared in the dark and it was time to forget what was happening 
around. Tahir would mostly cook a dinner, we would then talk, play cards or call families back in Syria. 
Sometimes, I tried to tell Czech fairy tales in Arabic and others Syrian stories in English, a challenging 
language practice. When the mood was good, a few people would gather to dance while others would 
be drumming on a pot or a piece of wood and sang. When the mood was down, everybody was just 
lying, smoking many cigarettes and scrolling down their Facebook walls on their phone. 
This night, the mood was good, at least until five Syrian men uncovered the tarpaulin door and said 
that they had just arrived from the push-back. The men started asking for cigarettes, food, bandages 
and blankets from all the others sitting in the tent. ‘Here, we are like Bingo (supermarket in Kladuša). 
Every night, people come from the border and say, please, give me this’, said Tahir and laughed. While 
a few volunteers and the local population were trying to aid people during the day, the help in the 
night was reliant only upon the camp inhabitants and their own social networks. The returnees sat 
down with us and recounted how they were driven in vans to the border, were subject to a few blows 
from police batons, all their possessions were stolen, and finally, they had to walk back to the camp 
for hours. I asked the men if they wanted to report their incident to our organisation the following day 
for the purposes of public advocacy and my thesis, and they agreed. 
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Following this event, I was walking home and thinking that I was going to hear their story again with 
all little details. Their story still shocked and scared me. However, the violence described by them was 
accepted as normal within the camps and their experience did not differ to all other stories of push-
backs that I was hearing every day, particularly in the terms of strategies that the police used to cause 
them harm. The only difference was that the lucky ones, like these men, ended with no or only mild 
injuries or saved their money, hidden in their anus or elsewhere internally , while others could not 
walk from the border back to the camp without their friends carrying them and lost everything they 
had. 
Entering the police van marked the beginning of the push-back in the men’s narratives, when many 
pointed that they knew their game was lost. People in the camp commonly referred to such police 
tactics as ‘combi’, ‘closed van’, ‘deport van’, ‘containers’, ‘car for criminals’, ‘cooking pressure pot’, 
‘fast drive’ and ‘zik-zak drive’. These names referred to various strategies and suffering involved within 
the journey to the Bosnian border, when various harms were inflicted without using one’s force. Most 
commonly, the men recounted the struggle to breathe inside of the vans, which were closed with no 
ventilation, for example Fares (25, Algeria, July 2018) said: ‘Me and my friend we had a problem to 
breath. There was no oxygen in the container. I said to them, please, I don’t have oxygen. But they 
started beating with the batons on the door of the van.’ 
Some men said that the van drove them to the Bosnian border during the day, and there they had to 
wait inside with no light and lack of oxygen until the night. More common was being enclosed in vans 
between one to three hours, and a few were trapped in combis even 24 hours. ‘It was like a closed 
van’, Vasim (Afghanistan, 26, August 2018) said to me, ‘Everyone started vomiting there because there 
it was too hot and no air. We told the police: ‘Can you please switch on the AC?’ (laughing), but no AC. 
They turned the heater on to torture us.’ Like Vasim, others also described that the police were 
intentionally turning a heater on to extremely high temperatures to cause them breathing problems 
and malaise. Struggling to breath was often combined with a fast drive when the driver would then 
break severely, resulting in people falling from one side of the back to another. This happened also to 
Aazar (19, Afghanistan, October 2018): ‘In the van, three other persons were vomiting because they 
were driving fast and swinging the car like this (showing car driving fast from left to right).’ The police 
stopped to pick up more apprehended men from police station(s) on the way, filling the back with up 
to thirty individuals. 
Police vans drove all the apprehended migrants to secluded areas by the Bosnian border, mostly 
around Kladuša, Šturlić and Bihać, in forests or fields, and that between 10 pm and 4 am. When the 
car stopped, those inside were aware what was going to occur next: theft, damage of their phones, 
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beatings and torture, followed by their expulsion to Bosnia. Many had experienced the same 
procedures during their many previous push-backs or heard about them across Bosnian camps. People 
were taken from the boot by ‘commandos’ either individually or in groups of two, three or four. Those 
still waiting inside for their turn said to feel fear while hearing insults, baton sounds and loud screams. 
Ibrahim (34, Iran, August 2018), who was being pushed back with his friend, said that his friend was 
the first one taken outside: ‘I could not see through the door as there were no windows, but I could 
hear how they were beating him. This took around 5 minutes. After, they told me to go out of the car 
and I knew I was going to be beaten.’ Particularly young boys recounted feelings of fear and confusion, 
like Yezen (17 years, Syria), said to me and other volunteers during our conversation of hearing batons 
cracking a bone and shouts of an older Algerian man, who was being deported with him. Despite 
previously living in a war zone in Syria, he said: ‘In my life, I have never heard screaming voices so mad, 
they screamed like this. In my life.’ 
While some received a few blows or slaps to their faces and were shouted at to run back to Bosnia, 
most said they were subjected to behaviour which they called ‘beating’, ‘punishment’ or ‘torture’. 
These stemmed from organised police violence strategies, which the participants referred to as ‘walls’, 
‘lines’, ‘circle’, and ‘tunnel’, based on diverse positions that the Croatian commandos undertook during 
the attacks: ‘There were four commandos at the border. And they said three persons to come out of 
combi. Ok, we came out and they created a circle. They put us in the middle of that circle and fought 
us all with batons’ (Ali, 20, Afghanistan, September 2018). The other common attack strategy was a 
‘tunnel trick’ when a few officers were standing on the left and others on the right, making a ‘tunnel’ 
leading from the back of the van to a forest, marking the Bosnian border: ‘Two of us had to walk 
through this tunnel and they were beating us by batons from both sides, while we were passing 
through their tunnel’ (Aazar, 19, Afghanistan, October 2018). Some also referred to ‘traps’ and 
explained that the police commonly used the natural landscape as a ‘trap’, when chasing them or 
forcing them to fall into a cold river (in autumn and winter) or downhill. In other cases, ‘commandos’ 
set various obstacles around the area, most commonly ropes, over which participants described to fall 
and caused themselves an injury. Amin (Bangladesh, 30, October 2018) experienced several push-
backs when each time, he said that the police was using new trap: ‘They put a rope on a way and when 
people were running outside of the hill, they fell because there was a rope. And when we fell, the 
police came with big sticks (batons) and started beating us. The last time, there was a wall and they 
were beating us behind that wall.’ 
To make the way from the vans more difficult to navigate and easier for the officer to target a victim, 
men said that the commando either firstly pointed a strong light into their eyes or used a pepper spray 
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while still sitting in a van, which blinded them: ‘One person was torturing us by the light into our eyes 
and other five were beating … They were beating us by batons on the shoulders, back, head. I did not 
know where they hit and to my private parts. We all never know where they hit, in the dark night, they 
can hit hard’ (Ejaz, 45, Pakistan, August 2018).  
Commandos were mostly using plastic or metal batons, kicks, slaps and punches. In some cases, the 
men recounted experiences of police officers stepping with their boots on their head, neck or back, 
pouring water on them, and several demonstrated how electric shocks had been applied to their body: 
‘When I was on the floor and the policeman with black suit gave me electric shocks into my neck, I told 
him that I had heart problems. But he kept beating me’ (Hakim, 26, Tunisia, September 2018). 
However, when the winter approached, participants more commonly stressed that the police took 
their clothes off or took their shoes and told them to walk in the snow back to Bosnia. In a few cases, 
I was also told that the police were taking photos and videos of the attacks. Taking photographs may 
be seen as a particularly cruel form of violence, in which the act of exposure multiply the feelings of 
shame, as observed on more extreme form of violence in the Abu Ghraib prison (Laustsen, 2008). 
Several participants had experienced the police using guns to threaten them. For example, Amin (21, 
Bangladesh, October 2018) said: ‘I was really scared when the (Croatian) police caught us. They pointed 
the gun against me and told me to not to move. I was very scared. They told us: ‘If anyone runs from 
here, we shoot them’.’ Similarly, others said that the ‘commandos’ pointed a gun to their heads to 
force them to run downhill and fall in the summer or enter a freezing river in the winter.  
Others described the police shooting live ammunition under their legs or around their body, while 
shouting at them to run back to Bosnia: ‘They were shouting at us: ‘Go Bosnia, go Bosnia!’, and 
shooting with a gun under our legs’ (Mohammad, 26, Syria, August 2018). These men were threatened 
by guns but were not physically injured by firearms. However, after my physical withdrawal from the 
fieldwork two young ‘game players’ were seriously wounded after being intentionally shot at by 
Croatian border patrols on two separate occasions in November 2019, followed by more similar 
incidents. 
Among other common violent strategies during pushbacks were also robberies and damage to private 
possessions. The men described how police units told them to get naked and body frisked them, either 
during apprehensions inside of Slovenia or Croatia, or before being pushed back, in southern Croatian 
border locations. For example, Jalal (22, Syria, November 2018) said: ‘They told us to sit down, 
searched our bodies and stole our stuff, my phone, money, passport, clothes. They got us naked and 
were kicking us from the back’. Police officers particularly stole individuals’ money, sometimes taking 
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from one apprehended group even 2000 euros, as well as their expensive phones. The officers 
regularly damaged older models of phones and other private possessions by using their boots, batons 
or driving over them with a car (see Figure 7). Many also said that the officers cut their charging cables, 
threw away their bags, tore up their identification documents, or burned their sleeping bags and 
clothes. The individuals were perpetually subjected to these systematic thefts and destructions during 
pushbacks, when for instance Hussein (27, Morocco, August 2018) pointed out that he lost five phones 
and 2500 euros at the Bosnian-Croatian border, as he had been financially supported by his family who 
can no longer send him money. 
 
Figure 7 Men showing their broken phones after the push-back from Croatia to Bosnia (photo 
by author). 
While the destruction and theft of private possessions may seem to be a more subtle form of direct 
violence than the physical aggression against the body, deprivation of the only private belongings that 
the people possessed often led to infliction of bodily harms later. Firstly, when police stole an 
individuals’ money, and his family could not financially support him, he then struggled to buy food and 
clothes and suffered from hunger and cold in squats and makeshift camps, where aid was limited. 
Similarly, mobile phones functioned for the migrants as their most crucial tool to navigate their journey 
and increase their safety. Loss of a phone led to even more dangerous border crossings without GPS 
or losing contact with a human smuggler and his help, and no ability to collect evidence of human 
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rights violation (i.e. photos of injuries or videos of attacks). Men without phones often pointed to the 
loss of contact with their family members. This was particularly stressed by the men, whose families 
lived in war zones: ‘I don’t know if my family is alive. I hear about bombs in the city but have no contact 
with them. Every day, I am scared because I have no contact’, Abdel (34, Syria) told me during our 
conversation. 
I also observed that individuals without phones often struggled to call for quick assistance from 
activists, legal advisers, medics or NGOs when needed. In January 2019, a young Algerian man died in 
front of the formal camp Miral after he had been hit by a car late at night and neither he nor his friend 
had a phone to call an ambulance, resulting in no immediate help. People also said they had saved in 
their mobile phones evidence that would help them claim international protection in their final 
destinations, such as photos of the ruins of their house or a bombed car and videos of fighting in their 
hometowns. This was reported particularly by individuals from Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where 
only certain areas and groups of population were considered as at risk of life in their home countries 
and deserving of international protection in host states with a high level of competition for European 
asylum. Damage of a phone or/and theft of identification documents led to the loss of this evidence 
and threatened an individual’s successful asylum claim, increasing his possibility to be deported back 
to a dangerous void. Indeed, as Galtung (1969) argues, destruction of one’s things is considered as 
direct violence as the consequence of these destructions may be harm to a person across time, which 
proves to be the case at the borders. In line with this, I argue that direct violence against those things 
that the migrants hold dear is akin to violence against their person. 
While I have so far pointed out the direct violence as taking place at borders, the border violence also 
functioned beyond the locations of the EU’s borders, in the places of apprehensions and detentions in 
Slovenia or Croatia, in addition to border zones. In the inner state territories, the interviewed men 
described being threatened by guns during their apprehensions or attacked by batons and kicks, like 
at border areas. In police stations, violence consisted of detention in cells or containers with a lack of 
oxygen, like in the combis, or attacked by regular police officers, besides being deprived of food and 
water. Several participants said they were subjected to various physical harms up to four times within 
one push-back procedure; when they were apprehended and held in the police station by regular 
police, and then, in combis and at the borders by the ‘commandos’. This shows that the border violence 
also takes place in the inner states, dozens or even hundreds of kilometres away from Bosnian borders 
and ‘the Balkans’. Hence, the border violence is geographically expanded to non-border areas as both 
the direct political violence inside and at the borders of states (1) are managed and perpetrated by the 
same (EU) authorities, (2) use the same patterns and violent strategies (detention in places with lack 
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of oxygen and physical attacks by police using batons, kicks, punches, guns), and (3) are driven by the 
same purpose, to push individuals out of EU territory and dissuade their further movements or in 
Galtung’s (1969) term to ‘lock the person out’ of the state(s). 
Thus, I argue that the location of the direct border violence, therefore, does not depend on the mere 
geographical location of borders, but on a complex set of political and violent patterns that are 
managed by the same decision makers and enforced by the same police units. Albeit, the participants’ 
narratives show that direct violence is used as a border deterrent in the EU rather than out of the EU. 
This location is fundamental to stress as migration studies commonly investigate more crude and 
brutal forms of violence against migrants in An-Other places (Taussig, 2004), where it is conventionally 
assumed to belong, such as Africa (Malkki, 1996; Newhouse, 2015; Onoma, 2013), Asia (Akhter & 
Kusakabe, 2014; Cuéllar, 2005), the Middle East (Khalili, 2008; Shahid, 2002) or Mexico (Vogt, 2018) – 
far away from European liberal and humanitarian shores and lands. When direct violence or torture 
against migrants are acknowledged within the EU’s border management context, it is associated with 
security externalisation policies and financial initiatives in ‘buffer zones, such as Libya, Nigeria, Turkey 
and the Mediterranean (Andersson & Keen, 2019; Mafu, 2019; Panico & Prestt, 2019), and now, 
Bosnia. As it has been argued in the previous chapter, the discourse of migration and violence in 
Bosnia, as an historically construed violent and criminal Balkan Route (El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019) and 
badlands (Bird et al., 2020) provides cultural and political camouflage to the true location, organisation, 
and objectives of the direct violence that migrants experience during ‘games’ and ‘push-backs’ inside 
of EU territory – Croatia and Slovenia. 
The people across the informal camps commonly stressed having limited or no possibility to protect 
themselves or resist the direct violence and push-backs, as they feared that this would either lead to 
another violent attacks or result in inactions due to having no power against the status quo. When 
some tried to negotiate with border authorities or asked them for help, this mostly led to further 
violence to silence their requests. ‘If we ask or say anything (to commandos), ask for asylum or give 
me back my phone, they would start beating us again.’ (Farhan, 37, Iraq, September 2018). 
While the interview narratives provide only a partial insight into the violence that takes place along 
the Bosnian-Croatian borders, exhaustive material about push-backs has also been published by 
activist groups (Border Violence Monitoring Network, 2020; Forensic Architecture, 2019; No Name 
Kitchen, 2020), various NGOs (Amnesty International, 2019; UNHCR, 2019a), and state authorities, who 
attempted to investigate push-backs. Among many others, this includes the Croatian Ombudswoman 
for Human rights who had requested police camera footage from places of push-backs and 
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documentations in Croatian police stations to interrogate the push-backs, told activists that these were 
rejected by the police as ‘non-existent’. 
Croatian state authorities nevertheless continue to deny the testimonies of migrants. For instance, the 
Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic said during an interview for Swiss TV: ‘I have spoken with 
the interior minister, the chief of police and officers on the ground, and they assured me they have not 
been using excessive force … Of course, a little bit of force is needed’ (Grabar-Kitarovic in SRF, 2019). 
The evidence of injuries and destroyed mobile phones has been also rejected by the Croatian Ministry 
of the Interior, Davor Bozinovic, who explained the injuries as migrants’ own fault when walking via 
forest terrain when illegally crossing borders, or caused during inter-communal fights, or are mere lies 
that migrants were instructed to say by activists (Valdec, 2018). This matches the previous findings 
from the Mediterranean, where state authorities consider harms and deaths as ‘natural causes’ during 
hazardous sea-crossings or as self-afflicted (Doty, 2011; Isakjee et al., 2020). While no investigations 
of push-backs have been conducted, in 2019, the European Commission gave a green light to Croatia 
to become part of the Schengen Zone as fulfilling the ‘highest standards’ of police behaviour guarding 
the EU’s external borders (Miner, 2019). This indicates that Croatia is only enforcing a broader border 
approach on the ground, for which it is not only encouraged by financial and technological support but 
also rewarded. This confirms how tight the border is between ‘direct’ and ‘structural’ violence: the 
question remains whether there is even a real distinction between them, although the two use two 
different means (Galtung, 1969). 
8.5: Conclusion. 
This chapter set out the process of the ‘push-backs’, which embed experiences of direct violence that 
are pervasive in the men’s narratives - it is the rule rather than an exception while attempting border 
‘games’. Indeed, almost every person in the Bosnian camps said they had observed or experienced the 
most crude and direct forms of violence during ‘push-backs’, which differed to the forms of violence 
observed along seas and deserts, where migrants are commonly harmed or die following a decision 
not to provide aid rather than through direct attacks (Cuttitta, 2018; Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 
2015) and hazardous natural environments substitute direct force. While the existing migration studies 
tend to treat border violence only in its structural forms, in contrast, the data here reveals that the 
direct attacks were called into action when structural violence (closed legal and safe border crossings), 
crumbled (Galtung, 1969). To this end, I argue that the direct violence construes an essential form of 
border violence at the Bosnian-Croatian borders, which cannot be side-lined in the academic research 
examining the nexus of migration and violence. 
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The data offers insight into the evolution of the direct border violence on the ground across the four 
seasons of the year, and simultaneously sheds light on the background of the EU’s border 
internalisation and externalisation trends, which generate such outbursts. The migrants’ narratives 
show that the rationale of the attacks was primarily related to the official rhetoric of border agencies 
‘to combat cross-border crime’, particularly human smuggling. However, these ‘combats’ often 
violently target migrants rather than criminal organisations, outside of legal procedures. The increasing 
attempts at games in the summer resulted in the higher deployment of smart and military border and 
specialised border patrols, whom migrants called ‘commandos’. These special police units often 
consisted of regular officers, which resulted in more crude attacks and mistreatments of migrants 
during the clandestine push-back operations. This suggests that internationally coordinated smart 
border technologies and military welfare, which are deemed as structural violence, construe concrete 
decisions and violent tools rather than an anonymous chain of structural violence. Thus, these 
structural forms of violence are deeply intertwined with the direct inflictions of harms and function in 
symbiosis, when they presuppose and reinforce each other at the land borders (Galtung, 1969). Direct 
acts of violence are fundamental to explore at the borders to understand human experience of the 
push-backs but also, as Jones (2019) argues, to seek responsibility for such acts. 
When exploring the police strategies and traps used by ‘commandos’ during the push-backs, the 
chapter provided insight into the detailed practices of the direct violence, which construed systematic 
tools of border measures against the migrants. These vary from enclosure in small places with a lack 
of oxygen – ‘combi’ and ‘closed van’ - fear when waiting for the attacks, the moments of being blinded 
by a pepper spray or light, and being exposed to ‘punishments’ and ‘tortures’ by batons and electronic 
devices, to severe beatings within the ‘tunnel trick’ and ‘traps’, and shootings. In the winter, cold 
weather and snow proved just as violent tools when migrants were forced to walk naked to Bosnia or 
enter freezing rivers. Also, it was argued that the destruction of mobile phones, IDs and thefts of the 
only finances that the migrants possessed, also construed direct violence as consequently having a 
significant impact on the people’s health and (non) survival. This shows that the direct violence is not 
bounded in time or body as the destructions and theft have power to result in bodily injuries across 
time, as pointed to by Galtung (1969). 
Finally, the interview-narratives showed that the direct violence took place in the EU; Croatia 
particularly, but also Slovenia, with the cooperation of Italy. This is a fundamental point in the data, 
which shows that despite violence being attributed to the migratory journeys along the ‘Balkan Route’ 
in reality, the most crude and damaging forms of border violence take place in countries that are 
politically and culturally self-represented as EUrope – deviated from ‘Balkans’ and violence, and thus, 
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often neglected in academic research on violence (in migration). This calls for direct violence to be 
placed at the centre of the analysis of border violence (in Europe) when seeking its complex forms, 
despite some scholars considering direct attacks as not being fundamental to scrutinise (Jeandesboz, 
2014; Žižek, 2009). Instead, I argue that direct violence is not merely dramatic events but it functions 
as a proccess by the side of structural (state) orders and (military, smart) border technologies and thus, 
significantly nuances our understanding of migrants’ journeys across European borders. 
I further encountered that border violence went beyond the second of a blow from a baton or damage 
of a phone as it entered the displaced men’s lives earlier and continued after their push-backs to 
Bosnia. Moving on from here, the question remains how other, at first sight less crude and less direct 
forms of violence, take place besides the border attacks. The following chapter will seek to answer this 
question, when focusing on what has been named previously by scholars as ‘structural violence’, 
construing of rules and laws that impede people’s legal and safe transit, protection, and withdrawal of 
aid in Bosnian transit camps.  
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Chapter 9: Structural violence of administrations and makeshift camps 
9.1: Introduction. 
While the last chapter discussed brutal and direct attacks used by police and military groups, it was 
pointed out that these attacks would not exist without myriad ways of structural organisation, financial 
and technological support. Thus, it was argued that direct force functions in a causal relationships with 
political decisions to close the ‘Balkan Route’, deploy smart technologies and military welfare, all of 
which are part of the EU’s broader internal and external border operations across Bosnia, Croatia, 
Slovenia and Italy. This chapter will continue to explore the forms violence takes at the borders, but 
by turning the focus away from crude attacks on the migrants’ bodies, identities and possessions to 
structural violence. 
Whereas there are certainly many aspects that create structural violence against migrants at borders 
and beyond them, this chapter examines how the long chains of decision-making translate into 
everyday experiences at the borders. These construe particularly diverse administrative procedures 
within the push-backs, as well as life in makeshift camps, where the withdrawal of state organised aid 
takes place alongside of solidarities and rich social life. 
The first section will trace the rules and laws that the participants recognised as hindering their 
movement and subsequently giving rise to or even justifying the direct violence against them. While 
focusing on visas, family reunifications, asylum applications, and various paper documents that 
migrants have been navigating after their decision to move from their home countries, it will be asked 
what these administrative procedures and paperwork mean in terms of everyday violence and its 
forms at the Bosnian-Croatian borders, while playing games and being subjected to push-backs. 
Then, the chapter will shift its focus to a different form of structural violence that commonly takes 
place at European borders – the withdrawal of aid in camps. To do so, the chapter will give particular 
importance to the data from participant observation in and around the Trnovi camp. Although the 
camps might seem to be intentionally abandoned by the state, the chapter will explore the various 
decisions to intervene or ignore the camps by diverse (non)state actors, who are constantly present 
on the ground and whose decisions result in the atrocious conditions of the camp and injury to its 
inhabitants. Furthermore, when looking at everyday routines in the camps, it will ask how this violence 
takes place alongside a community, fun, laughter, and care. By exploring in detail observational data 
from the camp, it will be explored how everyday life there interconnects with direct violence. 
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9.2: ‘No asylum for you!’: violent rules and administrations. 
As Žižek (2009) argues, it is vital to step back from the direct violence and perceive the background 
contours that generate such outbursts, to understand what Galtung (1969) calls structural violence. 
While following this theoretical remark, what is apparent within the migrants’ narratives is that the 
direct violence was closely interconnected with broader migration rules and laws, which were not as 
dramatic and recognised as violent from first sight, but which significantly led to harm, including 
exposure to the direct attacks later on. These structural forms of violence, or ‘legal violence’ (Menjívar 
& Abrego, 2012), were prevalent for the migrants already in their home countries. The men commonly 
talked about their struggles to obtain a visas or travelling documents, which had triggered the chain of 
unauthorised border crossing attempts. Since these rules, laws, and administrative procedures later 
affected the men’s violent experiences along the EU’s external borders, which are at the centre of this 
study, I wish to briefly explore them here. 
Samir (42, Afghanistan, July 2018) told me that he used to be a solider in Afghanistan, deployed in the 
U.S.-led operations against the Taliban, like many other Afghan men stranded in Bosnia. When the 
Taliban started threatening him, Samir said that his army superior offered him international protection 
in the U.S. but only in two years, a period that he felt could be fatal for him. ‘I had to leave without 
protection and visa because otherwise they (the Taliban) would kill me’, said Samir. Similarly, those 
escaping war zones, for instance in Yemen or Syria, talked about lacking the ability to move onwards 
via legal channels. Syrian participants reported how they had to flee first to neighbouring Lebanon, 
where they lacked basic rights and aid, as well as legal documents to continue seeking protection and 
safety elsewhere. One of them was Mustafa (19, Syria), who said that he had difficult time in Lebanon 
as he struggled to obtain asylum, or any identification documents, which would have allowed him to 
rent a flat, work or study. 
During my three months internship in Lebanon, I met the former UNHCR worker Anita, who was 
interviewing the Syrian displaced population to assess their right to be relocated to western states 
within family reunification programmes. Anita told me that only 1% of the interviewed could be legally 
relocated, which excluded particularly single adult men as they were not perceived as vulnerable. Also, 
men from Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh, whose lives were scared by economic and 
political inequalities, told me about their impossibility of obtaining travel permissions. It has been 
argued elsewhere  (Bigo, 2011; Jones, 2016) that administrative rules and smart border controls 
subject people to control after their decision to move, which the data here confirms. These restricted 
rules and regulations meant the participants had no other option other than to walk in groups or travel 
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with the help of human smugglers in cars, trucks and boats, without authorisation for months or years, 
until they arrived in Bosnia. 
However, all those arriving in Bosnia continued navigating closed legal transits, although they were 
now moving to ‘more open’ EU and Schengen borders (Jones & Johnson, 2016). IOM and Red Cross 
staff said during our conversations that asylum claims in the EU from Bosnia were non-existent and 
the family reunification programmes were dysfunctional. Those asking to be relocated from Bosnia to 
the EU states, where they had families, were told to walk back to Greece where such procedures were 
legally possible, but that it would take years and were likely to be declined due to high competition, 
which confirms research in Greece by Iliadou (2019). 
A few who wished to claim asylum in Bosnia and stay in the country (which others considered only as 
a transit point due to its poor economy) were trapped in difficulty to navigate administrative 
procedures. Participants described being told by UNHCR, IOM or Vaša prava26 to travel to the Service 
for Foreigner’s Affairs in Bihać/Sarajevo or to border police to firstly register in Bosnia, which would 
allow them to move freely in the country. However, many struggled to travel across Bosnia to obtain 
this document in the first place as public transport drivers were not allowed to drive undocumented 
migrants and the local population feared that transporting displaced people would open them to 
accusations of human smuggling. When people walked to obtain such documents, they said that the 
registration was in Bosnian or in English which they did not understand. When a migrant managed to 
register in the office, he was supposed to then register at a Bosnian address, but many failed to do so 
as they were residing in informal makeshift camps and squats due to limited capacities in formal 
camps. Because of this it was practically impossible to navigate the administrative system in everyday 
life, as evidenced by the fact that I met only two men who had tried to apply for asylum in Bosnia 
during the eight months my fieldwork but neither ever finished the process. Hence, the dysfunctional 
bureaucratic rules and procedures, which as Schneider et al. (2017) argue construe structural violence, 
led migrants to play the ‘games’ with the hope of obtaining international protection upon their arrival 
in the EU. 
‘The game is the only solution to cross and get legal and protected’, I was often told by the people 
living in camps. However, their unauthorised movement across the border was framed within the EU’s 
border laws as illegal and a crime (European Commission, 2019; Frontex, 2020a), to which end 
migrants’ game attempts were viewed from the state perspective as danger and conflict (Chouliaraki 
& Stolic, 2017; Hess & Kasparek, 2017). Although the same member states’ law of the Dublin 
 
26 Vaša prava (Your rights in Bosnian) is a Bosnian, non-governmental and non-profitable legal aid network for 
the displaced population and refugees (Vaša prava, 2019). 
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Regulation simultaneously referred to the right to obtain legal status upon arrival in the first EU’s 
member state, where a person is registered, finger-printed and his asylum application is lodged 
(European Commission, 2020a). Hence, if a person (without authorisation) enters Croatia and 
expresses his wish to seek asylum there, Croatian state authorities have a responsibility to examine his 
asylum claims. In contrast, if a person manages to move undetected by member state authorities until 
arriving in Germany and seeks asylum there, Germany than has the responsibility to deal with his case. 
Since the majority of people reported that they had family in western or northern Europe or/and 
wished to migrate there due to the better economic options and social integration than to stay in the 
first EU state they entered (Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia), they hoped to cross undetected until 
arriving in their final destination. But when individuals were apprehended in Croatia or Slovenia, they 
commonly said to the state authorities (police) that they wished to claim asylum there to prevent their 
return to Bosnia to precarious makeshift camps. Only a few interviewed said that they had walked 
directly to police stations in Croatia or Slovenia to seek asylum in the country. 
However, nearly all those who expressed their wish to claim asylum in Croatia or Slovenia, said they 
were denied the opportunity to do so or their asylum claims were undermined. These asylum requests 
were either ignored by police officers, or shut down by words such as, ‘No asylum for you, go back to 
Bosnia!’, ‘No asylum in whole Europe’, ‘Shut your mouth and go back’, ‘No place for you here’ or 
‘Asylum is closed’. Others described that the officers reacted to their requests with threats, insults, 
physical attacks or simply laughed at them: ‘The police just said: ‘You need asylum?’ and laughed’ 
(Isaak, 28, Palestine, September 2018). Similarly, Samir (42, Afghanistan, July 2018) told me: ‘They 
(Croatian police) did not beat some people but took their money. But because I asked for azyl (asylum), 
they beat me. I said that I needed azyl azyl, azyl, and after police started beating me and saying: ‘Why 
are you asking for azyl?’ (Samir). Others reported feeling ‘tricked’ by state authorities, who had firstly 
promised to transport them to a state-run accommodation centre and open their asylum procedures, 
but instead they were pushed back to Bosnia: ‘I told them that I wanted azyl (asylum) and go to the 
camp. And they said ok, and that they were going to take us to the camp. But they took us to the 
Bosnian border and said to me: ‘This is the camp, go, go!’’ (Fajsan, 29, Iran, October 2018). 
The police were not the only actors who were deployed to hinder the men’s asylum procedures and 
stay in the country. Participants also often referred to other actors present in Croatian and Slovenian 
police stations, particularly translators who were supposed to help the men to articulate their asylum 
claims. Instead, they would often ask for bribes to translate accurately or together with the police 
officers made them sign documents resulting in their expulsions back to Bosnia. For instance, Mahad 
(45, Iran, August 2018) explained how he was detained in a Slovenian police station, where he 
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repeatedly asked for asylum when cooperating with a translator. Instead, he was forced to sign a paper 
document in a language he did not understand, after the translator left, leading to direct attacks and 
push-back to Bosnia: 
I told them that I wanted asyl (asylum) but police denied and made jokes with us when we 
asked for asyl. They told us to sleep on the ground and said that if we woke up, they would 
beat us. I kept telling: ‘Please brother, I want asyl.’ But police said no, no. Police gave us paper 
and told us to sign it, but we did not want this. But one Nigerian got beaten because he did 
not want to sign this paper. And when I supposed to sign that paper, I wrote on the paper that 
I wanted asyl in Slovenia. And they ripped up the paper and forced me to sign the new paper. 
I did not have an option … The paper was in English, but we did not have a translator. We had 
Persian translator but not for this paper. We had to sign it by force. Persian translator was not 
a good man, I did not trust him. He told us that we could stay in Slovenia and would not be 
sent back, but we were sent back. They just told me to sign that paper (Mahad). 
While most did not obtain a copy of the documents signed in police stations, a few men managed to 
save the copy and brought it back to the camps in Kladuša (see Figures 8 and 9, below). The documents 
were invoices (Placilni Nalog) to pay between 200 to 500 euros for committing the ‘crime of 
unauthorised entry to the country’ under the law about ‘aliens’, which the men were made to sign. In 
these documents, the men were labelled as unauthorised border crossers and no information about 
their intention to seek asylum in the country was included. Some said they had been duped by a 
translator who had not translated accurately, as described above. Others struggled to understand the 
document that they were signing because of lack of translation, although in the document it was stated 
that the men obtained a brochure explaining the matter of the committed crime and the payment 
order in their mother tongue. This denial of translation feeds into the cycle of violence at the borders 
as it withdraws legal support needed for one’s survival.  
Minors also said that police officers commonly wrote in the documents that they were adults (18 years 
old) to avoid providing them special assistance or having to pay more attention to their asylum claim 
due to their vulnerability. Hence, these administrative procedures did not only hinder the men and 
boys to seek asylum, but treated them as ‘aliens’ and ‘criminals’, as stated in the paper documents, 
which allowed for their transportations in ‘combis’ to Bosnian border areas, direct attacks and thefts, 




Figures 8 and 9 Placilni Nalog (an invoice in Slovenian) for fine 500 euros for unauthorised entry 
from Lisac (Croatia) to Susak (Slovenia), which one participant was forced to sign in a 
Slovenian police station. 
 
From the data it is apparent that there is a significant pattern in the denial of the right to seek asylum, 
which serves as justification for the direct attacks of migrants and their push-backs to Bosnia. Thus, as 
laws in migration constitute structural violence (Schneider et al., 2017), the denial of access to the law 
also does so as it frames the migrants as ‘criminals’. The migrants are intentionally denied access to 
asylum claims when they could speak about their individual story, under which they would have the 
right to be protected. Thus, this denial to be heard leaves the men stranded in the narrative of mere 
unauthorised border crossers and positions them to be perceived as committing a crime and be treated 
as criminals. As Žižek (2009, p 39) aptly points out, ‘an enemy is someone whose story you have not 
heard’. This also matches the argument by Menjívar and Abrego (2012) that laws and rules give people 
the power to violate human rights and make others suspects in their eyes, which proves to be the case 
at European borders. 
Importantly, rejecting or undermining asylum procedures through forced signatures on documents, no 
or inaccurate translation, and incorrect documentation of individuals’ age directly led to the people’s 
push-backs to Bosnia, during which the police systematically used physical attacks. Although the men’s 
narratives show that the direct attacks also regularly took place during the denial of asylum in Croatia 
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and Slovenia, when the state authorities used physical aggression against them to enforce the border 
administrations. In this way, the administration not only withheld from the men the possibility of 
protection and gave rise to push-backs and attacks, but also used direct attacks as the ‘right’ way to 
treat individuals they regarded as ‘criminals’. 
It is my argument that the border administrations are necessary components of push-backs and direct 
violence, and need to be understood in this way rather than separated out from the structural violence 
phenomenon. Hence, the administrative violence embedded in the state rules is not as invisible, 
abstract and indirect, as structural violence is often considered to be (Galtung, 1969). Instead, I argue 
that there is a direct subject-object relationship between state authorities, who appeared to be at the 
end of the chain to enforce rules and laws, and migrants. This means that the migrants were denied 
asylum by direct decisions made by concrete state authorities, although, these decisions are 
embedded in more structural border rules. This goes in line with ethnographic analysis of violence 
(Farmer, 2009), which aims to blur the division between violence as mysterious chains of structures 
(Galtung, 1969) and direct and concrete decisions, such as to ignore migrants’ asylum claims and allow 
the push-backs and violence to be experienced on the ground. 
What the data here further indicates is that the structural violence encountered in the men’s 
experiences is embedded in the parallel sphere of law and order. At first, migrants are disabled to claim 
asylum in the country upon their arrival, and thus, they are given no other option than to cross without 
authorisation. At second, Law about Aliens together with unofficial administrative tactics obfuscate 
and circumvent their obligation towards processing the men’s asylum claims upon their arrival in the 
state and using direct violence against them. This suggests a significant integration of violence into the 
states’ laws and rules. The parallel law system firstly formally recognised the migrants as justifiable 
targets of harm during their cross-border journeys from Bosnia onwards and then subjected them to 
beatings. Therefore, systematic administrative procedures made legal movements out from violence 
(home countries) for the displaced men almost impossible, but instead, managed their movement into 
violence (Bank et al., 2017). 
However, structural violence was not limited to administrative procedures, which together with the 
direct attacks were impacting on the men’s everyday lives. As a result of the perpetual push-backs, the 
men found themselves stranded in a ‘forced circular mobility’ (Stojić-Mitrović & Vilenica, 2019, p 541), 
which forced them to return to Bosnian camps, where they temporarily lived before attempting new 
games. This shifts the attention back to Bosnia, to the Trnovi makeshift camp, where the men lived, 
and where I further explored the forms violence took place at the borders. 
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I found structural violence to take place in the camps in the form of the withdrawal of state-run aid, 
which intentionally turned the camp into a more an inhospitable landscape, where its inhabitants often 
lived in hunger and illness. This withdrawal of basic material aid, similar to the withdrawal of legal aid 
discussed in this chapter, construes less brutal and less direct forms of violence, yet it adds to the 
complex forms of violence aiming to ensure the migrants’ enclosure out of EU territory. In line with 
this, the following section will outline the landscapes of makeshift camps and discuss how they are 
intentionally sustained in poor living conditions to keep migrants in a permanent state of injury after 
the push-backs on the one hand, while also give rise to voluntary efforts, friendships and a sense of 
community on the other. The discussion on camps adds another layer to understanding structural 
violence, which takes place at the border alongside direct attacks and significantly impacts the 
migrants’ everyday life. 
9.3: Trnovi camp: building a home by the side of conflict. 
To access the Trnovi camp, where initially around 800 people lived, one must walk to the edge of the 
town to an abandoned field. After rain, it is especially difficult to enter or exit the camp. A beaten 
pathway leads through a field that is slippery and where people often fall. Since people lack daily access 
to clean clothes and water, one slip can result in days of being and feeling dirty. Rubbish and rotting 
food remain lay around, which the communal services refused to collect, such often marked the whole 
pathway. Just before entering the big field in which the camp is situated, there is a football playground 
from where shouts of people in the summer acknowledge every goal scored. These happy screams 
were often louder than the sounds of a flying helicopter over the camp, surveying the movement 
around the border zones. Next to the playground are two containers that became temporary homes 
for a few men who wanted to have more privacy from the camp and later in the winter to be better 
protected from the cold. The other building is a former slaughterhouse with broken windows, where 
activists, with whom I volunteered, established a clothes exchange and showers that operated often 
with the help of migrants (see Figure 10, below). 
The ugly looking building of showers was the object of the constant efforts of migrants and volunteers 
to turn it into a space for communal life. In the spring, the provisional showers consisted of four 
wooden structures with plastic tarps over them, to which water pipes were leading from a small gas 
heater and water tanks placed in a car’s boot. After a few months, Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) 
provided a shower trailer, which could accommodate around forty to fifty people to shower per day. 
Despite the provisional structures of the showers and the environment of the nearby border, 
volunteers and migrants put efforts together to make these sites welcoming, safe and relaxing. Besides 
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the need for a shower, the men came here to play chess, listen to music and dance in the circle, or just 
smoke a cigarette and chat with friends, as they would do in places far away from borders. 
 
Figure 10 Cleaning the shower trailer at the end of the day (photo by Jack Sapoch27). 
 
However, the limited space in the showers was not enough to fight against poor hygiene, skin 
infections and illness. Priority for these makeshift hygiene services was given to those people suffering 
with scabies, who made up the first several customers daily. While those who had scabies needed to 
stay clean to treat their skin diseases properly, this simultaneously neglected the prevention of scabies 
 
27 Published with the consent of the author of the photograph. 
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amongst the camp’s other inhabitants. Secondary priority was given to game returnees, who were 
injured and needed to clean their wounds and change their muddy clothes before seeing MSF and 
medical volunteers, after not showering for days or weeks in the game. However, there were regular 
disagreements among activists about priority places. When I gave priority to an older Moroccan man 
with a bruised torso and muddy clothes, Emma (27, volunteer) objected: ‘Everyone is coming from the 
games, everyone is injured all the time. We cannot give priority to everyone!’. 
As seeing people in an emergency turned into the norm, priorities got tighter. Similar disagreements 
resulted in the priority selection of only the ‘most injured’ men to enter the showers, straight after the 
scabies patients. Those whom volunteers saw as not as injured as others often ended up washing their 
scratches and wounds in polluted water in the camp. The remaining hundreds of people, who simply 
needed to shower and clean their clothes, had to wait in the line for hours or wait for another day(s). 
Many gave up waiting and did not shower, causing skin diseases and respiratory infections. It was 
common to see bleeding or leaking scabs on men’s legs and arms. Across the makeshift camp, hepatitis 
also occurred and resulted in at least one death. Others washed themselves in front of their heimas by 
pouring freezing water from plastic bottles, even when the temperatures dropped below zero. Hence, 
the daily effort to maintain basic hygiene was a struggle, which could be fatal in the insanitary camp 
environment. 
The medical treatment of injuries from push-backs or diseases was problematic in the camps due to a 
highly restricted medical system in the country. Residents in Bosnia themselves remarked that they 
had often struggled to access medical aid, which fully excluded migrants from hospital care. For 
example, hospitals regularly refused to treat migrants, stating that they had ‘limited finances’ due to 
the destabilised system from the recent war. When I called an ambulance for a man whose body was 
paralyzed and in pain, I was told: ‘We don’t treat people in the camp’. While MSF and a few medical 
volunteers were present in the camp, they only arrived three times per week for three hours, which 
was not enough for the high numbers of people in need of medical attention. For this reason, many 
people were treating themselves, like Usama, a young man in his twenties from Morocco: ‘Doctor here 
can give me only pain killer and hospital does not want to treat me. If I get injured, I treat myself. I take 
tramadol to not feel pain, clean injury with water and use bandage’. Self-medication was, however, 
provisional and sometimes dangerous, using the same bandages without cleaning them or old pieces 
of textile to cover injuries and overdosing on medications, leading to more severe health conditions 
and prolonging the recovery period. 
After passing the showers and getting closer to the end of the field, one can hear hundreds of voices 
shouting and laughing and often smell the smoke from burning plastic, coming from the fires set 
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around the camp. In late October, I was standing by a high fire made of a car tyre, which warmed up 
around twenty people sitting and chatting around. Next to me was a five year old Iranian boy who had 
just returned with his family back to the camp after trying the game. His cheeks were red and the 
warmth and comfort of the fire made him fall asleep on his mother’s lap. I asked Hamid, a tall Iraqi guy 
in his late twenties, why they did not burn wood from the forest instead of tyres and plastic. ‘Because 
tyre burns for very, very long time and it makes big fire to keep us warm. Wood is wet. Also, lots of 
rubbish is around and we need to get rid of it’. Open fires in front and inside heimas and squats, that 
had served as the only source of warmth, however, created heavy and poisonous air. Fire also served 
as the only light in the night, besides smartphones that people struggled to charge due to the limited 
electricity. The electricity was for a short period available in the camp for two hours per day, when 
hundreds of people were fighting over the few spots to charge their phones. In another act of violence, 
the electricity was cut off completely in the Trnovi camp with no warning or explanation from the 
municipality. 
However, fire also marked out small outdoor kitchens in the camp, when those relying on their own 
financial resources or those sent by families, were cooking food and often shared it with others in their 
next-door heima. The smell of food in the night, coming from different tents, spread around the camp. 
A few people said they were proud to be able to cook their own food and share it among themselves 
to show respect and care, like they had done before coming to the border. ‘Stop it! Breakfast!’, I could 
hear Sajid shouting holding plates with fried eggs and coffee, when inviting all volunteers cleaning the 
camp to his tent. I was standing by, but Sajid placed his blanket on the floor: ‘You know that in Arab 
culture, the most important is the guest. We give him the best things that we have. Here, this blanket 
is the cleanest thing that we have, so, please, sit on it.’ These small acts of solidarity and moments of 
fun, such as cooking in the camp, playing football or listening to loud music and dancing in the showers, 
were fundamental daily routines that could help obfuscate the reality of border and violence. In the 
previous studies on makeshift camps in the Calais ‘Jungle’ (Mould, 2017) and ‘City Plaza’ in Athens 
(Koptyaeva, 2017), this process is named ‘(collective) home-making’, where similarly to the Trnovi 
camp, social richness is lived alongside conflict. 
When people managed to eat their own food in the circle of friends, they escaped from being a 
continuous subject of violence. ‘If you come to the camp for food, you see that police is always there, 
pushing people in the line as if we were animals’, explained one of my closest participants, 
Mohammed. Similarly, others told me that they felt like animals who could be always pushed, attacked 
or insulted when receiving food from NGOs. For instance, Aman, a Pakistani young man, told me that 
while he was waiting for food a woman working for IOM was standing by and saw two street dogs 
fighting. She looked at the dogs and said: ‘They are just like you’. Aman threw away his plate on the 
139 
 
ground and left: ‘You know if she said this in a different situation, but when we were in that line, 
waiting for the food in the camp, I felt it in my stomach and heart. Just like dogs, not humans.’ This 
signifies what Vaughan-Williams (2015) calls animalisation, when migrants are surrounded by the 
prominence of animal metaphors and imaginary in their representations, or live in zoological places. It 
has been argued that animalisation of migrants takes place globally (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), from 
the U.S.-Mexico border, where migrants are called chickens (Coutin, 2005) to the Jungle camp in Calais, 
named as a place for wild animals (Davies et al., 2019). 
What also made the migrants feel like ‘animals’ or ‘dirty’ was the struggle to keep the camp clean. 
While the dirt or poor hygiene does not appear in ways as dramatic to the direct attacks, it constitutes 
a process of slow deterioration which can be debilitating and sometimes fatal, as demonstrated in the 
hepatitis death case. The municipality sent six portable toilets to the camp, which were not enough 
and therefore, were mostly full and always dirty. When I was helping two young boys to set their tent 
in an empty spot one night, after they had arrived tired from the game, four men started shouting at 
us: ‘No, not here! This whole area is a toilet!’. The edge areas of the camp were often filled with human 
excrement. Since they lacked access to toilets, others decided to use the shower trailers as a toilet and 
often they were filthy and polluted. Besides human excrement, the muddy camp was also polluted by 
large amounts of rubbish and plastic. The food provided occasionally by NGOs was served on plastic 
plates, which were later dumped in between the heimas with food scraps and left to rot for days or 
weeks until burned. The camp would often attract dogs from a nearby animal shelter and the street in 
search of food. The camp was a visible site of pollution with a strong smell that intensified after the 
rain, when all the rubbish, human excrement and mud mixed together and floated from the top of the 
camp to the buttom (see Figure 11, below). The men were walking here mostly barefoot with sandals 




Figure 11 Children playing in a puddle after the camp was destroyed by the rain (photo by 
author). 
 
While the volunteers suggested to the municipality to lay gravel at the camp to prevent the floods, 
pollution and damage to shelters, the mayor rejected this by saying that no proper living structures 
were supposed be constructed in the Trnovi camp as all makeshift settlement were temporary and not 
a long-term solution. Deriving from the research by Ahmetašević and Mlinarević (2018), the decisions 
not to build a safer living environment and not to provide formal and regular aid was also directed by 
the EU authorities, who requested that no accommodation should be build or placed within a 30 km 
radius of the border. However, the Trnovi camp was sited only few kilometres from the Croatian border 
and thus was excluded from state-run support and perceived as not obliging by these rules and being 
problematic. Thus, while the camp’s pollution was avoidable through voluntary aid, the international 
rules sustained the camp’s polluted nature. Consequently, the Trnovi camp comprised of mere shelters 
made of wood, tarpaulins and tents and other makeshift heimas. When looking at the structures of 
heimas, one could recognise how long its inhabitants had lived in the camp. People who arrived in the 
camp recently often slept outside around fires due to the limited donations available or shared a small 
heima with five to ten people. In contrast those who stayed in the camp for several months accessed 
more and better material over time and built stronger structures, like my Syrian participants. 
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‘I need to show you something, yallah! (quickly in Arabic), come, come!’, Mohammed was shouting at 
me and leading me to the ‘Syrian’ centre of the camp. When I entered his heima, there was a wooden 
bed frame and little wooden chair. ‘I made this today! Martin (activist) gave me wood, nails, hammer, 
and everything. But no one has mattress. So, I will sleep just on wood. Alhamdulillah (thanks God in 
Arabic) for this bed. You can sit on the chair when you come to visit’, said Mohammed. However, even 
the strongest shelters were mostly damaged after heavy rain or storm. When I was sleeping in the 
night in my car in the autumn and could hear the rain on the bonnet, I could not sleep anymore as I 
was imagining the catastrophe in the camp the next day. Broken wood, ripped tarpaulins and 
everything floating in water, and the camp had to be rebuilt once again by the communal forces among 
the migrants, the local people and the volunteers, who put their efforts together to ‘make and remake 
the site of their home place’ (Mould, 2017, p 396). While the volunteers were trying to change all the 
soaked and muddy blankets, limited resources kept their distribution tight so they could be given only 
to the groups of two or three people, with the embarrassed words, ‘sorry, but we have only few’. With 
the upcoming autumn and cold, I asked the MSF staff whether they were going to distribute blankets 
in the camp as they had been doing in Serbian squats. But the answer was no and that the blankets 
could be distributed only in an emergency situation, which meant that someone would have to die of 
cold first. 
This shows that while during the push-backs the migrants’ private possessions were destroyed directly 
by police attacks, in the camps their shelters and possessions were damaged by natural forces. Yet, 
these too could be traced back to the direct consequence of their lack of protection. Sleeping rough or 
under broken shelters, falling ill with skin infections or hepatitis, or feeling hungry or cold, were no 
accidents of nature, but rather the consequences of strategic decisions made by state authorities, and 
as pointed out previously by Davies et al. (2019) regulated by international treaties and agreements, 
such as the prohibition of any state-run aid within 30 km from the border. Although there is a complex 
chain of actors who are involved in policies and decision-making, which intentionally or as a side-effect 
contain makeshift camps’ pollution and their inhabitants’ wounds and illness. These range from the 
local authorities and local police to national governments and supra-national policy (Mould, 2017). 
When discussing life and violence in the camps, one must also mention the role of non-state actors 
(Maestri, 2017). Some international NGOs’ and their European Commission funded aid in the camp 
went in the lines of the broader EU’s external border approach, further locking migrants out of the 
EU’s territories. For instance, IOM - the major NGO managing accommodation facilities for migrants in 
Bosnia - was present in the Trnovi camp only to offer migrants the so called assisted voluntary return 
to their home countries. As part of this service, 412 individuals returned home from Bosnia in 2018 
(IOM, 2019). A few men, with whom I spoke before their return to Afghanistan, Iraq and Algeria, 
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explained that they could no longer stand the pressure of push-backs and poor living conditions in the 
camps, struggling to get food, some had suffered somatic injuries after push-backs and could not 
access medical care, some were emotionally distressed and said to ‘have had enough’. 
Assisted voluntary return was therefore available alongside the perpetual inflictions of harms on the 
men, NGOs standing by and observing their slow deprivation, not stepping in until the migrants’ 
wasted away or ‘had enough’ and wished to leave. The men were taken to their home countries, free 
of charge, where their lock-out from EU territory became even more secure. As Crane (2020) points 
out, the migrants’ survival is maintained in exchange for their exclusion from the EU. Indeed, stepping 
into support migrants is deeply selective. Both decisions to intervene and ignore the camps occur with 
the intention to coerce migrants to go away – the same objective that gives rise to the direct attacks 
on the other side of the border, in Croatia and Slovenia. The denial of aid thus adds to the ‘politics of 
exhaustion’, marked by fractured mobility not only from an endless chain of push-backs (de Vries & 
Guild, 2019, p 2162), but also by migrant’s enclosure in poor living conditions in the camps. 
These decisions and withdrawal of aid also positioned the Trnovi camp as an unofficial site that was 
not obliged to follow international rules. This turned the camp into what Bird et al. (2020) aptly call a 
‘badland’, making the camp also a justifiable place for interventions, most fundamentally including its 
demolition (Altin & Minca, 2017; Davies et al., 2019). In December 2018, soon after the first snow fell, 
the Trnovi camp disappeared under the wheels of bulldozers (see Figure 12, below). The demolition 
was justified by the newly established Miral camp offering ‘safer’ accommodation, managed by IOM, 
who were allocated €7 million from the EU. However, the Miral camp consisted of a mere former 
factory hall, where only bunk beds were provided with no mattresses. The new makeshift camps thus 
re-emerged in abandoned buildings, where hundreds of men wanted to have privacy and autonomy, 




Figure 12 Trnovi camp after its demolition in December 2018 (phot by Jack Sapoch28). 
 
The living conditions in makeshift camps, as argued here, could be at first sight referred to as what 
migration scholars describe as violent abandonment or violent inaction (Bhagat, 2020; Davies et al., 
2019; Isakjee et al., 2020). However, I want to argue that these terms are still too passive to capture 
the process fully and that direct actions and decisions are put in place to create limited and obscured 
aid in Bosnia that inflicts more harms in polluted, restricted and surveyed makeshift camps. National 
authorities and various aid providers do not abandon the camps. They are often present through the 
enforcement of international rules that hinder aid close to the EU’s borders, through police officers 
pushing people while waiting in line for food or coming to demolish the informal camps, or through 
NGOs providing  assisted voluntary returns to their home countries, which aim to lock out migrants 
out of the EU territory like push-backs. This form of structural violence thus concentrates direct and 
personal action of human beings, like the direct border attacks, although they use different means and 
the time of wounding differs (Galtung, 1969). This again shows the close interplay between direct and 
structural violence, which both reinforce each other at the borders. 
 
28 Published with the consent of the author of the photograph. 
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Finally, it needs to be said that this interplay does not only matter for the theoretical analysis in this 
thesis. Importantly, it is fundamental for migrants at the borders, who commonly discussed the border 
attacks and living conditions in the camps as symbiotically inflicting pain in their everyday life. ‘I am 
not worried of the pain if they (Croatian commandos) break my leg (during the push-back). I don’t care. 
But I am worried that if they break my leg, I will be stuck here (in the Trnovi camp) for more months 
or the whole winter. This is what I worry about’, Emir, an Algerian man in his late twenties, said to me 
while he was sitting in the camp surrounded by snow, only a few days before the camp’s demolition. 
9.4: Conclusion. 
Accounts of structural violence (Galtung, 1969) present it as the system of administration, 
international rules or aid provision in the camp that comprises long and highly ramified causal chains 
and cycles. Andersson and Keen (2019) are therefore correct when they argue that structural violence 
is omnipresent in migration through the withholding from migrants’ possibilities of support during 
border crossings and transit camps, and thus need to be scrutinised in the analysis of diverse forms of 
violence at the border. While many migration and border studies discuss structural violence (Altin & 
Minca, 2017; Andersson & Keen, 2019; Bank et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2019; Davies et al., 2017; Igonin, 
2016), they mostly perceive this form of violence as ‘indirect’, operating through the ‘inaction’ and 
‘abandonment’ of migrants. These studies also commonly analyse structural violence as separated out 
from direct violence. In doing so, I argue that they miss how structural forms of violence use direct 
decisions and actions and operate in symbiosis with direct violence, although they use different means. 
This interplay between direct and structural violence is focal, as although violence is used in diverse 
means at the borders, it follows the same objective: to lock out migrants from EU territory. 
I have argued here that these connections can be traced through the men’s everyday lives. It is 
apparent in the various administrative procedures and paper documents that the men had been 
navigating throughout their cross-border journeys, and which gave rise to the direct attacks or even 
justified them. This administration is designed to achieve violent results, when giving the men no other 
option than to play dangerous games due to no possibility to obtain legal transit across borders or seek 
protection in Bosnia. However, the participants often experienced the parallel legal system (Dublin 
Regulation/Law about Aliens and unofficial administrative tactics) which denied them the ability to 
claim asylum, and often portrayed them in legal language as ‘criminals’ and ‘aliens’, under verbal 
attacks, threats or/and beatings. These administrative procedures triggered (more) direct violence and 
the men’s push-back to Bosnia, which were legally framed as the legitimate combatting of 
unauthorised border crossings. However, the men’s narratives show that the administration and push-
backs were in fact involuntary expulsions of asylum seekers with the common use of physical attacks, 
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which violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 14), the EU Directive on Asylum 
Procedures (2005/85/EC) (Vaughan-Williams, 2015) and cruel treatments or torture (United Nations, 
1975), among other relevant documents. 
While tracing other forms of structural violence, the chapter moved on to the discussion of the 
withdrawal of material aid in the camps, which similar to the withdrawal of legal aid at the borders 
undermines the migrants’ survival at the borders. To encompass this form of structural violence, I 
described in detail the Trnovi camp, its landscape and various daily events taking place there that were 
significantly inflicting harms, and ultimately death, on the men’s often injured bodies from the push-
backs. Thus, such structural violence enabled the harm inflicted by the direct attacks to continue in the 
everyday in the camps. This evidence was outlined by discussing the migrants’ daily struggles to 
maintain bodily hygiene and prevent skin diseases, keep the camp clean, access medical care, live in 
protected and warm shelter and prevent hunger. By doing so, the chapter has argued that structural 
violence operates within international and national decisions, is implemented by concrete state actors 
(police, NGOs) on the ground and that this keeps migrants in a permanent state of injury and 
debilitation. These actors turn structural violence into a subjective experience when strategically 
deciding when to ignore migrants’ needs and when to step in at the site of direct violence, and that 
under the condition to secure the migrants’ exclusion from the EU. 
These encounters empirically contribute to the literature discussing violence in camps, when showing 
that the violence in the makeshift camp functions differently than through ‘humanitarian’ and 
‘biopolitical logics’ of state-run camps, which control migrants through their containment and physical 
enclosure (Agier, 2011; Iliadou, 2019; Jeandesboz, 2014; Nieminen, 2019; Peteet, 2005; Umek et al., 
2018). However, it was not mere state-abandonment that was inflicting harm in makeshift camps but 
to confirm Martin et al. (2019), the makeshift camps are in constant interplay between strategic 
abandonment and intervention, as well as the establishment of state-run camps which then triggered 
the destruction of makeshift camps. These all sustained the migrants’ injuries in the camps and 
complicated their cross-border movement or led to their exhaustion that forced them to leave back 
home. Thus, I argue that the direct decisions to act and not to act construe violence in the camps.  
However, the camp was not only marked by widespread violence. The camp was also a place where 
people helped each other, joked, laughed, ate together, prayed, sang, and shared their stories and 
hoped for a better future. By these small acts of care and respect, the men wished to escape from 
being a continuous subject of violence. Even in the middle of widespread political terror, fear and 
moral panic, solidarities and daily life go on, although, it is impacted by violence (Ferrándiz, 2004a). 
The data here thus contributes to the literature on makeshift living places, which argues that camps 
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are neither just managed by care and control (Foucault, 1975) or are fully abandoned exceptional 
places of homo-sacer (Agamben, 1998), but are also places of solidarity and social co-existence 
(Koptyaeva, 2017; Mudu & Chattopadhyay, 2017; Sigona, 2014), where people ultimately live (Rygiel, 
2011).  Hence, Bosnian migrant makeshift camps reveal how solidarities and daily life grow along side 
of conflict in rural border and urban places around the whole of Europe, from Greece and Serbia to 
Italy, Spain and France.  
While living at the border for months and years, violence becomes woven into the social fabric of the 
everyday, when slowly shifting one’s routines and relations. In these small daily acts, migrants make 
meaning of the broader patterns of structural and direct violence that surrounds them. Yet, the 
everyday is often side-lined in the research examining the nexus of migration and violence, which this 
thesis aims to address in the following section, while questioning the significance of the everyday at 




Chapter 10: Tracing border violence through the everyday. 
10.1: Introduction. 
The previous chapters focused on push-backs and direct violence as well as more structural border 
violence operating via border administration procedures and makeshift living places, which I argued 
function in the causal relationship. However, violence cannot be understood solely in terms of physical 
force, assault, or the infliction of pain alone (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). This shifts our 
attention to the impact and meaning of violence in everyday life while questioning violence at work 
where it is at least apparent (Fernández et al., 2017), in migrants’ taken-for-granted routines, rituals 
and relations at the border. This chapter thus details how the experiences of violence are woven into 
the fabric of migrants’ everyday lives while navigating friendship, love and conflict with others, 
rebuilding shelters, showering, eating, praying, waiting and being bored, getting ready for games, and 
developing drug and alcohol addiction. By doing so, it explores what these unremarkable and at first 
sight non-violent events tell us about remarkable and visible violence at the border and how the 
everyday things and practices became objects and sites of border violence on micro level. 
However, violence entangled in mundane and ordinary things and practices often leaves no visible 
traces of harm, even on ones’ dead body, as the data will show. The invisibility makes it not only 
problematic to recognise the day-to-day experiences of violence, but it also constitutes its real 
efficiency (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). To this end, I wish to trace harms that seem invisible of 
the everyday at the borders as taken for granted and thus highlight the significance of understanding 
violence as an everyday process, which construes an academic blind spot in understanding violence 
and migration in Europe. 
 
The chapter firstly presents a detailed narrative of Youssef, a young man who died at the border with 
no traces of violence on his body. Whilst presenting his story, I want to explore what the everyday in 
Kladuša looked like, as permeated by diverse episodes of violence discussed in the previous chapters, 
but also filled with love for family, memories from home, and hope for a better life. By doing so, I want 
to question how these impact the men’s daily routines and how the everyday matters in making sense 
of violence at the border, even in its most grim consequence, death. 
 
The chapter then explores the routinisation of violence, questioning how the accumulation of violence 
across time shift individual and collective understanding of violence in the makeshift camps. To do so, 
the chapter will present the men’s understanding of what violence is and what it is not across the time 
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spent at the Bosnian border, while also considering the men’s personal memories from home and 
humour, giving the violence social meaning in their day-to-day lives. 
 
The discussion then shifts the focus to the men’s inter-subjective experiences of violence, when 
questioning how they perceive themselves across the perpetual exposure to violence and how violence 
impacts their personhood, sense of value and relationships with others. Following that, the pervasive 
presence of violence will be questioned in the migrants’ daily choices, when they wait and while they 
experience boredom in the camps where often the only sign of change comes with violence. Moreover, 
the chapter will elucidate how day-to-day life at the borders gives rise to new forms of harms, those 
that seem as ‘one own’s fault’ in the first sight, such as alcohol and drug abuse, self-harm, and inter-
communal fights. It will be explored how these ‘self-harms’, which prove to be the most efficient killing 
force, are interconnected to the broader cycle of border violence. 
 
The chapter ends with drawing empirical conclusions from this chapter, before moving to the final part 
of this thesis that discusses the final conclusions from the all empirical chapters and how they inform 
us about border violence as everyday against migrant men of colour at the Bosnian-Croatian borders. 
10.2: A dead body with no traces of violence. 
The body of Youssef is now lying in the morgue in Drmaljevo. The police investigated an 
abandoned house in Velika Kladuša, where the young man was temporarily living with other 
migrants… The police stated that there were no traces of violence on his body, adding that 
the death occurred during a sleep. 
Excerpts from the Facebook group ‘Migranti BiH’ (19/05/2019). 
I met Youssef the first week I arrived in Kladuša. He was a tall young man in his early 20’s, very skinny 
with dark black hair and gentle contours on his face. I saw him walking in the main square looking tired 
and with each step his chin was falling. When we started talking, he occasionally closed his eyes for 
few seconds, but when I touched his shoulder to ensure he was fine he opened them and continued 
in conversation like nothing happened. He said that he had just returned from the Croatian border and 
showed me bruises and scratches around his chin, arms and belly. After seeing a doctor, we went for 
a coffee. Slowly pulling from his cigarette, he described how the Croatian authorities had caught him 
and violently brought him back to Bosnia: smashing his phone, stealing his money, and laughing at him 
when he asked for asylum, followed by beatings and push-back. His story contained the same police 
strategies already explored in detail, however, his expression, eyes and emotions indicated how 
diverse and subjective suffering and pain at the border are. 
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Youssef then told me that he was born in Benghazi (Libya), where his father was killed during the civil 
war. After his father’s death, Youssef’s mother took him to her home country, Morocco, where he 
occasionally worked as a waiter but struggled to find a stable job. He recalled playing football tirelessly 
in order to avoid thinking about a life which he described as unemployment and misery. Youssef 
wanted to provide for his family, not for pleasure or fun, but for survival. He said that at the age of 17 
he decided to travel to Spain and find work. He borrowed 100 euros from his relatives and travelled 
partly with smugglers by boats or hidden in trucks and partly alone by foot through Turkey, Greece, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, and then to Bosnia, hoping to cross to Croatia, Slovenia, Italy 
and then to Spain by bus. 
In the months that passed after first meeting Youssef in Kladuša, he told me about his 16 other 
unsuccessful games and how they had left him with more marks of police force and pushing him back 
to life in abandoned houses. However, Youssef did not complain about them anymore as these became 
routinised. One day, we went out for a coffee to the same restaurant as always, however, this time a 
waiter stopped us before we found our seats: ‘Sorry, you have to leave. Boss said no migrants here.’ 
Youssef responded: ‘Yes, I understand, me problem,’ and told me to not to try negotiating and rather 
leave. The next months, we did not even try to enter a café or restaurant together as Youssef, like 
many others, feared the same reaction. 
Youssef’s face was marked by other signs of violence than the ones caused by border guards: bruises 
and scratches from inter-communal fights. As time passed, I saw Youssef’s body becoming skinnier. 
His eyes became watery and tired and his speech became slower as well. He mumbled more. He told 
me one day that he was regularly using tramadol, an opioid pain-killer, to forget the reality for a 
moment. I was often seeing him either begging for money around the town or just sitting and looking 
into nowhere or arguing with his friends over money or food in the main square. As his use of the drug 
developed, we began seeing less and less of each other. 
The week after my arrival back in the U.K. from Bosnia, I called a friend who informed me that a man 
in Kladuša had died. She sent me Youssef’s photo, explaining that he had overdosed in a squat. 
Youssef’s friends said that he felt severe pain in his body while fasting during Ramadan and took an 
extensive amount of pain killers that killed him. Local radio and news announced that Youssef had died 
by natural causes as ‘police found no traces of violence on his body’. 
I was thinking of Youssef’s daily experiences of diverse forms of violence that had made his life at the 
borders painful and questioned how this quotidian at the border was significant in these violent 
episodes, leading to his death. Youssef was waking up daily to the same reality, circulation between 
these different violent events and difficult moments. I came to realise that violence became for Youssef 
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the daily way of life rather than diverse episodes of physical aggression that came and passed. This 
large-scale cycle of violence met and crystallised into the sharp, hard surface of routinised suffering, 
which Nordstrom and Robben (1996) described as contests marred by inescapable harms. Violence 
blurred in the ordinary moments of the day, eventually impacting Youssef’s daily routines, social 
relations and religious rituals. What eventually was the most harming (and killing) force in Youssef’s 
life was, therefore, ordinary life at the border, when what passed normal would be abnormal 
elsewhere (Ginty, 2014). 
However, this everyday violence left no visible traces on the dead body as no spectacular event of 
aggression or unnatural cause of death was recognised, as well as no perpetrator was there to see or 
blame, but Youssef. In line with this, various questions arose when reading the news about Youssef’s 
death and discussing his story with other migrants, volunteers, my family and friends: Was his death 
random? Did he die of his own irresponsible (intimate, ritual, routinised) behaviour at the border? Or 
did the diverse routinised forms of border violence lead to his death that occurred during his daily 
existence at the border? And most importantly, are the day-to-day lives of other migrants turned into 
painful or fatal experiences by border enforcements? 
Since Youssef’s life was scored by an exemplary fashion of border violence, as are those of most men 
whom I was meeting in Kladuša, any of them were/are exposed to similar risks and fates. Throughout 
my fieldwork, I saw an increasing physical and mental degradation of other men living in the same 
conditions as Youssef. I found a deadly monotony in their everyday at the border, within which physical 
and psychological harms impacted their social realm. Fortunately, most men eventually managed to 
cross the border and moved to their destinations or to my knowledge keep surviving at the borders 
until today. Although death was not daily expected in Kladuša, messages and photos of migrants’ faces, 
who had just faded away, shared in camps spread gloom and fear. Death was thus present in the camps 
in its potentiality when the migrants’ desire to avoid it was being threatened (Mladenova, 2019). 
Almost every month, names and photos of dead or missing people in the games, dying in inter-
communal fights or hepatitis circulated on diverse WhatsApp and Facebook groups. All these deaths 
posed the same questions, listed above after Youssef’s story. Although Youssef’s death was not a 
singular case, I found that physically dying along the South-Eastern European routes is rare rather than 
common. This differs to the sea routes leading to the EU, passages though the US-Mexico border, or 
the coasts of Indonesia and Miami known as the corridors of deaths (Doty, 2011; Squire, 2017; Vogt, 
2018), where migrants’ physical deaths are registered almost daily. For instance, almost 20,000 
persons were reported drowned or missing in the Mediterranean Sea since 2014 (IOM, 2020a). 
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However, although Youssef’s story does not match to large numbers of corpses and South-Eastern 
Europe is excluded from the narratives of migrants’ corridors of death, I believe that his story signifies 
something fundamental: how truly harming and devastating the force of border violence is embedded 
in moments when at first sight nothing special is happening at the borders. Feminist calls for 
investigation of personal - private sites and concrete and local practices - as political underline this 
(Enloe, 2011). Indeed, Youssef’s story shows how the men’s ordinary events, which are not noticeable 
as violent – daily decisions, relations, routines, and rituals at the borders, can result in the 
extraordinary – severe harms and death. Hence, I open this chapter with Youssef’s story because it 
shows the most powerful efficiency of border violence that stems from its saturation of daily worlds 
(Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004); for both surviving and dying migrants. In line with this, the 
following section will question how the everyday violence is constructed and experienced through the 
routinisation of diverse forms of harms, before moving onto the discussion of how it affects the men’s 
daily relations, rituals, and routines. 
10.3: ‘Today no beatings, only slaps to my face’: Routinisation of violence 
What is firstly vital to discuss is how violence passes as normal from abnormal and consequently 
permeates the everyday practices and things. It is not surprising that violence for many of my 
participants had entered their lives long before coming to the border, during wars and persecutions in 
their home countries. As a consequence of their daily circulation within attacks, conflicts, and 
struggles, the men did not only exhibit injuries, diseases and physical pain, but also the symptoms of 
stress and psychological disorders. Some were seen to shake and expressed that they felt fear and 
anxiety. The men also regularly complained that they could not sleep, had nightmares, urinated 
themselves while sleeping, or hallucinated. These problems had little ease due to non-existent access 
to psychological aid, although migrants often developed strong support networks amongst 
themselves, together with various aid providers. 
The men commonly lived in such emotional distress and physical pain for months or years that their 
long-term exposure to various harms was impacting not only their bodies and minds, but also their 
social realities as positioned in violence and its understanding. The accumulation of harms in their daily 
lives particularly shifted their individual and collective understanding of violence. I noticed that many 
were slowly reconstructing and reframing how they perceived the world around them at the border. 
The line was shifting for many between what was violent and what was not, what was worthy of 




The individual’s subjective perception and experiences of (border) violence were particularly 
dependent on their time spent in Kladuša, in Bosnia, on their migratory journey, and their previous life 
in conflicts in home countries. Those who had just met with oppression and physical aggression and 
who lived for short periods in the deprivation of the camps were shocked and considered such 
experiences as unacceptable. They mostly wished to stand against violence by speaking about it, when 
seeking the attention of other camp inhabitants or volunteers. In contrast, the men who had been 
living at the border for months or years mostly understood violence as unavoidable and not anymore 
worth paying any special attention to. They treated various episodes of harms as normal, which 
resulted in their passivity and acceptance of violence and their reluctance to report a push-back or 
speak about it. This idea of how (border) violence becomes, after some time, routinised is illustrated 
by the following conversation between Vasid, a man from Pakistan, who approached me to report his 
first push-back, and two Afghani boys, Nouman and Musa, for whom (border) violence had become 
ordinary: 
‘Good morning. My name is Vasid. I came from Pakistan. I am a teacher and yesterday I was pushed 
back, which was horrible because I walked for three days in the jungle (forest).’ Vasim was almost out 
of his breath and looked terrified, while standing in front of me and firing off his story. But before I was 
able to answer anything and tell him to sit down, Nouman and Musa, who were standing by, jumped 
in: ‘Three days? We walked for twelve days to Italy and were pushed back. This is normal my friend!’ I 
saw a bored expression in their faces. They were possibly hearing such stories every day in their squat 
and around the town and therefore struggled to understand Vasim’s surprise and shock that the first 
push-back had brought to his life. But Vasim was hurt by their reaction and started shouting and slowly 
weeping: ‘No, this is not normal. This is not normal! I am not animal. I am a human and this is not 
normal!’ Nevertheless, the conversation continued in the same manner, when Nouman in a passive 
voice insisted on his perception of the world at the border as violent as usual and continued trivialising 
Vasim’s experience: ‘No, my friend you are here and this is normal - beatings, push-backs. Look around. 
This is normal!’ But for Vasim, who just arrived in Kladuša and had never been subjected to police 
violence and life in a makeshift camp before, this was not normality: ‘I refuse to take this as normal. It 
will never be normal!’ 
The brief exchanges between those adjusted to violence and one shocked by it, offers an insight into 
various narratives that I was hearing across several months. It is important to expand on this and point 
out that Nouman and Musa came from Kandahar (Afghanistan), a province under the control of the 
Taliban. Furthermore, at the time of this conversation, they had been living in squats at various border 
locations in Serbia and Bosnia for two years. Both Musa and Nouman told me about seeing bomb 
explosions and deaths in their home countries, which had now transformed into less dramatic forms 
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of violence for them at the border. Similarly, a different Afghani boy, who was observing an inter-
communal fight between two men with knives in the camp, turned around and said: ‘This is not 
problem. Knives are not problem. (In) Afghanistan, bombs are problem’, and smiled. 
 
Indeed, many other men came from countries and geopolitical areas that have/had been stroked by 
bombings, wars, religious and political persecutions, such as Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Pakistan, Libya, and Iran. They were daily in touch with their home environments, following the news 
about new explosions, reading messages about people arrested by governments, and following videos 
of corpses being pulled out from ruins in their towns, hoping not to recognise any of their relatives. 
Furthermore, many pointed out during conversations that they had been abused or attacked by state 
authorities or human smugglers while travelling before reaching Bosnia. Hence, (border) violence was 
not a new phenomenon for many migrants as noted by Vogt (2018) in her research with Central 
American migrants crossing Mexico. Hence, migration journeys are embedded in the movement from 
violence to violence (Bank et al., 2017). Migrants’ past subjection to various harms cannot be omitted 
in an understanding of border violence as this shapes their experiences of it, routinisation and 
normalisation in daily life at the borders. As showed here, long-lasting exposure to violence became 
for many part of normal habitus, which defines violence as everyday phenomenon (Ginty, 2014). This 
violence is unexceptional (Enloe, 2011), it does not surprise anymore as it is expected in any minute of 
the day. For this reason, reaction to such violence are marked with rejection or even boredom, framing 
this violence as unimportant, as remarks by Nouman and Musa indicate. 
 
Yet the men’s intersubjective understanding of border violence and its saturation of daily life at the 
border also depended on their intimate histories, for example of their childhood. I began to understand 
the significance of this after I met Milan, a skinny man in his early forties. Milan was a father of two 
daughters, who with their mother were waiting for him in Bangladesh. Milan was sitting on a mattress 
in his tent, with knees under his chin when telling me about his push-back. He was so polite and kept 
calling me madam in his quiet voice. He explained to me that the reason why the baton blows to his 
head had been so terrifying for him was not due to the physical pain these were causing, but the shock 
and the sudden disorder that had come to his life he’d associated with them. He had no previous 
experience with such or any other physical aggression before. Milan broke into tears when he said: 
‘My father and my mother, they never hit me. They never touched me.’ His distress, so clearly evident 
in this uttered sentence, showed that the line between what is terrifying does not depend on mere 
pain or somatic experience of violence, bounded in time and place. Instead, it depends on an 
individual’s socio-politico-economic situation(s) in their world (dis)order (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 
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2004), more precisely in this case, the transformation of the line between order and disorder that is 
bounded in intimate relationships. 
 
While the men’s previous lives had an impact on their experiences at the borders, I encountered that 
the line between the men’s perceptions of violence as shocking and normal was slowly shifting 
throughout their time spent in Kladuša. Since Vasim left a few weeks after our first interaction and I 
lost contact with him, I never found out if he fulfilled his promise that ‘violence was never going to be 
normal for him’. I hope that he did not have to test his promise anymore and escaped to peace. 
Similarly, Milan left after a few months to a camp in Bihać to seek the help of a smuggler and I lack 
knowledge of the continuation of his journey. However, I observed the transition of understanding, 
experiencing and narrating violence, particularly with my closest participants. When I first met 
Mohammed, Rashid, Tahir, and Sajid in the summer, I saw they were angry. They were shouting while 
complaining about the attacks, the loss of their passports and phones during the push-back, their 
return to the Trnovi camp, and the lack of medical attention. ‘Fuck Croatian police! Fuck them! Fuck 
them!’ At the end, Mohammed said: ‘I want to go back to Syria. There, maybe a bomb will fall on my 
house one day. But here, the war is every day. Every day, I am beaten at the border and live in the 
war.’ 
 
However, as the time passed, I noticed how all became adjusted to the world where they had become 
stranded. Six months later I got a call from Tahir after one week of not knowing where he had been: 
‘Karolina, deport! I am walking back (laughing). No beating, everything is good. Only (the police) stole 
my money and broke phones. Everything is ok.’ This time, Tahir did not perceive the robbery and 
destruction of his phone as violent. His voice was calm, indicating acceptance or even expectation that 
violence was going to occur. If any physical aggression had not been used against him, he would have 
considered it as luck or an exception rather than the norm. I routinely observed this process of 
movement of the line between what these men held to be violent and what was not during my 
fieldwork. As Mishra (2018) points out, the dichotomy between the mundane and extraordinary; and 
the normal and disturbed seem blurred in prolonged violence. 
 
This also illustrates the remark by an Afghani boy, whom I met briefly in the camp while he was arriving 
back from his twentieth attempt at the games: ‘Today, no violence, only slaps into my face.’ Avoiding 
perceiving the direct infliction of injuries within the structural oppression of border policies and rules 
as harming also impacted on the men’s reluctance to be medically treated. When injuries and diseases 
occurred in the camps some men refused to search for medical attention as being not worthy and 
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unimportant, but rather supressed their pain. The trivialisation or suppression of violence was also 
commonly accompanied by humour and laughter incorporated in the men’s stories about various 
struggles, attacks and tortures. For instance, Mahmoud said when describing his experience of the 
push-back29 that ‘he was laughing to him and his friends to make his tragedy (attack and push-back) 
easier.’ Others stopped acknowledging violence against them and around them, as not worth anymore 
being repeatedly talked about, trying to report or resist. Instead, they preferred silence and the 
invisibility of their own difficulties and traumas rather than complaints and attention. 
 
For me, this is evidence of how the men’s norms and rules sedimented over time after they had been 
taken out of their everyday context into a new one, in which violence became routinised and needed 
to be taken less seriously to make these harms easier to cope with and survive. Previous studies (Das 
et al., 2000; Green, 1994; Henriksen & Bengtsson, 2018; Hume, 2009; Nordstrom & Robben, 1996) also 
found that the verbal techniques of minimization within testimonies of abuse or silence suggest that 
violence has become internalised and normalised to cope with violence and be self-protected. 
Therefore, using trivialisation, acceptance, normalisation, suppression of violence and humour in 
everyday routinised life at the border functioned for men as coping mechanisms.  
 
When focusing on the routinisation of the direct and structural violence in an individual’s daily life, the 
division between these two overlaps and blurs (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004), and the 
assumption of a new level of normality appears (Žižek, 2009). In this new normality, the men stop 
tirelessly keeping track of diverse forms of violence, their beginning and end, space and perpetrator(s). 
Violence stops being temporal as counted in separated events, which Arendt (1970) defines as random 
and unexpectable occurrences that interrupt routine processes and procedures. Instead, violence 
permeates daily life as insignificant and unavoidable (Scheper-Hughes, 1992). This new level of 
normality enabled the men to prevent their (physical and psychological) exhaustion, to stand up and 
try to cross the border again. 
 
However, this does not mean that the men stopped being aware of the imminence of violence or that 
fear in their lives disappeared. It is vice versa, as Green (1994, p 231) argues: ‘Routinisation of violence 
is what it fuels its power. Such routinisation allows people to live in a chronic state of fear with a façade 
of normality.’ Indeed, violence is at work where it is at least apparent (Enloe, 2011). This means that 
within the routinisation of violence, the men re-constructed and re-interpreted their understanding of 
violence from shocking to ordinary. Importantly, I observed that this transformation of violence into 
 
29 Ibid, Chapter 8.2, p 110. 
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everyday life also shifted the men’s perception of themselves in the world, affecting their relations and 
daily routines, as the following sections outline further. 
10.4: ‘Who am I?’: Change of subjectivities, relations and routines within border violence. 
10.4.1: Change of subjectivities. 
Transformation of the line between what is violent and what is not also affects one’s social realities, 
shifting a man’s understanding of himself as well as his position in the world. When the assumptions 
of violence become routinised and normalised, the questions of ‘Who am I?’ commonly appears 
together with the confusion whether this ‘new me’ is compatible with the original me and my values, 
as the following data will show. 
Firstly, I noticed how living with everyday violence affected the men’s understanding of their physical 
bodies. They often showed me their portrait photos on phones, capturing their physical appearance 
before violence had been triggered in their lives, pointing to various bodily changes that violence had 
caused; loss of weight and muscles, change of skin colour, visible injuries, long nails, oily or grey hair, 
and dirty clothes. Due to these changes, the different participants described themselves as ‘less 
manly’, ‘ugly’, ‘like animal’, ‘not human’, ‘like some criminal’, ‘fighter’, ‘Other’. Even in the cases when 
I could not see any change in their looks, the men were persuaded about their physical transformation 
due to their encounters with violence. This is for example underpinned by the conversation with Ali, a 
20 year old journalist from Pakistan. Ali was sipping his coffee in his tent while showing me photos of 
him in Pakistan: ‘Look at me at this photo (showing a photo of him standing with his father in a 
restaurant, both dressed in suits) and look at me now. I was strong and looked good. But now, 
everything is gone. I am just animal for everyone.’ 
This shows how violence becomes embodied through the ordinary and everyday encounters in the 
camps (Acuto, 2014). The chaos, fear and violence infused throughout the men’s physical bodies 
(Nordstrom & Robben, 1996) or deformed their understanding of their own bodies, even when no 
visible changes appeared. Thus, the day-to-day experiences of violence made the men to learn a new 
truth about themselves, the one embedded in the ideology of border enforcements that framed the 
displaced men as ‘threat’, ‘criminals’ and ‘Other’ (Fanon, 1961; Nieminen, 2019), which the insights 
into the men’s everyday understanding of themselves at the border allow us to trace. It shows us that 
violence does no only withhold migrants’ life giving items, but also withholds their self-identity 
(Farmer, 2009). I further observed how this transformation impacted the men’s understanding of 
themselves in the world around them, particularly their relations with others, which the following 
section aims to explore. 
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10.4.2: Shared realities and (intimate) relations. 
The somatic and/or mental transformation by violence had an impact on the men’s shared realities 
with families, friends, and other social and intimate relations. The men commonly explained how they 
would feel embarrassed at their appearance and for this reason, they wanted to avoid any contact 
with their families and friends in their home countries. ‘If my family sees me like this, I will feel shame’, 
Zamir an 18 years old boy from Iraq told me. ‘Look at my face, I am so skinny. Look at my clothes. I look 
horrible. The last time I called my mother, she was crying because I lost weight.’ In this way, Zamir 
explained why he had cut contact with his mother. Many other men interrupted their communication 
with their loved ones for the same reason, besides often having either a damaged or no phone. 
Previous research in the Calais camp found similar findings when displaced people commonly said ‘I 
don’t want my mother to see me like this’ when journalists tried to take photos of them (Davies et al., 
2017, p 1271). 
However, the new understanding of their bodies, as re-constructed within their life in violence, also 
impacted the men’s social relations at the borders. On the one hand, the men often established the 
strong bonds amongst themselves necessary for cooperation during the games and survival in camps. 
On the other hand, I noticed how some struggled to begin communicating with or establishing relations 
with the non-displaced population based on the assumption that the men’s worlds deviated from their 
normality. Particularly, these men recounted that they were scared to make new friendships or 
romantic relationships due to their appearance, which they believed carried visible signs of violence. 
For instance, Hamed, a young Tunisian man, told me that he had been invited by volunteers and local 
people to come to their private house for a dinner. When I asked him why he had decided not to go, 
he said that he was scared of feeling discomfort: ‘I am not like them. I look bad and my situation is bad. 
I would not feel comfortable.’ On another occasion, the same participant told me: ‘I would never invite 
any woman even for a coffee like this. I look horrible.’ Other men also mentioned their reluctance to 
leave the camp and squats and try to establish new relations. They mainly worried about their ‘bad’ 
physical appearance, upon which they could be recognised as ‘migrants’ and rejected, besides being 
harassed by police and refused in public spaces. 
There was one more intimate relation that was violated by border violence, perhaps, the most 
important for many: their relationship with God. Most of the men were Muslims, and many struggled 
to follow their religion in the living conditions of the camps. The vast majority of the men across camps 
were not seen to pray and remarked that they could not follow their religion due to the dirty 
environment they lived in and disruption of their minds by stress and violence. Violation of religious 
practices within daily life at the border was particularly visible in the time of Ramadan. The men were 
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supposed to give up water, food and cigarettes during the hours of daylight for thirty days. Many 
refused to fast as Islam allows exceptions for people, who were physically or mentally unwell: ‘I am 
very sad that I cannot fast. This makes me feel like not me. Every year, I say, hopefully, I will be safe 
next year, and I can do Ramadan. But I can’t.’ Farhan told me. Other men pointed that they had limited 
access to food and needed to get strong for the games, and hence, refused to fast. Those, who decided 
to fast, sometimes spoke of the nausea as their bodies were too weak to cope with the absence of 
food that was already limited. Proliferation of violence into religious practices became not only linked 
to health problems but also death, as indicated in the story of Youseff30, who was fasting, but his body 
was in pain from following the religious ritual. To be able to continue to fast, Youssef took a large 
amount of medication, that he was addicted to, and died. This shows that the men’s religious practices 
were disrupted, disabled or turned into harm within the everyday cycle of border violence. While in 
one case the consequence was death, in most cases the consequence was the absence of religion in 
the men’s lives. Not being able to practice religion led to the absence of their core traditions and 
values, which the religion carried, as well as the ‘absence of oneself’, as Farhan stated. 
The men often considered these diverse absences of intimate relations as the main issue when they 
were comparing their lives in the time of peace versus the one struck by (border) violence. One night, 
I was sitting with Rosalinde in the Helicopter Place near to a fire and drinking chai prepared by the 
Afghan men, who had been living in this empty plane hangar. The men were discussing various issues 
related to their life at the border and I was surprised when they concluded that ‘they did not mind 
having no house, no money and feeling pain but they mind having no love, which they had in the past.’ 
Although a lack of intimacies may seem to be less important than acts of physical aggression, this 
shows that communication and relations with other people and God are what made the men attached 
to their original values, norms and life in peace. 
The data here thus confirms the argument by Lazreg, (2008) and Nieminen (2019), who suggest that 
the aim of violence is not simply to cause pain but to destroy the person’s world as he knows it, damage 
his capacity to create shared realities, and  end their values. In line with this, I argue that the damage 
of self-perception, the absence of shared realities and (intimate) relations and religious rituals are truly 
harming rather than visible episodes of aggressions or state oppression. This has been previously also 
observed by Latif (2012), who argued that violation of the production of everyday life in Palestinian 
camps (distorted family values and daily habits), caused by diverse manifestations of violence, inflicted 
more harms for the refugees than their previous experiences of war (direct violence and killing). The 
founder of the concept of everyday violence, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) similarly argue that 
 
30 Ibid, Chapter 10.2, p 147-148. 
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such everyday social processes have power to destroy humans with even greater frequency than 
painfully graphic and transparent state repressions. This is indeed a powerful argument, which 
however, needs further exploration. For this reason, the following section will delve further into how 
the destruction of the everyday impacts not only on one’s intimate relations and shared realities, but 
also daily practices that people are not allowed to pursue due to the violence happening in the 
background of the everyday. 
10.4.3: Decisions and routines. 
Violence also impacts individual’s decisions and routines when the new level of normality is 
established, the one that deviates from what a person used to know. Seemingly, normality was 
restored during the time of solidarities in camps, when people shared food, drank coffee, told each 
other stories, joked, and played football. While these moments seemed calm, they did not diminish 
violence that was pervasively present but hidden under these routines, as Acuto (2014) suggest there 
are pieces of peace in violent times. Various mundane moments, conversations, plans, routines and 
times of fun seemed to carry the weight of border violence. Even children’s games carried violence, 
when one group was pretending to be Croatian police and another refugees in the game, fighting each 
other with guns made of wood. Similarly, in an English class an eleven years old girl, Arika, from Iran 
started by asking a question on how to translate ‘injury’. These children’s games show us that violence 
is also quotidian yet carry dramatic and visible experiences of violence that translate into these 
ordinary games and times of fun, and thus cannot be side-lined in the analysis of violence (Mishra, 
2018). 
Moreover, when people seemed to forget about violence, they were quickly reminded by the sound 
of a gunshot from the nearby border or new injuries to see in the camp. These delivered the message 
that if one crosses the arbitrary line (of the border), the consequences are well known (Green, 1994). 
Such scenes generalised violence in the daily life of people through an atmosphere of fear and worry, 
which were omnipresent. Fear became the reality in which the men lived in a hidden state of 
emergency’ and that was factored into the choices they made daily (Nordstrom & Robben, 1996), as 
shown in the following field diary excerpt. 
I was standing in the showers, picking up used razors from the ground after the men had shaved, and 
throwing them into a bin. Suddenly, I could hear a bike being ridden very fast behind the fence. It was 
Sajid on a child’s bicycle, which he had found by rubbish bins in the town. The bike was tiny, its tyres 
had almost no air and Sajid’s large body riding it was something funny to see. He was cycling so fast, 
screaming and laughing: ‘Vaaaaaaah! Look at me!’ When he stopped, I asked him what he was doing 
the whole day: ‘Nothing. (Went to) medina (town in Arabic), smoke, eat. Waiting for call, but nothing’. 
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It was one week on from the departure of his three friends to the game. Sajid did not only worry about 
his friends, but also about his own plans, which were dependent on their success or failure. If they 
were able to pass the game to Italy, Sajid was going to follow the same trail. If they were caught and 
pushed back, they all had to start planning from scratch, search for a new smuggler, get more money, 
and spend more time in the Trnovi camp. While talking to me, Sajid kept holding his phone. He pressed 
a button to check if someone had called. But there was nothing. 
Through the description of Sajid’s day, I wish to illustrate how the mundane lives at the borders were 
usually permeated by violence and fear. It may seem that Sajid was not doing more than playing 
around and being bored. However, all these activities were managed by waiting for violence. Although 
violence was routinised, Sajid was waiting to find out whether the events of police attacks and push-
backs were going to appear again and destroy his plans. All his limited choices, plans and routines were 
dependent on the uncertain and unpredictable nature of this violence. This left him no option other 
than to wait for a call, a message, a sign, or a rumour. It is this mixture of fear, unpredictability and the 
ordinariness of ruptured routines, which Mishra (2018) considers as violence emerging in the everyday 
and which is also illustrated at the border. 
Similarly, other men often said they had to spend their days waiting, before departing for games. ‘I 
was planning to go tomorrow (to the game)’, Hamed told me when meeting him in the main square. 
‘But I was waiting to see how many people were going to be pushed back. Today, I saw a man with 
broken skull. It was horrible, so much blood. It really scared me. I will wait longer.’ This shows that 
waiting was a fundamental part of the life at the borders when planning out future days. A previous 
study in the Lesvos Islands (Iliadou, 2017) found that waiting in perilous conditions of camps with little 
resources and certainty became a fundamental feature of border violence, as the time moves slowly 
and inflicts enduring pain to people. However, waiting at the borders for extended periods became 
routinised and perceived as ordinary rather than shocking, albeit, managed by fear, rumours, and signs 
of violence around. 
10.4.4: Re-production of violence against oneself or others in informal camps. 
The routinised and daily violence presented in the previous sections allows us to re-think the effects 
of the diverse forms of more visible direct and structural violence. The men’s enclosure in the daily 
violent processes, events, and landscapes affected their (intimate) relations, routines and waiting in 
an atmosphere of fear. I also encountered that the machinery of violence during the days spent at the 
borders slowly eroded the men’s identities by shifting their behavioural patterns into new harming 
ones. I particularly observed that border regimes gave rise to new types of harms, such as alcohol and 
drug abuse, self-harm, and inter-communal fights. Harms or deaths resulting from this violence are 
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however often considered as random, one’s own fault, non-violent or natural, as Youssef’s story 
showed, and thus are excluded from the discussion on border violence. These harms excluded any 
external perpetrators, only the men themselves were to see and blame as perpetrators of their own 
or others’ displaced bodies, when using excessive amount of medications, cutting their own veins or 
fighting in the camps. However, Galtung argues (1969) that violence breeds violence. In line with this, 
I argue that the actions and rules of border regimes had bred the new types of violence that occurred 
in the migrants’ community, as illustrated in the following and the last section. 
It was a day of hot summer weather, and I was driving water to the Helicopter Place. When I arrived, I 
saw Ahmed with an axe in his hand cutting wood after which he fell. He stood up but looked like he 
was struggling to keep his balance. He was just standing there with is eyes fully focused on the wood. 
I called his name, but it seems like he was in a different world. ‘Too much tramadol and diazepam 
today,’ his friend Pasha told me. A few hours later I again saw Ahmed but this time he was vomiting 
near the showers and then lying on the ground. I walked to him and asked if he needed any help. We 
had a short conversation when I asked him why he was taking drugs every day. ‘Life on diazepam is 
better than the real one that is fucked’, he responded. Ahmed was not alone in this respect and I began 
to notice how many other men started using drugs after months of living in Kladuša. A few minors and 
young adults explained that this was their first time separated from their families, culture and control. 
For this reason, they wanted to try marijuana or alcohol as an experiment. However, extensive and 
long-term drug and alcohol abuses were mostly interconnected with the cycle of border violence, as 
Abbih, a 17 year old boy from Syria, explained: ‘Many people take pills, mostly strong anti-depressants. 
It is easy, one pill costs 10 euros and you don’t need any prescription. I think it is dangerous, but we 
take it because if you take it, you can forget about where you are.’ 
When the weather was getting colder and the chances of crossing the border decreased, I noticed that 
drug abuse escalated. Sometimes it seemed that the majority of those entering the restaurant to have 
food and change their clothes were moving slowly and struggling to keep their balance. Their eyes 
were half-closed, and they mumbled when someone attempted to communicate with them. Others 
acted aggressively or tried to self-harm, while admitting that they had used opioids or large amounts 
of anti-depressants. When the misuse of medications and drugs increased, so did the inter-communal 
fights and attempts at suicide. Men also said they took drugs in the games to avoid feeling pain in their 
muscles while walking for days or weeks or if the police attacked them. This shows that the men mostly 
used drugs to ‘forget’, as Abbih described, or escaped to a ‘better world’ pointed to by Ahmed, or ‘not 
to feel pain’ in the games, which indicates the complex chain effects of the day-to-day subjection to 
border violence. In a precarious life, one only has limited choices to escape, cope with violence and 
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survive. This, however, led to an even more complicated assemblage of violence, although with no 
external perpetrator were to see or blame. 
Amongst these new patterns of violence, as re-produced within the life in violence, there is also the 
use of aggression against others as the means of protection of one’s self, friends or family. In many 
cases, aggressive behaviour – whether attacking someone, fighting or in one case a murder - were 
related to drug abuse. However, the men also wanted or used violence against another person - 
migrant, smuggler, or police officer, if they felt in danger, based on the assumption that this was the 
only means of self-protection or justice. One night, I was teaching Amira, Jamal and their older brother 
Ali English in their tent. They all came from Deir ez-Zor, a city in Syria controlled for three years by ISIS. 
Suddenly, they all stopped repeating words written in their notebooks, when hearing shouts from the 
nearby tents. Ali and Amira stood up and ran there. Jamal took my hand and started pulling me close 
to the place, from where the shouts were coming. We saw a man lying on the ground with blood 
pouring from his belly. He had been stabbed by another person who had accused him of stealing his 
money and phone. When other men separated the fight and the injured man was transported to a 
hospital, we went back to the tent. We started reflecting upon what had just happened and I remarked 
that it was horrible this man was stabbed. But Jajama, 17 years old and younger than her siblings, 
disagreed with me: ‘In Deir ez-Zor, my father always said to Ali: ‘You have to go and fight if you feel in 
danger and no one else is there to protect you’. 
What this reveals is an absence of state protection, which Davies et al. (2017) itself describes as 
violence against migrants. This is accompanied by fear and a lack of belief in the police as the main 
security organ that impacts individuals’ and the collective’s means of gaining safety, when the only 
option to respond to violence is violence. As a result, the people’s solution to robberies, threats, 
conflicts, financial exploitation, and attacks was not to call the police but to fight for themselves. To be 
protected, the men also relied on their friends or national groups, with whom they travelled or lived 
in the camps. They were looking after each other and guarding each other, particularly the women, 
children and minors. Within this new social network of protection throughout the journey, violence 
functioned as the last but sometimes the only option to stay safe. Similarly, few men said that they 
tried to stand against a smuggler who stole their money: ‘We want to search for him and get our money 
back and we beat him if necessary. We cannot call police as they do nothing because we are migrants, 
and he is smuggler.’ This signifies that migrants used violence to re-establish social order and their 
environment, which had been violated or destroyed by border enforcements in the first place. 
However, such protection often had minimal effects or led to a continuation of violence, when the 
other side also responded with force and brutality. At the end of this violent cycle, migrants mostly 
ended up harmed. As Stanley and Jackson (2016) suggest, mundane rhythms in the camps can be 
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reconfigured as sites where violence is not only produced but also reproduced, as showed in alcohol 
and drug addictions, self-harm and inter-communal violence. 
10.5: Conclusion. 
The analysis pursued in this chapter discussed how the experience of violence is woven into the fabric 
of migrants’ everyday lives while living at the border. In doing so, this chapter revealed the scale and 
nature of border violence beyond the direct physical aggression and the withdrawal of state support 
and unwraps the last, and the most crucial, angle of border violence presented in this thesis – the 
everyday violence, which presents an academic blind spot on violence, borders, and migration in 
Europe. 
 
I began this chapter by detailing the story of Youssef and his everyday life in Kladuša across eight 
months of our contact, until his death. It was highlighted that Youssef died in a moment when ‘nothing 
special’ was happening at the border, and thus state authorities proclaimed his death as non-violent. 
Yet his life was scored by extraordinary violent events, as is the case with most migrant men in Kladuša. 
I then turned to trace how diverse forms of violence blurred into the ordinary moments of the day and 
eventually caused severe harms and death. 
 
This evidence was set out by the discussion of how the migrants collectively constructed and 
experienced the border violence through routinisation of diverse forms of harms at the borders. By 
spending a longer time at the borders and conflict zones, the men were more likely to accept violence 
as the part of their everyday. As the result of this, the men were supressing or minimising violence, 
which allowed them to better cope with the violence, yet, these also normalised violence and erased 
its marks. In agreement with Beck (2011), it is the routinisation of violence which fuels its power to re-
establish order and transform the social environment of borders rather than as a means to pursue 
particular ends. It is this taken-for-granted dimension of violence that turns it into phenomenon that 
goes without saying and makes border violence unnoticeable and depoliticised (Acuto, 2014). 
As another important aspect of violence being woven into the everyday, I observed that the men were 
shifting their understanding of themselves over time. Violence significantly deformed their 
understanding of their own bodies, even when no visible changes appeared. As a result of this, the 
men struggled to maintain their (intimate, family, religious) relations or were reluctant to establish 
new ones. Consequently, many interrupted contacts with their loved ones, stopped practising their 
religion and socially isolated themselves. Finally, the significance of violence to the everyday was 
outlined by the focus on migrants’ daily decisions and routines. I argued that the fear and worries of 
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violence were factored into the men’s daily choices, whether to wait or go in the game. Moreover, 
new types of violence against oneself or others had occurred in the camps, such as taking drugs to 
escape the physical and real world of violence or fighting with others as the last and the only option 
be protected at the borders. 
To draw conclusions from these empirical encounters, I argue that Youssef’s death was not random or 
resulting merely from his irresponsible behaviour. Instead, he and other migrant men died of living a 
daily life stranded in circulation between the countless violent episodes taking place over time, which 
were defined as truly harming and devastating, rather than singular events of extraordinary physical 
direct attacks or more structural violence, such as withdrawal of state support. To this end, I suggest 
that we can illuminate central practices at the heart of violence through the everyday, as also argued 
by feminist literature that points out that personal is political and international (Enloe, 2011; 
Guillaume, 2011). 
This chapter thus revealed that the everyday matters in understanding violence for several reasons. 
Firstly, considering social dimensions and the everyday, the men assign to diverse violent episodes 
painful and terrifying meanings rather than the somatic experiences of pain alone, as argued by 
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004). Border violence becomes truly harming upon the destruction of 
the person’s world as he knows it, values it and relates to it through social contacts. These findings 
thus provide ethnographic insights into border violence in Europe, which has not yet been  examined 
before, but various ethnographers highlighted it in conflict zones (Das et al., 2000; Ferrándiz, 2004b; 
Green, 1994; Lazreg, 2008; Morar-Vulcu, 2015; Nieminen, 2019; Nordstrom & Robben, 1996; Quesada, 
2004; Vigh, 2011). Secondly, the focus on the everyday captured the violence and its transformation 
across months and years as a process. This brings new insights on border violence and contributes to 
the literature on violence and migration in the European border context, where most studies tend to 
treat violence as events that come and pass. Thirdly, it is the everyday that turns to be the most 
harmful when leaving marks of violence that are not physical marks (Laurie & Shaw, 2018), and are 
thus not considered as border violence at all, as proclaimed by state authorities over Youssef’s death. 
This violence is everywhere but nowhere, affecting the migrants’ daily decisions and actions that harm, 
but no perpetrator is there to see or blame except the migrants themselves. The everyday, destroyed 
by violence yet not being considered as violent, thus allows migrants to disappear without a trace.  
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Chapter 11: Conclusion. 
11.1. Introduction. 
I have argued throughout this thesis that violence is at work in everyday practices, where violence is 
the last expected; in private sites, where violence is routinised and leaves no visible marks. This 
engagement with migrants’ encounters of violence in their day-to-day realities at the border allows 
me to explore border violence as an everyday phenomenon, while considering both direct and 
structural harms experienced by gendered and racialized migrants. By doing so, the study investigates 
border violence along the second major transit route for migrants to the EU - the so-called Balkan 
Route - with the focus on Velika Kladuša, the town sitting on the most north westerly point of the 
Bosnian border with Croatia. This concluding chapter draws together the major arguments from the 
thesis and discusses what we can learn about border violence here, its conceptualisation and empirical 
encounters. 
Since violence constitutes a key dimension of the migratory routes to the EU, this thesis shows that it 
is essential to understand this violence comprehensively by capturing its diverse forms and how these 
function as everyday processes and experiences across time. Such analytical approach has been 
undertaken predominantly by ethnographers (Nordstrom & Robben, 1996; N. Scheper-Hughes, 1992) 
in war zones and far-away non-European places, where crude attacks and killings take place by the 
side of structural violence. This research expands this ethnographic to violence against migrants at EU 
borders, where migration scholars predominantly examines violence against migrants as structural, 
indirect or frame this violence as state abandonment (Cuttitta, 2018; Murray, 2006; Squire, 2017; 
Stierl, 2018). Such understanding invites us to imagine border violence as a passive and separated out 
phenomenon from direct and crude attacks and concrete daily experiences violence. This also goes in 
line with a commonly held understanding that direct and concrete forms of vioence are not part of 
democratic and liberal territories, as the EU presents itself (Elias, 2001; Isakjee et al., 2020).  
This research also sheds light on border places where violence against migrants takes places, yet has 
not been researched but in this thesis, and poses a crucial question who is subjected to this violence, 
moving beyond a homogenous label ‘migrants’. The vast academic attention in migration and violence 
studies was gathered around sea routes to the EU, side-lining land routes. To address this research 
lacunae, this study was conducted at the latest transit at the Bosnian-Croatian border. Finally, there is 
almost not attention to race and gender as factors in tandem organising violence in European border, 
with the focus here on racialized migrant men, whom I found to be the most common victims of border 
violence in the context examined here. 
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This study is thus among the first to explore how both direct and structural forms of violence function 
in symbiosis at the Bosnian-Croatian borders, asking whom it specifically targets based on one’s race 
and gender, and seeks to what extent this violence organises their everyday life at the border. 
11.2. The methodology used in this research. 
To explore border violence at work in migrants’ private sites and everyday practices, I conducted eight-
month of militant ethnography research. This means that I was using participant observations together 
with direct political actions at the borders, employed in my role as a volunteer in makeshift camps. 
Firstly, these methods allowed me to access the migratory routes from inside the migrants’ community 
and map their evolution in the SEE region as dependent on unpredictable border violence, leading me 
to the latest transit spot at the Bosnian-Croatian border. My role as a volunteer proved a most suitable 
method to be daily present at the border with the migrants and learn about their diverse forms of 
violent experiences and the ways they culturally construct and experience them. 
As a second line of the research, I conducted 68 interviews with the migrants, questioning their 
experiences of games and push-backs to collect testimonies on direct violence, which I could not 
otherwise observe due to their unexpectable, clandestine and dangerous nature. The purpose of the 
interviews was however two-fold: academic and activist (evidence collection of police violence and 
public advocacy of victims), which is in line with militant research, when trying to make my research 
relevant to the migrants’ community (Apoifis, 2016; Juris, 2007). 
On the one hand, being a volunteer-researcher led to a strong rapport between me and my closest 
participants, our mutual support at the border, and my increase of safety while being in the field. This 
methodological approach thus mitigated my positionality as it allowed me to adjust my different 
gendered and cultural roles. Importantly, learning the basics of Arabic with my participants and 
reflecting with them on both extraordinary and ordinary events at the border also nuanced my 
knowledge on their experiences of violence, from their role as ‘men’ and ‘Arab Sunni Muslims’, across 
their past memories of wars and on to their plans for a better future. 
Nevertheless, I researched from a position of relative power, as on the other hand, I was able to leave 
the border without playing the ‘games’ and experiencing the push-backs, making our political locations 
unchangeable. Also, while my daily movement in the camp resulted in trust for some, it triggered 
suspicion for others. Finally, I argue that trying to ‘help’ with the research discovery is often on the 
edge of ‘doing harm’ in the quickly evolving violent fields, as demonstrated on the struggle to protect 
my participants’ privacy after publicly disseminating the evidence on border violence. Yet uncertain 
research practices and failures are part of knowledge production (Bøås & Bliesemann de Guevara, 
2020). By conceding these dilemmas of research in violent fields, I call for a transparent research 
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practice that keeps questioning with our participants and other practitioners what truly ethically 
committed research practice is, beyond ticking boxes of ethical approval. 
In the following part, I will move onto the thesis’ summary and discussion of its academic contributions 
in the existing literature. In the following section, I will closely draw a number of conclusions upon the 
migrants’ experiences of violence encountered at the Bosnian-Croatian borders. It will also point to 
unexplored avenues in this study to draw the basis for further research that could elaborate on this 
work. 
11.3. The summary of findings and the final discussion. 
The first conclusion to be drawn from this research relates to how violence against migrants is bounded 
in the micro context of Kladuša, lying at the border between Bosnia and Croatia. In Chapter 6 I argue 
that migratory journeys across Kladuša are framed along the Western popular imagination as journeys 
across a symbolic line between the Balkans and Europe, Islam and Christianity, violence and peace 
(Mishkova, 2008; Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004; Rexhepi, 2018). For instance, Frontex and EU policy makers 
commonly framed the migrants’ precarious living conditions in Bosnia as placed in the ‘Balkan Route’. 
The term ‘Balkans’, as Bird et al. (2020) and von der Brelie and Salfiti (2018) argue, is useful policy tool 
to designate the migratory journeys with chaos and criminal activity and offer subtle yet violent tools 
to fix it, which proved to be the case along the Bosnian-Croatian border. This thesis further shows that 
some European actors, such as a few volunteers, linked even more direct and devastating violence to 
a region-specific predicament, when seeing migrants’ injuries from border attacks in Bosnian camps. 
This Western popular perception of violence as something ‘inherently Balkan’ are not new 
(Hatzopoulos, 2003) and push the narratives about direct violence against migrants from the so 
considered liberal European states to Other places with wild and violent order (Bird et al., 2020; El-
Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019). 
The case of Bosnia particularly demonstrates this as the country is commonly ‘Balkanised’ within the 
EU political discourse, which echoes historians’ examination of the Balkans as barbarian and the 
opposite of the (self-)presentation of Europe (Todorova, 2009). For instance, Bosnia as the Balkan state 
has been accused as the home for militant Islam (Sarajevo Times, 2019), the local government(s) are 
considered as dysfunctional and in need of controlled by Brussels (Ahmetašević & Mlinarević, 2018; 
Rexhepi, 2018), and policy makers has called the country as the latest spot of the ‘Balkan Route’, when 
occupied by thousands of injured migrants residing in makeshift camps. This means that using the term 
Balkan is not only a policy strategy to displace migrants’ precarious living spaces out of the EU (Bird et 
al., 2020; El-Shaarawi & Razsa, 2019) . Instead, I suggest that the dominant EU policy narratives using 
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the ‘Balkan’ terminology invite us to imagine violence against migrants, including direct and crude 
attacks, as not surprising or even normally occurring in Bosnia (research data, p 80). 
Yet I problematise these assumptions about where Balkan and violence end and Europe and peace 
start by shedding light on how those living and migrating through this location make sense of this place. 
I show that the migrants phrased their journeys as games and rehla, the terms entangled in their 
experiences of violence when trying to move from Bosnia to Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, which merged 
into ‘one border between hell and heaven’ (research data, p 78). This violence in Croatia was surprising 
for many migrants and difficult to grasp due to its membership in the EU, which itself portrays as a 
humanitarian and democratic; language that proved to have power to conceal Croatia’s far-right 
tendencies (MacDowall, 2018) in a commonly held understanding. The migrants’ terminologies and 
experiences are thus distant from the dominant assumptions about Balkans and Europe and where 
violence takes place. By showing these examples, I excavate violence as being inflicted by the EU police 
guards in the EU, when injured bodies are then pushed out of the EU to its neighbourhood, such as 
Kladuša. 
Thus, the migrants’ language used at this border allows us to re-think where to locate violence in 
migration and call to shift our attention to states that represent themselves as liberal, and thus, 
culturally incompatible with such violence. Drawing upon Galtung (1990), I argue that it is Europe’s 
assumed incompatibility to use violence (i.e. the official rhetoric of transnational justice and 
humanitarian values) in contrast to the Balkan’s assumed common use of violence (i.e. recent Yugoslav 
wars), that are naturalised in the language, which legitimises the violence against migrants and allows 
it to continue with impunity. For this reason, I agree with scholars who recently called for need to 
consider ‘Balkans’ ambiguous position in Europe while understanding (violent) responses to migration 
(Bird et al., 2020; Isakjee et al., 2020; Trakilović, 2020). 
Whilst violence against migrants can be seen as part of Croatia’s struggle to find its rightful place in 
Europe (aspiring to join the Schengen Zone) (Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004), the data here shows that this 
is however also the case in Bosnia. I demonstrated this by narrating the closure of public services for 
the migrants, evictions of the makeshift camps, and harassments of migrants by the local police. Such 
practices have been also observed in other former-Yugoslav states, which scholars explain by the 
states’ aspiration to join the EU (Rexhepi, 2018). This means that on the one hand, SEE countries, such 
as Bosnia, are vulnerable to the vagaries of the changing social and political map of Europe (Razsa and 
Lindstrom, 2004), which are managed by violence against migrants handled by EU state authorities 
(i.e. Croatia). On the other hand, Bosnian authorities soon employed themselves violence against 
migrants. Yet this research does not examine whether and how this approach is managed by the EU 
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external border management (Andersson & Keen, 2019) or the country’s integration process in the EU, 
which calls for further examination. This research however contributes to the literature on migration 
in SEE region by portraying the migrants’ experiences of violence taking place alongside solidarities, as 
embedded in the local dynamics between migrants and the local residents and the historic-political 
context of this border. By doing so, this study is one of the first that examined the Bosnian-Croatian 
borders in today’s migration movements. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that violence is not only legitimised upon 
geographical locations and its symbolic meanings. Instead, violence is also legitimised against specific 
group of populations upon racialized and gendered ideologies (Galtung, 1990; Said, 1978) when those 
attacked by border police by batons and remained enclosed in makeshift camps were particularly Arab 
Muslim migrant men. Although browned-skinned women are considered to be the genuine victims of 
violence (Malkki, 1996; Razack, 2004) and refugees in need of protection and empowerment 
(Milivojević, 2018; Zavratnik & Krilić, 2018), such assumptions turned to be flawed in the border 
migration context examined here. Whilst women also experience violence (particularly sexual 
harassment) and they certainly need protection this does not mean that the men should be side-lined 
in migration policies as incapable of vulnerability or as always powerful agents, especially in times of 
violent conflict from which many had escaped, as it is generally expected from masculine roles 
(Myrttinen et al., 2017; Schulz, 2018). This critique was the point of departure for my analysis, when I 
argue that these commonly held understandings of gender and race proved to be dangerous at the 
border context examined here, racializing the men as Other migrants and a threat in need of violent 
interventions. 
For instance, in Chapter 7, I show that the ‘single’ men (travelling without women and children) are 
perceived by state authorities, humanitarian workers, the local residents as strong and independent 
upon the dominant assumption about masculine agency, which rendered them as invisible and side-
lined them from diverse forms of aid, as also pointed by Charsley and Wray (2015) elsewhere. Yet 
masculinity and virility together with racialized assumptions about Arab and Muslim male bodies as 
dangerous made the men as a visible threat during the ‘games’ and triggered the direct police attacks 
against them. Violence in the makeshift camps and ‘games’ was thus mainly experienced by racialized 
and gendered migrant men, who had set on these dangerous journeys to protect their families (women 
and children), as in line with their own assumptions of masculinity and for some, the notion that ‘men 
have to feel pain to be men’ (research data, p 94). 
To make sense of these tensions between collective and individual expectations to be a man and 
vulnerabilities in migration and violence, I follow the notion of racialization (Carr & Haynes, 2015). I 
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argue that the migrants’ skin colour, nationality and religion together with male gender presented a 
package to be a (terrorist, ex-combatant, sexual, backward) threat at the border and legitimised the 
use of violence against them. This signifies how border violence against Arab Muslim men is embedded 
in the local context of racism and gendered hierarchies. Assumptions such as, Christianity over Islam, 
Europeans over Arabs, white men over brown men, sanitise and legitimise this violence (Galtung, 1990; 
Said, 1978) when a Croatian border guard remarked to one of my participants: ‘we have orders to beat 
you all’ (research data, p 106). Yet I also take inspiration from the feminist literature on gendered and 
racialized violence (Butler, 2004a; Crenshaw, 1991; Harris, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 2006) to understand how 
‘all’ who the EU border guards have orders to beat is constructed from different social categories (Arab, 
Muslim, men, migrant). I suggest that cultural fantasies on race, gender and others social locations 
organise violence against specific groups of migrants in tandem, which proves to be the case in the 
context of border violence against men. 
By analysing the men’s gendered and racialized experiences of violence here, I contribute to the 
literature on race in migration (Bhui, 2018; Fanon, 1961; Kaya, 2016; Isakjee et al., 2020; Milivojević, 
2018; Pajnik, 2019; Razack, 2004; Turner, 2015), which shows that racial violence against migrants is 
inherent across Europe, as embedded in broader political projects across past and present day, such 
as colonialism and the war on terror. Yet I also argue that the men’s experiences of violence should 
not be peripheral in academic analysis of this racial violence to encounter both women’s and men’s 
experiences of violence and call for policies to pay attention to all migrants across their differences. By 
doing so, I contribute to an emerging literature on male migration (Charsley & Wray, 2015; Griffiths, 
2015; Turner, 2019). Importantly, I suggest that bringing the two streams of literature on race and 
gender into a dialogue has much to offer to engage with diversity of the migrants’ experiences of 
violence and understand racialized and gendered ideologies triggering this violence in the first place. 
Yet to do so, there is need to also encounter migrants’ ethnic, language, and cultural differences or 
class differences, as suggested by Harris (2000), which this research has omitted. This calls for future 
examination of how different (national, socio-economic, …) sub-groups of migrants experience 
violence and make meaning of it, which would elaborate on this work. 
A third conclusion is that violence against the migrants takes in both direct and structural forms, which 
I recognise while drawing upon Galtung (1969), who argues that structural violence takes place 
alongside direct violence and these two forms of violence needs symbiotic analysis. This point of 
departure is crucial here not only because I observed both direct and structural violence to take place 
at the Bosnian-Croatian border. Importantly, such analysis remains curiously absent in migration 
research, which predominantly analyses structural and indirect violence, examining border 
externalisation politics (Andersson & Keen, 2019) and smart border technologies (Bigo, 2014), or focus 
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on withdrawal of legal border crossing channels or aid in transit (Davies et al., 2017; Squire, 2017). Yet 
I argue that understanding of violence only through structural means is only partial response of what 
is happening at the EU’s borders, overlooking complexity of various harms at the Bosnian-Croatian 
border. 
For instance, whilst engaging with the migrants’ narratives of ‘games’ and push-backs in Chapter 8, I 
map the instances of perpetual direct and concrete police attacks against migrants and their 
possessions in Croatia and also, in Slovenia. This violence consists of extensive direct violent strategies, 
which in the migrants’ terms ranged from ‘combis’ when being left with lack of oxygen in closed police 
vans, to severe beatings by batons while crossing a ‘tunnel’ made of police officers, ‘tortures’ by 
electronic devices and shootings. These police strategies develop across time, in line with the official 
rhetoric of the EU’s combat of human smuggling operations and alongside the deployment of visible 
smart border and military technologies (drones, helicopters) at the border and new ‘commando’ 
border units. Yet, this violence also transformed across the season of the year, when police used 
weather to substitute their weapons (i.e. forcing migrants to walk naked in snow or enter freezing 
rivers), as it is in the Mediterranean, where dangerous sea environment (Schindel, 2019) substitutes 
direct attacks. Among the most common strategy also belonged the destructions of the migrants’ 
phones and theft of their possessions which they needed for survival, thus, inflicting harms on their 
bodies across time. 
Majority of migrants whom I met in Bosnian camps told me to experience or observe these strategies 
of the direct violence, which shows that this violence is not random, anomalous, or an unintended, as 
pointed in study on direct violence along the U.S.-Mexico border (Vogt, 2018). Neither direct violence 
against migrants are mere dramatic occurrences that do not need academic attention, as suggested 
by some scholars (Jeandesboz, 2014; Žižek, 2009). Instead, the destructions of migrants’ possessions, 
beatings by batons or even incidents that portray practices of torture construe intended and organised 
military border tactics that articulate the policing spaces of land borders in the EU. Yet the direct 
infliction of pain is allowed to happen due to structural organisation (military and smart border 
techniques and cross-national combat of smuggling) and deployment of concrete perpetrators by the 
state (commandos), which highlights how direct violence is symbiotic with structural violence. The case 
of the Bosnian-Croatian border especially shows that direct attacks are called into an action when 
structural violence (closed legal and safe border crossings), crumbles (Galtung, 1969). This 
distinguishes the migratory routes along land borders from sea borders, where closed legal channels 
resulted in unauthorised border crossing through dangerous space of water (Schindel, 2019), where 
migrants get harmed or die with no need of direct police violence. 
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Yet the interplay between direct and structural violence is not bounded only in police attacks, but also 
in administrations in police stations during the push-backs and then, the ongoing life in the makeshift 
camps, as I showed in Chapter 9. This structural violence was illustrated on state authorities 
withdrawing the migrants’ possibilities of legal and material support – while denying them the right to 
claim asylum in EU (Croatia and Slovenia) and restricting their basic support (medical aid, shelter, 
hygiene, food, …) in the Trnovi camp in Bosnia. This violence did not appear to me as ‘indirect’ or 
managed by mere ‘abandonment’ of the state, as commonly conceptualised in the existing literature. 
Instead, I argue that this structural violence uses direct actions. For instance, police enforced 
administrative procedures on the men with the use of direct attacks. Also, diverse state authorities 
were present in the camps to enforce the ban of aid or directly destroy the camps, as observed in other 
migrants’ camps around Europe (Martin et al., 2019). This means that although the structural violence 
consists of highly ramified and anonymous chain (Andersson & Keen, 2019), I found concrete people 
(police/humanitarian workers) to appear at the end of this chain, who used direct actions. This 
highlights Galtung’s (1969) question whether there is even difference between direct and structural 
violence, when I suggest that these different manifestations of violence need relational analysis. 
To this end, I argue that political decisions, military and humanitarian technologies generate direct and 
concrete outburst of violence, which presuppose and reinforce each other in the migrants’ everyday 
at the border (Galtung, 1969). This is a conceptualisation that rejects border violence as a passive, 
subtle, or anonymous chain of structural decisions, which invites us to imagine this violence as 
accidents of EU’s border management. Instead, I suggest that border violence uses direct decisions and 
actions with the aim to lock migrants out of the EU territory (Galtung, 1969), but sometimes it uses 
crude and immediately harming means, and other times, it uses administrations, international rules 
and humanitarian actions that inflict pain across time. This full conceptual and empirical picture of 
border violence has been neglected in the existing literature (except Isakjee et al., 2020), which marks 
academic contribution of this study. 
A final and the most crucial argument of this thesis is that violence is often situated and made meanings 
of within the quotidian at the border, hidden in the migrants’ seemingly mundane situations of daily 
life. Following feminist scholars (Acuto, 2014; Crane-seeber, 2011; Enloe, 2011; Fernández et al., 2017; 
Ginty, 2014; Mishra, 2018; Stanley & Jackson, 2016), this thesis traces violence where it is at least 
apparent – in migrants’ private and concrete practices; while deciding whether to go in the game or  
wait in the camp, having fun, experiencing boredom, (not) socialising with others or praying. This thesis 
shows how these and more migrants’ personal encounters are political, and matter in understanding 
of violence, although they mostly leave no marks of violence. I engage with these migrants’ taken-for-
granted interactions, rituals and routines at the borders and problematise them to show how 
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seemingly innocent situations have power to harm and kill, as affected by direct and structural forms 
of violence taking place in the background. By doing so, this thesis has sought to engage with how 
personal matters in understanding violence (Acuto, 2014) and how violence is experienced in everyday 
life (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004), which makes anonymous chains of structural violence and 
clandestine border attacks operations concrete and intimate experiences. In this way, this thesis 
contributes to the literature on politics of the everyday life, which is puzzling in migration and violence 
research (Iliadou, 2019; Obradović-Wochnik & Bird, 2020; Vogt, 2018). 
In Chapter 10, I show that border violence has serious impacts on the migrants beyond their physical 
and psychological health by focusing on their day-to-day life. I demonstrate this on the migrants’ 
routinisation of violence across time spent in violent conflicts and at the border, which shifted their 
collective understanding of violence as ‘usual and normal’ (research data, p 150). I further observed 
that border violence significantly deformed the migrants’ understanding of their own bodies, even 
when no visible changes appeared. As the result of this, the men struggled to maintain their relations 
or were reluctant to establish new once, when violence was slowly destroying their intimate, family 
and spiritual connections to the world around them. The omnipresent fear was also woven to the 
men’s daily choices, such as daily thinking whether to go in the game or stay in the Trnovi camp longer 
as dependent upon rumours about new police attacks or new injured bodies to see around. As the 
result of this daily cycle in between attacks and struggles in the camps, many began taking drugs and 
inter-communal fights were common as the last and the only option be protected at the borders. These 
situations often ended in severe harms or deaths, yet ‘left no traces of violence’ (research data, p 147). 
By outlining these observations, I excavate violence at work in private sites, which would otherwise 
stay unnoticeable or deemed as unimportant in understanding of violence and depoliticised (Acuto, 
2014). For this reason, I attempt to track violence as taking place when ‘nothing special is happening 
at the border’, outside of dramatic events, when no perpetrators are to see but migrants. The everyday 
realities at the border make this violence as an ongoing social process in between direct attacks against 
migrants and their withdrawal of legal support in makeshift camps. If we consider these examples of 
violence in everyday life more broadly, as embedded in direct and structural violence taking place 
within the EU border protections, I argue that they are no accidents, no causalities, nor self-afflicting 
harms. Instead, I observed how migrants ended up in these daily situations as the result of intentional 
and systematic direct and structural forms of violence. Migrants’ private sites thus shed a new light on 
border violence that challenges a common academic understanding of violence, which mostly start 
with state and structural forms of violence. 
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Illuminating everyday life at the border also allows us to learn about how migrants make meaning of 
border violence across time. I agree with ethnographers scrutinising violence in conflict zones 
(Nordstrom & Robben, 1996; Scheper-Hughes, 1992) and argue that it is not the horrifying bleeding 
wound or physical pain alone that gives violence its meaning and destroys a person. It is rather 
routinisation and domestication of this violence that matters for migrants as it maintains diverse forms 
of violence as an ongoing process, which slowly destroys what the migrants value and what connects 
them with the social world (family, friends, the local community, religious practices). In this way, 
violence becomes present during peaceful and playful moments, for instance when children re-play 
the ‘games’ and border attacks with humour in the camps (research data, p 158). Violence thus goes 
on without saying and with no visible marks, by the side of friendship, love and solidarities, which is 
crucial to highlight given that most migrants make their life at the border and experience violence 
there for months or years. 
Despite trying to unwrap the subjective and cultural meaning of the border violence, the 
conceptualisation here remains limited in the word ‘violence’ itself. While I have examined the ‘forms’ 
or ‘means’ how this violence takes places and is manifested in the day-to-day life, the root meaning of 
this word has not been in depth explored here. With a simple question ‘what is violence?’ to my 
participants, instead of immediately asking ‘in which forms does this violence take place?’ and ‘how is 
it lived?’, we could go into more detailed understanding of violence and consider the participants’ 
different expressions and phrasing for this phenomenon. Thus, more rigour could be assigned to the 
definition of ‘border violence’ for various sub-categories of migrants in future research when trying to 
conceptualise violence as a complex social phenomenon. 
When drawing conclusions from the empirical findings, let me lastly point out the most obvious point 
of this thesis: systematic use of diverse forms of violence against migrants at the EU’s land borders 
mapped in this thesis shows that violence does not stop migration movements, it does not save 
migrants’ lives, nor it effectively fights cross-border crime of human smuggling. These claims often 
made by Frontex, Croatian state authorities or the prominent EU Commission members thus proves to 
be wrong by the extensive evidence outlined in this thesis. This argument confirms that the violent 
border techniques are dysfunctional and harming and fatal for the humans in need of protection as 
mapped across borders stretching from the desert between the U.S. and Mexico (Doty, 2011; Martínez 
et al., 2014), passages through Africa (Mafu, 2019), the Middle East (Panico & Prestt, 2019), sea routes 
leading to Europe (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015), and land routes leading from Bosnia to 
Croatia examined here. 
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Whilst I have pointed out that contributions to the academic literature, these findings were also 
disseminated in media and in the form of policy reports to numerous policy makers and humanitarian 
organisations in the EU Parliament and Croatia and other EU states, where violence sits uncomfortably 
and is deeply problematic. It is impossible for me to search for the real impact of this policy and public 
outreach. However, I hope that it also marked this thesis’ contribution beyond academia when working 
in activist collectives to provide in-depth insights to border violence and proposing ways forward. 
Having information about border violence in its all forms and long-lasting impact on the migrants’ 
everyday life at the border could highlight how violence uses brutal force, which is directed by concrete 
people, decisions and state-technologies and how the EU-centred narratives about ‘Balkans’ and 
racialized and gendered migrants legitimise such violent outbursts. Importantly, the impacts of 
violence go beyond physical pain as it destroys one’s social world as he knows it. These all information 
about border violence needs to be considered when finding the ways how to stop and prevent violence 
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